本文選題：政府 + 績效信息��； 參考：《湘潭大學》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：政府績效管理是當今世界各國推動政府改革的科學管理工具。黨的十八屆三中全會提出,要“嚴格績效管理,突出責任落實”。保障政府在履行公共管理職能、提供公共服務過程中所產生、傳遞和發(fā)布的所有績效信息的真實性和公信力,是提高政府管理績效、推進政府管理體制創(chuàng)新的關鍵。但不可否認的是,在政府績效管理實踐中,尤其是在績效信息供給過程中,績效信息內部人控制行為頻現。這嚴重影響著政府績效管理的效率,一定程度上制約著政府治理體系和治理能力的現代化。在政府績效信息供給過程中存在著多層次的委托代理關系。與此同時,委托代理理論也逐漸發(fā)展為現階段學術界研究公共績效治理的重要理論之一。而當前國內外對政府績效信息內部人控制的研究鮮有關注,以委托代理理論為視角開展的相關研究更是鳳毛麟角,這也是本文寫作的源動力和目的之一。運用委托代理理論,剖析政府績效信息內部人控制行為的產生,探索其規(guī)避路徑,是增進政府績效、提高公共管理質量、滿足公眾需求的現實需要。因此,本文以委托代理理論為視角,旨在運用經濟學的工具,基于我國政府績效管理實踐和客觀事實,重新審視政府績效信息供給過程中的委托代理關系,不僅有利于剖析績效信息內部人控制的深層次原因,還有利于為政府績效管理科學發(fā)展提供有效的實現途徑。本文主要對政府績效信息、內部人控制行為和委托代理理論的相關概念進行了界定,詳細闡述了政府績效信息內部人控制行為中的委托代理關系,并以委托代理理論為視角,從表現、負面影響及成因等三個方面對我國政府績效信息內部人控制行為進行了較為細致地分析,提出了規(guī)避政府績效信息內部人控制行為的路徑,確保委托人與代理人的利益目標趨于一致。在實現委托人與代理人共贏的同時,推進高績效政府建設目標的順利實現。
[Abstract]:The government performance management is a scientific management tool for various countries in the world to promote the reform of the government. In the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the party proposed to "strict performance management, to highlight the implementation of responsibility". To ensure the authenticity and credibility of all the performance information produced, transmitted and published in the process of public administration and public service. It is the key to improve the performance of government management and promote the innovation of government management system. But it is undeniable that in the practice of government performance management, especially in the process of performance information supply, the internal control behavior of the performance information is frequent. This seriously affects the efficiency of government performance management and restricts the government governance system and governance to a certain extent. In the process of government performance information supply, there are many levels of principal-agent relationship in the process of government performance information supply. At the same time, principal-agent theory has gradually developed into one of the important theories in the study of public performance governance at the present stage. At present, there is little concern about the internal and external research on the internal control of government performance information. It is also one of the most rare studies in the perspective of theory, which is also one of the motive forces and purposes of this article. By using the principal-agent theory, it analyzes the emergence of the human control behavior in the government performance information and explores its evasion path, which is the practical need to enhance the government performance, improve the quality of public management and meet the needs of the public. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, the purpose of this paper is to reexamine the principal-agent relationship in the process of government performance information supply, using the tools of economics and based on the performance management practice and objective facts of our government. It is not only beneficial to the analysis of the underlying causes of the internal control of the performance information, but also to the scientific development of the government performance management. This article mainly defines the related concepts of government performance information, insider control behavior and principal-agent theory, expounds the principal agent relationship in the internal control behavior of government performance information, and takes the principal-agent theory as the angle of view, from three aspects, from performance, negative impact and cause of cause to me. The internal control behavior of the government performance information is carefully analyzed, and the path to avoid the internal control behavior of the government performance information is put forward to ensure that the interests of the principal and the agent tend to be consistent. At the same time, the successful realization of the high performance government construction goal is carried out while the principal and agent are achieved.

【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：D630

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本文編號：1813174