本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：渠道　出處：《江蘇大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：進(jìn)入21世紀(jì)以來,隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的不斷發(fā)展和人們生活水平的日益提高,產(chǎn)品的生命周期日漸縮短,廢舊產(chǎn)品越來越多,伴隨而來的資源危機(jī)和環(huán)境問題變得日益突出。因此,大力發(fā)展循環(huán)經(jīng)濟(jì),保持社會可持續(xù)發(fā)展,構(gòu)建資源節(jié)約型、環(huán)境友好型社會就成為一項(xiàng)迫在眉睫的戰(zhàn)略性問題。而循環(huán)再制造工程是實(shí)現(xiàn)循環(huán)經(jīng)濟(jì)、緩解資源短缺和可持續(xù)發(fā)展的主要途徑之一。對廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收再制造也日益成為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)重要的戰(zhàn)略運(yùn)作方式。有關(guān)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)各節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)之間的定價(jià)及協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)研究,對于提升供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的整體優(yōu)勢和績效等方面,都具有非常重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 盡管閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的研究已經(jīng)引起人們的高度重視,出現(xiàn)了一些研究成果,但是還沒有形成完整的理論體系。人們通過對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行建模研究了許多的定價(jià)和協(xié)調(diào)模型,但這些模型絕大部分基于市場需求確定、信息對稱等情況下的研究,與閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)運(yùn)作的實(shí)踐存在著較大的差距,從而使得這些研究難以提高它的理論指導(dǎo)能力。本文從實(shí)際出發(fā),充分考慮更為接近現(xiàn)實(shí)的各種情況,在復(fù)雜的實(shí)際環(huán)境下,如多渠道的回收、銷售渠道和回收渠道之間的沖突、雙重信息不對稱等等,構(gòu)建相應(yīng)的定價(jià)決策模型進(jìn)行分析和研究,并進(jìn)一步探討了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中各節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)的協(xié)調(diào)、激勵(lì)機(jī)制,以實(shí)現(xiàn)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的整體最優(yōu)。其主要研究內(nèi)容如下： 論文首先對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈及其協(xié)調(diào)的理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行研究。其中包括：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的內(nèi)涵以及與傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈相比的所獨(dú)有的特點(diǎn)；閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的結(jié)構(gòu)和關(guān)鍵流程的分析,在此基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)一步對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作的模式和協(xié)調(diào)模式進(jìn)行了分析；對博弈論、委托代理理論、顯示原理等進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)的闡述,為后續(xù)的協(xié)調(diào)和激勵(lì)機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)奠定了理論依據(jù)。 接著,分別研究了信息對稱情況下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的定價(jià)和契約協(xié)調(diào)設(shè)計(jì)問題。隨著電子商務(wù)和信息技術(shù)的不斷發(fā)展,混合渠道的銷售和回收成為可能�；谶@種實(shí)際情況,通過構(gòu)建渠道沖突下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價(jià)模型,對不同回收渠道的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行了分析,探討了各成員的最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略和利潤,提出了一種改進(jìn)的價(jià)格折扣契約,實(shí)現(xiàn)了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的整體優(yōu)化和提升。以制造商和零售商的混合回收渠道為研究對象,構(gòu)建了不同渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的決策模型,對各種模型下的定價(jià)決策進(jìn)行了比較分析,提出運(yùn)用兩部定價(jià)契約機(jī)制來實(shí)現(xiàn)不同渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。最后,通過數(shù)值仿真對模型的各種結(jié)論進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。 基于隨機(jī)環(huán)境下,廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收量受到回收商的努力水平影響時(shí),運(yùn)用委托代理理論分析出現(xiàn)單邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下契約的設(shè)計(jì)問題,考慮如何設(shè)計(jì)契約來激勵(lì)回收商更加努力地工作。在此基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)一步考慮了廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收量同時(shí)受到回收商和制造商的努力水平影響時(shí),即出現(xiàn)雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下契約的設(shè)計(jì)問題,通過設(shè)立一個(gè)更具有一般性的投入產(chǎn)出函數(shù)(柯布道格拉斯函數(shù))研究制造商和回收商雙方在合作回收的過程中,最優(yōu)契約的設(shè)計(jì)以及契約中參數(shù)的影響因素。最后,通過數(shù)值仿真分析了契約設(shè)計(jì)中各參數(shù)的特點(diǎn)。 在前面研究的基礎(chǔ)上,探討了雙重信息不對稱條件下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)。當(dāng)廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收過程中同時(shí)出現(xiàn)逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí),利用委托代理理論和信號甄別原理,制造商如何設(shè)計(jì)激勵(lì)契約實(shí)現(xiàn)雙目標(biāo)的混合激勵(lì),分析了最優(yōu)激勵(lì)契約的特征,并與單一信息不對稱時(shí)的激勵(lì)契約進(jìn)行比較分析。特別是當(dāng)不對稱信息為連續(xù)型變量時(shí),通過對傳統(tǒng)激勵(lì)契約的改進(jìn),構(gòu)建一種新的激勵(lì)機(jī)制模型,并對模型中的參數(shù)進(jìn)行分析。論文中所得出的結(jié)論能為閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中企業(yè)的決策實(shí)踐提供有用的理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Since twenty-first Century, with the development of science and technology and the increasing of people's living standard, the product life cycle is becoming shorter, more and more waste products, along with the energy crisis and environmental problems become increasingly prominent. Therefore, vigorously develop the circular economy, maintain social sustainable development, build a resource-saving and environment-friendly society become a strategic problem imminent. Recycling remanufacturing engineering is the realization of circular economy, one of the main ways to alleviate the shortage of resources and sustainable development. Making the recycling has become a modern enterprise important strategic operation mode. The design research on the pricing and coordination mechanism between node enterprises on the closed-loop supply chain system. To improve the supply chain system, the overall advantages and performance, has very important theoretical significance and practical significance Righteousness.
