基于批發(fā)價(jià)格契約的供應(yīng)鏈社會(huì)責(zé)任研究
本文選題:社會(huì)責(zé)任 切入點(diǎn):供應(yīng)鏈 出處:《青島大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文
【摘要】:現(xiàn)在,若企業(yè)單純得追求自身經(jīng)濟(jì)利益最大而忽視對(duì)社會(huì)責(zé)任的承擔(dān)未必能實(shí)現(xiàn)收益最大。企業(yè)不再是孤立的,企業(yè)間的業(yè)務(wù)往來(lái)越來(lái)越多,一種網(wǎng)狀結(jié)構(gòu)逐步形成,供應(yīng)鏈順勢(shì)而生。現(xiàn)實(shí)中,對(duì)于供應(yīng)鏈上的企業(yè),有的企業(yè)具有較強(qiáng)的討價(jià)還價(jià)能力,而有的企業(yè)的討價(jià)還價(jià)能力較弱,因此也造成各個(gè)節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)在整條供應(yīng)鏈中的影響力不同。本文基于批發(fā)價(jià)格契約進(jìn)行社會(huì)責(zé)任研究,考慮包含單個(gè)供應(yīng)商和單個(gè)零售商的供應(yīng)鏈,其中供應(yīng)商占主導(dǎo)地位,研究了信息對(duì)稱下供應(yīng)商和零售商分別作為責(zé)任主體的均衡,需求信息不對(duì)稱借助轉(zhuǎn)移支付協(xié)調(diào)上下游企業(yè)收益提高供應(yīng)鏈整體收益的情形,成本信息不對(duì)稱供應(yīng)商是否存在謊報(bào)行為。研究結(jié)果表明,社會(huì)責(zé)任主體一方會(huì)把更多的成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁給對(duì)方;零售商為責(zé)任主體,零售商沒有動(dòng)機(jī)同供應(yīng)商一起分擔(dān)供應(yīng)商社會(huì)責(zé)任成本;需求信息不對(duì)稱,借助轉(zhuǎn)移支付,不僅供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找娴玫搅舜蟠筇岣?而且供應(yīng)商和零售商的收益都得到提高;成本信息不對(duì)稱,零售商作為責(zé)任主體和無(wú)責(zé)任主體,供應(yīng)商不會(huì)謊報(bào)生產(chǎn)成本。
[Abstract]:Now, if the enterprise is simple pursuit of its greatest economic benefit and ignore social responsibility may not be able to achieve maximum profit. The enterprise is no longer isolated, more and more business dealings between enterprises, and gradually formed a network structure of the supply chain, homeopathy and health. In reality, for the enterprises in the supply chain, with a strong the bargaining power of some enterprises, and some enterprises bargaining power is weak, so the influence caused by the node enterprises in the supply chain. The research on the social responsibility of different wholesale price contract based on the consideration that contains a single supplier and single retailer supply chain, the dominant supplier, the supplier under the asymmetric information and as the main responsibility of retailer equilibrium, asymmetric demand information by means of transfer payment coordination of upstream and downstream enterprises to improve supply chain overall income income The case of asymmetric cost information suppliers if there are false behavior. The results show that the social responsibility of the main party will put more costs to other retailers; as the main responsibility, the retailers have no motivation together with supplier supplier share the cost of social responsibility; asymmetric demand information, by means of transfer payment, not only the supply chain revenue has been greatly enhanced. But the benefits of vendors and retailers are improved; the cost of information asymmetry, retailers as the main responsibility and the main responsibility, the supplier does not lie in production costs.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號(hào)】:F274
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