本文選題：營(yíng)銷努力　切入點(diǎn)：創(chuàng)新能力　出處：《系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐》2017年12期

【摘要】：本文研究了一個(gè)由供應(yīng)商負(fù)責(zé)提升關(guān)鍵零部件性能的創(chuàng)新,制造商負(fù)責(zé)產(chǎn)品制造與銷售的供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作系統(tǒng),考慮當(dāng)營(yíng)銷努力水平和產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新程度同時(shí)影響需求時(shí),制造商激勵(lì)供應(yīng)商創(chuàng)新的決策行為.基于激勵(lì)方式的不同,構(gòu)建了三種激勵(lì)決策模型,探討不同情形下創(chuàng)新效應(yīng)和營(yíng)銷努力效應(yīng)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈成員決策影響的互動(dòng)機(jī)制.研究結(jié)果表明:產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新效應(yīng)是制造商激勵(lì)供應(yīng)商創(chuàng)新的內(nèi)在推動(dòng)機(jī)制,營(yíng)銷努力效應(yīng)在一定程度上推動(dòng)了創(chuàng)新活動(dòng)的發(fā)展;產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新效應(yīng)和營(yíng)銷努力效應(yīng)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈成員決策和利潤(rùn)有積極的影響;創(chuàng)新效應(yīng)和營(yíng)銷努力效應(yīng)聯(lián)合作用下,基于質(zhì)量批發(fā)價(jià)格契約制造商可以獲得較高的利潤(rùn),但此時(shí)供應(yīng)商創(chuàng)新水平較低甚至低于批發(fā)價(jià)格契約情形,繼而文章進(jìn)一步引入了成本分擔(dān)契約,并論證了成本分擔(dān)契約能夠使制造商獲得最優(yōu)收益,同時(shí)有效地激勵(lì)供應(yīng)商創(chuàng)新.
[Abstract]:This paper studies a supply chain operation system in which the supplier is responsible for improving the performance of the key components, and the manufacturer is responsible for the manufacture and sale of the product, considering that when the level of marketing effort and the degree of product innovation affect the demand at the same time,Manufacturer's decision-making behavior that motivates supplier innovation.Based on the different incentive modes, three incentive decision models are constructed, and the interactive mechanism of the influence of innovation effect and marketing effort effect on the decision making of supply chain members under different circumstances is discussed.The results show that: the product innovation effect is the intrinsic driving mechanism for manufacturers to stimulate supplier innovation, and the marketing effort effect promotes the development of innovation activities to a certain extent;The product innovation effect and the marketing effort effect have the positive influence on the supply chain member's decision and the profit, under the innovation effect and the marketing effort effect union action, the manufacturer can obtain the higher profit based on the quality wholesale price contract.However, the innovation level of supplier is lower or lower than that of wholesale price contract, and then the cost sharing contract is introduced, and it is proved that the cost sharing contract can make the manufacturer obtain the best income.At the same time, effectively stimulate supplier innovation.
【作者單位】： 華中科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金重大國(guó)際交流與合作資助項(xiàng)目(71320107001) 國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金(17BGL139) 河南省高等學(xué)校哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)應(yīng)用研究重大項(xiàng)目(2017-YYZD-10)~~
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：1707361