本文選題：應用服務供應鏈　切入點：外包合同　出處：《重慶大學》2011年博士論文

【摘要】：近年來,以應用服務提供商(Application Service Provider, ASP)服務模式為代表的應用服務外包逐漸成為中小企業(yè)解決信息化建設中資金短缺、人才匱乏等問題的有效手段之一。然而,現(xiàn)實交易環(huán)境中的信息不對稱給由應用基礎設施提供商(Application Infrastucture Provider,AIP)、ASP以及客戶企業(yè)所組成的應用服務供應鏈帶來很多風險,各節(jié)點企業(yè)的過度風險規(guī)避行為導致應用服務供應鏈運作績效較低,以致嚴重阻礙了ASP服務模式的發(fā)展。對此,本文研究不對稱信息下如何通過應用服務外包合同及應用服務供應鏈風險分擔合同的設計以激勵ASP顯示真實的服務能力信息、成本信息以及付出所期望的努力水平,并在競爭與市場需求不確定環(huán)境下實現(xiàn)ASP與上游供應商之間關于市場風險的合理分擔。 首先,針對服務能力信息不對稱下客戶企業(yè)選擇ASP的逆向選擇問題,建立了應用服務外包委托代理模型,通過模型求解得到了應用服務外包最優(yōu)招標合同菜單,并對該合同的相關性質進行了分析。不對稱信息下客戶企業(yè)主要根據(jù)服務能力、經(jīng)濟成本選擇ASP,而與服務報價無關;客戶企業(yè)向ASP支付的服務報酬主要由服務成本及信息租金兩部分組成;ASP中標的服務能力較完全信息下中標的服務能力低。 其次,在考慮外界網(wǎng)絡條件影響客戶企業(yè)服務收益的情況下研究ASP的道德風險問題,設計了對稱信息及不對稱信息條件下的應用服務外包激勵合同,并分析了最優(yōu)外包合同的性質。對稱信息條件下,客戶企業(yè)將承擔外界網(wǎng)絡條件不確定所帶來的全部風險;不對稱信息條件下,最優(yōu)合同不能以無差異合同形式存在,且最優(yōu)合同在網(wǎng)絡條件較好時能實現(xiàn)帕累托最優(yōu),而在網(wǎng)絡條件較差時發(fā)生扭曲,存在效率損失。隨后,在前面研究的基礎上,針對客戶企業(yè)如何平衡激勵ASP在硬件及軟件建設的多任務投入問題設計了應用服務外包正式合同、關系合同,并分析了貼現(xiàn)率及成本替代強度對合同激勵效果的影響。貼現(xiàn)率較低時,客戶企業(yè)應選擇正式合同對ASP進行激勵;隨著貼現(xiàn)率的增加,關系合同的激勵效果增加;關系合同中,不同任務之間的激勵效果具有互補性,且隨成本替代性逐漸增強。 再次,針對ASP成本效率參數(shù)及努力水平信息不對稱下的應用服務外包合同設計問題進行研究。在ASP所擁有的成本效率參數(shù)及努力水平均不可觀測下研究客戶企業(yè)如何通過外包合同設計以激勵ASP顯示其所擁有的成本信息及付出最優(yōu)的努力水平。收益共享系數(shù)是成本效率參數(shù)、風險規(guī)避度、產(chǎn)出方差的減函數(shù);客戶企業(yè)向ASP支付的期望服務報酬除了補償保留效用與服務生產(chǎn)成本還將額外支付風險成本、信息租金;風險成本隨風險規(guī)避度、產(chǎn)出方差遞增,隨成本效率參數(shù)遞減;信息租金隨風險規(guī)避度、產(chǎn)出方差、成本效率參數(shù)遞減。 最后,針對應用服務供應鏈上游節(jié)點企業(yè)ISV(Independent Software Vendor,獨立軟件開發(fā)商)與ASP面臨市場競爭與需求不確定下的市場風險分擔問題,建立了隨機需求下的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了ASP承擔風險及ISV承擔風險兩種風險分擔合同,并運用算例對外生變量進行了參數(shù)敏感性分析。當由ISV承擔風險時,ASP將向ISV定購其所分配服務需求的上限;ASP承擔風險時,ISV將向ASP提供一個軟件許可銷售計劃,并通過提高軟件開發(fā)質量及維護升級服務水平來提高ASP訂購軟件許可的積極性;ASP作為盟主的風險分擔合同較ISV作為盟主的風險分擔合同對應用服務供應鏈的協(xié)調效果好。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the application service provider (Application Service, Provider, ASP) service model as the representative of the application service outsourcing has become the small and medium-sized enterprise informatization construction to solve the shortage of funds, one of the effective means of problems such as shortage of talent. However, the information asymmetry of real trading environment for the application infrastructure provider (Application Infrastucture, Provider, AIP) the application of service supply chain, ASP and enterprise customers which bring about the risks of excessive risk of each enterprise hedging behavior lead to the application of service supply chain operation efficiency is low, that seriously hindered the development of ASP service model. In this regard, this paper studies how to design contract under asymmetric information sharing through the application service outsourcing contract and application services. Supply chain risk to stimulate ASP display service ability of real information, cost information and pay the desired Work hard and realize the reasonable share of market risk between ASP and upstream suppliers under the uncertainty of competition and market demand.
First of all, according to the adverse selection problem of ASP customer service ability of enterprises under asymmetric information, establish the application service outsourcing agent model, through the model to obtain the optimal bidding application service outsourcing contract menu, and the related properties of the contract are analyzed. The customer enterprise under information asymmetry mainly according to the service ability, the economic costs of ASP, but has nothing to do with the service price; customer service remuneration paid to ASP mainly by the cost of service and information rent of two parts; the ASP service is under complete information the service ability is low.
