本文關(guān)鍵詞： 寄售 進場費 扣點 優(yōu)化 博弈　出處：《南京理工大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：在經(jīng)濟全球化的市場條件下,零售商特別是零售業(yè)巨頭的地位越發(fā)凸顯,零售商憑借優(yōu)勢地位掌握著與制造商談判和交易的主動權(quán)。面對不確定需求,零售商為了規(guī)避風險要求供應商采用寄售模式銷售商品,并按照寄售契約中約定的比例從銷售收益中獲取提成。如何設計寄售契約,合理分配二者利潤從而優(yōu)化供應鏈引起了學者們的廣泛關(guān)注。但是,在制造商和零售商決定合作之前往往還有一項重要的決策,即兩者之間的相互選擇與匹配問題。零售商可以通過制定合適的寄售政策(進場費和扣點的組合)篩選出對自身最有利的制造商集合；制造商可以通過比較不同的寄售政策,選擇能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)自身寄售利潤最大化的零售商,從而實現(xiàn)市場資源的有效配置�，F(xiàn)有研究對這一匹配過程的決策關(guān)注較少。在此背景下,本文研究了在制造商采取策略性選擇的情況下,零售商如何制定合理的寄售政策借此選擇合適的制造商集合以實現(xiàn)收益最大化。 本文的研究主要包括以下三部分內(nèi)容：第一,零售商壟斷環(huán)境下,零售商面對多個制造商的最優(yōu)寄售政策制定問題；第二,零售商競爭環(huán)境下,具有銷量差異的零售商制定寄售政策的博弈；第三,零售商競爭環(huán)境下具有銷量和成本雙重差異的零售商寄售政策的博弈。針對第一個問題,建立了壟斷零售商和多家制造商互選的混合整數(shù)規(guī)劃模型,給出了零售商最優(yōu)寄售政策的計算方法,通過算例分析探討了進場費和扣點決策的一般性規(guī)律。針對后兩個問題,分別建立了具有銷量差異的零售商寄售政策博弈模型、具有銷量和成本雙重差異的零售商寄售政策博弈模型,通過重點分析兩零售商-兩制造商問題,給出了博弈的均衡解以及寄售政策的具體算法,通過算例分析討論了競爭環(huán)境下強勢零售商和弱勢零售商決策的相互影響。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：在零售商壟斷市場上,由于制造商在產(chǎn)品價格、成本、銷售規(guī)模等參數(shù)上具有不同特征,零售商通過調(diào)整進場費和扣點制定最優(yōu)寄售政策可以大大提高自身的收益。在零售商競爭的市場上,強勢零售商和實力強的制造商匹配,弱勢零售商和實力偏弱的制造商匹配,而那些強勢零售商和弱勢零售商均未選擇的制造商,一般都是利潤和銷量過低、缺乏市場競爭力的制造商。在寄售模式下,零售商的競爭一方面會導致零售商利潤的下降,另一方面有助于市場資源的優(yōu)化配置。
[Abstract]:Under the market conditions of economic globalization, the position of retailers, especially retail giants, is becoming more and more prominent. Retailers have the initiative to negotiate and trade with manufacturers by virtue of their dominant position. In order to avoid risks, retailers require suppliers to sell goods in consignment mode and earn a commission from the proceeds of sale according to the proportion agreed in the consignment contract. How to design consignment contract, The rational distribution of profit between the two and the optimization of the supply chain has attracted wide attention from scholars. However, there is often an important decision before manufacturers and retailers decide to cooperate. That is, the problem of mutual selection and matching between the two. Retailers can select the set of manufacturers that are most beneficial to them by formulating appropriate consignment policies (a combination of entry fees and deduction points); manufacturers can compare different consignment policies. In order to realize the efficient allocation of market resources, the existing researches pay less attention to the decision-making of this matching process. In this context, we choose the retailers that can maximize the profits of their consignment sales, and thus realize the effective allocation of market resources. This paper studies how to make a reasonable consignment policy to select the appropriate manufacturer set in order to maximize the profit under the strategic choice of the manufacturer. The research of this paper mainly includes the following three parts: first, retailers face the optimal consignment policy of multiple manufacturers in the monopoly environment of retailers; second, in the competitive environment of retailers, retailers face the problem of optimal consignment policy. Third, the game of retailer's consignment policy with different sales volume and cost under the competition environment. In this paper, a mixed integer programming model of monopoly retailers and multiple manufacturers is established, and the calculation method of retailer's optimal consignment policy is given. The general rules of entrance fee and deduction point decision are discussed through an example. The game model of retailer consignment policy with different sales volume is established, and the game model of retailer consignment policy with double difference of sales volume and cost is established, and the problem between two retailers and two manufacturers is analyzed. The equilibrium solution of the game and the concrete algorithm of the consignment policy are given, and the interaction between strong and weak retailers in competitive environment is discussed by an example. It is found that in the monopoly market of retailers, the manufacturer has different characteristics in the parameters of product price, cost, sales scale, etc. Retailers can greatly improve their earnings by adjusting entry fees and discount points to make optimal consignment policies. In a market where retailers compete, strong retailers match strong manufacturers, weak retailers match weak manufacturers. Manufacturers who are not selected by strong and weak retailers are generally manufacturers with low profits and sales and lack of market competitiveness. In consignment mode, retailers' competition will, on the one hand, lead to a decline in retailer profits. On the other hand, it helps to optimize the allocation of market resources.
【學位授予單位】：南京理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F713.3

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