基于弱勢企業(yè)公平關切視角下的閉環(huán)供應鏈決策模型研究
本文選題:制造商主導 切入點:零售商主導 出處:《中國礦業(yè)大學》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
【摘要】:實施閉環(huán)供應鏈管理不僅能夠節(jié)約資源,而且能夠提高企業(yè)運作效率,在瞬息萬變的市場上增強競爭力,因此對閉環(huán)供應鏈的研究具有重要的現(xiàn)實意義。本文分別建立了制造商主導和零售商主導的閉環(huán)供應鏈決策模型,從弱勢企業(yè)對處于優(yōu)勢地位的領導者具有公平關切行為的視角下研究閉環(huán)供應鏈成員的決策,并結合低碳環(huán)保的時代背景,探討碳排放規(guī)制對零售商主導的閉環(huán)供應鏈的影響。本文主要采用Stackelberg博弈論的方法研究了公平關切行為和碳排放規(guī)制對閉環(huán)供應鏈成員決策問題的影響,主要從以下幾方面進行了研究和探索:(1)在制造商處于領導地位的閉環(huán)供應鏈中,建立了弱勢企業(yè)零售商和回收商具有公平關切行為的決策模型,對公平關切行為從嫉妒心理和同情心理兩個方面進行討論,研究表明:嫉妒公平關切行為能夠提高決策者在閉環(huán)供應鏈中討價還價的能力,同情公平關切行為則是一種利他行為,零售價隨著嫉妒系數(shù)的增加而增加,回收率隨著同情心理系數(shù)的提高而提高。(2)在零售商處于領導地位的閉環(huán)供應鏈中,建立了弱勢企業(yè)制造商和回收商具有公平關切行為的決策模型,對具有公平關切行為的主體從嫉妒心理和同情心理分析對閉環(huán)供應鏈的影響,研究表明:回收商的公平關切行為對零售商主導的閉環(huán)供應鏈無影響,零售商單位產品利潤是制造商嫉妒心理系數(shù)的減函數(shù),隨著同情心理系數(shù)的增加而提高。(3)將碳排放規(guī)制引入到零售商主導的閉環(huán)供應鏈中,研究表明:回購價不受碳排放規(guī)制的影響,回收率、零售價、單位產品利潤以及批發(fā)價是關于減排系數(shù)的增函數(shù),零售商和回收商能從制造商減排措施中收益,利潤高于無碳排放規(guī)制,制造商則由于減排成本的投入,利潤要低于無碳排放規(guī)制的情形。
[Abstract]:The implementation of closed-loop supply chain management can not only save resources, but also can improve the operational efficiency of enterprises, enhance the competitiveness in a rapidly changing market, so the research of the closed-loop supply chain has important practical significance. This paper establishes a decision model of closed-loop supply chain manufacturer led and retailer led, from weak enterprises with a perspective on the behavior of fairness concerns in the dominant position of the leader of the members of the closed-loop supply chain decision-making, combined with low carbon environmental background, explore the impact of carbon emission regulation of the closed-loop supply chain retailer. This paper mainly uses the method of game theory Stackelberg to study the influence of behavior of fairness concerns and carbon emissions regulations on the decision problem of closed-loop supply chain members. Mainly from the following several aspects of research and exploration: (1) the manufacturer is a closed-loop supply chain leadership in building The weak enterprise retailers and recyclers have decision-making model behavior of fairness concerns, the behavior of fairness concerns from the two aspects of jealousy and sympathy psychological discussion, research shows that the ability of jealousy can improve the behavior of fairness concerns policymakers bargaining in the closed-loop supply chain, sympathy for the behavior of fairness concerns is a kind of altruistic behavior, retail price increases with envy coefficient, recovery rate increased with the increasing coefficient of empathy. (2) in the retailers in the closed-loop supply chain leadership, established the weak enterprises manufacturers and recyclers have decision-making model of behavior of fairness concerns, is the main behavior of fairness concerns analysis of the effect of the closed-loop supply chain from jealousy and sympathy psychology study shows that behavior of fairness concerns recycling business has no effect on the closed-loop supply chain retailer leading retailers, units of production Product profit is a decreasing function of the manufacturer jealousy coefficient, increased with the empathy factor. (3) carbon emissions regulation into the closed-loop supply chain dominated by retailers, the results show that the effects of carbon emissions, the repurchase price is not affected by the regulation of the recovery rate, the retail price of a single product profit and the wholesale price is increasing function on emissions reduction coefficient, retailers and recyclers can benefit from the manufacturers of emission reduction measures, profit is higher than non carbon emissions regulations, manufacturers are due to emission reduction cost, profit is lower than the non carbon emissions regulation.
【學位授予單位】:中國礦業(yè)大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F274
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