Secondly, considering the problem of moral hazard effects of ASP external network condition return customer service business case, the design of symmetric information and asymmetric information under the conditions of the application service outsourcing incentive contract, and analyzes the properties of optimal contracts. Under symmetric information, enterprise customers will bear the external network condition does not identify all risks bring; under the conditions of asymmetric information, the optimal contract can not exist in difference form of the contract, and the optimal contract in good network condition can achieve Pareto optimal, and distorted under poor network conditions, there is efficiency loss. Then, on the basis of previous research, aiming at how to balance customer incentive in multi task ASP the hardware and software construction investment design application service outsourcing formal contract, relational contract, and analyzes the discount rate and the cost of alternative strength of the contract Effect of incentive effect. The discount rate is low, enterprise customers should choose a formal contract incentive for ASP; with the increase of the discount rate, increase the incentive effect of the relational contract; relational contract, incentive effect between different tasks are complementary to each other, and with the cost of replacement gradually increased.
Thirdly, research on the problem of application service outsourcing contract design ASP cost efficiency parameters and effort level under asymmetric information. The cost efficiency parameters and effort level have in ASP can not be observed by the customer enterprise outsourcing contract design to stimulate ASP display information and pay the cost of the optimal level of effort of its own. The revenue sharing coefficient is the cost efficiency parameters, risk aversion, reduction function of variance of output; enterprise customers to pay ASP expected service remuneration in addition to compensation of reservation utility and service production cost will also pay an additional risk cost, risk cost and risk information rent; aversion, the variance of output increasing, decreasing cost efficiency parameter; the information rent and risk aversion, the variance of output, decreasing cost efficiency parameters.
Finally, according to the application of service supply chain node enterprise ISV (Independent Software Vendor, independent software developers and ASP) facing the market competition and demand uncertainty under the market risk sharing problem, set up a Stackelberg game model under stochastic demand, the ASP risk and ISV risk two risk sharing contract, and use of operator cases of exogenous variable parameter sensitivity analysis was conducted by ISV. When the ASP will take the risks, to limit ISV order assigned service demand; ASP risk, ISV will provide a ASP software license sales plan, and by increasing the quality of software development and maintenance and upgrade service level to increase the enthusiasm of ASP the order of software license; ASP as the risk sharing contract with ISV as the risk sharing effect on supply chain coordination application service contract.

【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：C931;F224;F273.7

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