本文關(guān)鍵詞： 閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 雙渠道 渠道偏好 博弈定價(jià) 回收渠道選擇　出處：《天津工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中,制造商開(kāi)辟網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道后,消費(fèi)者會(huì)對(duì)傳統(tǒng)渠道與網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道產(chǎn)生不同的渠道偏好,同時(shí)兩條渠道會(huì)分別產(chǎn)生不同的渠道運(yùn)營(yíng)成本,這些因素都會(huì)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈成員的定價(jià)產(chǎn)生影響。在我國(guó),建筑機(jī)械需求的不斷增大為更接近市場(chǎng)需求的零售商進(jìn)行產(chǎn)品再制造提供可能,零售商再制造為閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈提供了新的管理運(yùn)營(yíng)模式。因此本文研究基于渠道偏好和運(yùn)營(yíng)成本的雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策問(wèn)題和零售商再制造的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收渠道選擇問(wèn)題,運(yùn)用博弈論建立決策模型。通過(guò)對(duì)模型的求解與分析,得出管理啟示。第二章對(duì)文中應(yīng)用到的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈、博弈論和回收渠道理論進(jìn)行了介紹。第三章考慮零售商負(fù)責(zé)回收廢舊產(chǎn)品、制造商開(kāi)辟網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道的雙渠道閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈,基于消費(fèi)者對(duì)傳統(tǒng)渠道和網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道偏好不一致和渠道運(yùn)營(yíng)成本的不同,建立了制造商和零售商之間三種不同權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下的博弈定價(jià)決策模型。比較分析了模型的均衡解,得到了消費(fèi)者渠道偏好度、渠道運(yùn)營(yíng)成本對(duì)最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略和企業(yè)最大利潤(rùn)的影響。研究表明:最優(yōu)直銷價(jià)格隨網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道偏好的增加而增加,而最優(yōu)零售價(jià)格隨之減小;網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道運(yùn)營(yíng)成本增加對(duì)制造商不利對(duì)零售商有利,而傳統(tǒng)渠道運(yùn)營(yíng)成本增加對(duì)制造商和零售商都不利。第四章研究了零售商再制造的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)與廢舊品的回收渠道選擇問(wèn)題。分別在三種不同回收模式(即零售商回收、第三方回收、零售商與第三方同時(shí)回收)下建立了零售商主導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈模型,對(duì)定價(jià)與回收量決策給出相應(yīng)的博弈均衡解,并對(duì)結(jié)果進(jìn)行了比較分析。結(jié)果表明:雙回收渠道總是比單回收渠道對(duì)零售商,消費(fèi)者和整條供應(yīng)鏈有利,但對(duì)制造商不利;當(dāng)零售商回收價(jià)格與回收量轉(zhuǎn)換率和第三方回收成本與回收量轉(zhuǎn)換率增大時(shí),制造商最大利潤(rùn)將會(huì)增加而零售商最大利潤(rùn)和供應(yīng)鏈總利潤(rùn)均會(huì)減少。第五章對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中制造商開(kāi)辟網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道后博弈定價(jià)和零售商進(jìn)行再制造的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中回收渠道選擇的研究結(jié)果進(jìn)行了總結(jié),并對(duì)相關(guān)的研究進(jìn)行了展望。
[Abstract]:In the closed-loop supply chain, after the manufacturer opens the network channel, the consumer will produce different channel preference to the traditional channel and the network channel, at the same time, the two channels will produce different channel operation cost respectively. These factors will affect the pricing of supply chain members. In our country, the increasing demand for construction machinery provides the possibility for retailers who are closer to the market demand to remanufacture their products. Retailer remanufacturing provides a new management mode for closed-loop supply chain. Therefore, this paper studies the pricing decision problem of double-channel closed-loop supply chain based on channel preference and operating cost and the closed-loop supply chain return of retailer remanufacturing. The problem of channel selection. Game theory is used to establish decision-making model. Through solving and analyzing the model, the management enlightenment is obtained. Chapter two is about the closed-loop supply chain applied in this paper. Game theory and recycling channel theory are introduced. Chapter three considers that retailers are responsible for recycling used products and manufacturers open up a double-channel closed-loop supply chain. Based on the consumers of traditional channels and network channel preferences and channel operating costs are different. A game pricing decision model with three different power structures between manufacturer and retailer is established. The equilibrium solution of the model is compared and the consumer channel preference is obtained. The influence of channel operating cost on the optimal pricing strategy and the maximum profit of the enterprise. The research shows that the optimal direct selling price increases with the increase of network channel preference, while the optimal retail price decreases; The increase of operating cost of network channel is bad for manufacturer and good for retailer. In Chapter 4th, the closed-loop supply chain pricing and recycling channel selection of remanufacturing by retailers are studied respectively in three different recycling modes (1). Retailers recycle. The Stackelberg game model led by retailers is established under the condition of third party recovery (retailer and third party recovery), and the corresponding game equilibrium solution is given for pricing and payback decision. The results are compared and analyzed. The results show that the dual recovery channel is always beneficial to retailers, consumers and the whole supply chain, but not to manufacturers; When the conversion rate between the retailer's recovery price and the payback is increased, and the third party's recycling cost and the payback conversion rate increase. The maximum profit of the manufacturer will increase, while the maximum profit of the retailer and the total profit of the supply chain will decrease. Chapter 5th: the closed loop supply chain in which the manufacturer opens up a network channel and the retailer remanufactures the closed-loop supply chain. The results of the research on the selection of the recovery channel were summarized. The related research is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F714.1;F713.32

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