Although the research of closed-loop supply chain has attracted people's attention, there have been some research results, but has not formed a complete theoretical system. It was studied by many of the pricing and coordination model of the closed-loop supply chain system modeling, but most of these models are determined based on the market demand, research on information asymmetry condition and there is a big gap with the practical operation of the closed-loop supply chain system, which makes these studies difficult to improve its theoretical guidance ability. In this paper, considering the various situations is more close to reality, in the complex environment, such as the recovery of multiple channels, the conflict between sales channels and recycling channels the dual information asymmetry, construction analysis and research of pricing decision model, and further discusses the coordination of each node enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain system, Incentive mechanism to achieve the overall optimal closed-loop supply chain. The main research contents are as follows:
Firstly, the theoretical basis of the closed-loop supply chain and the coordination of the study. Including the definition of the closed-loop supply chain, compared with the traditional supply chain's unique characteristics; analysis of the structure and key processes of the closed-loop supply chain, analyzed on the basis of closed-loop supply chain operation mode and the mode of coordination; game theory, principal-agent theory, display principle of the system is discussed, which provides a theoretical basis for the design for the coordination and incentive mechanism.
Then, the system of closed-loop supply chain under symmetric information, pricing and contract coordination design problems were studied. With the continuous development of e-commerce and information technology, hybrid channel sales and recovery possible. Based on the actual situation, the pricing model of closed loop supply chain through the construction of channel conflict in the recovery of the closed-loop supply chain the channels are analyzed, discussed the optimal pricing strategy and the profit of each member, and proposes an improved price discount contract, to achieve the overall optimization and upgrading of the closed-loop supply chain system. The hybrid recycling channels of manufacturers and retailers as the research object, constructs the decision model of closed-loop supply chain under different channel power structures of all, the pricing decision models are compared and analyzed, put forward to use the two part pricing contract mechanism to achieve different channel power structure of closed-loop supply chain Finally, all kinds of conclusions of the model are verified by numerical simulation.
Based on the random environment, the recovery rate of waste products affected by the recycling business effort level, using the principal-agent theory analysis and design problem of the single moral hazard under contract, how to design the contract in order to encourage recycling operators to work harder. On this basis, to further consider the recovery of waste products is also affected by the recycling business and the manufacturer's effort level, which is the design problem of double moral hazard contract, through the establishment of a more general input-output function (Cobb Douglas function) of manufacturers and recyclers in the process of cooperation both in recovery, as well as the influence factors of optimal contract design contract parameters. Finally, through numerical simulation and analysis of the characteristics of each parameter in the design of the contract.
On the basis of previous research, discusses the design of incentive mechanism of closed loop supply chain under dual information asymmetry condition. At the same time when the adverse selection and moral hazard in the recycling process of waste products, by using the principal-agent theory and signal screening principle, the manufacturer how to design incentive contract to achieve the goal of double mixing, analyzes the characteristics of optimal incentive the contract, and compare with the single information asymmetry incentive contract. Especially when the information asymmetry is a continuous variable, through the improvement of the traditional incentive contract, construct a new incentive mechanism model, and the parameters of the model are analyzed. The conclusions of the paper can provide useful theoretical basis for the practice of decision-making in the closed-loop supply chain.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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