本文選題：糧食安全 + 渠道博弈��； 參考：《南京審計(jì)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》2017年06期

【摘要】：中國(guó)是人口和糧食大國(guó),促進(jìn)糧食生產(chǎn)、保證糧食安全是國(guó)之大事。由于市場(chǎng)利益主體之間存在博弈行為,收購(gòu)價(jià)格由農(nóng)戶與糧食收購(gòu)企業(yè)共同決定。采用納什議價(jià)模型表示議價(jià)過程,運(yùn)用2006年至2014年的小麥價(jià)格數(shù)據(jù),研究農(nóng)戶和企業(yè)在糧食收購(gòu)過程中的議價(jià)問題,從而判斷糧食最低收購(gòu)價(jià)的政策效果。結(jié)果表明:政策確實(shí)能改變農(nóng)民的議價(jià)能力,保護(hù)農(nóng)民利益,但政策實(shí)施存在時(shí)滯;更重要的是,政策會(huì)導(dǎo)致農(nóng)戶議價(jià)能力從絕對(duì)劣勢(shì)到絕對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)的突變,造成農(nóng)戶憑借最低收購(gòu)價(jià)獲得主導(dǎo)價(jià)格的能力,即政策扭曲了市場(chǎng)定價(jià)機(jī)制。最后,給出模型結(jié)果、實(shí)證結(jié)論和政策建議。
[Abstract]:China is a country with a large population and grain. It is a national priority to promote grain production and ensure food security. The purchase price is determined by farmers and grain purchasing enterprises because of the game behavior between the main bodies of market interests. The Nash bargaining model is used to represent the bargaining process, and the wheat price data from 2006 to 2014 are used to study the bargaining problem in the process of grain purchase by farmers and enterprises, so as to judge the policy effect of the lowest purchase price of grain. The results show that the policy can change the bargaining power of farmers and protect the interests of farmers, but there is a delay in the implementation of the policy, and more importantly, the policy will lead to the mutation of bargaining power of farmers from absolute inferiority to absolute superiority. The policy distorts the market pricing mechanism. Finally, the model results, empirical conclusions and policy recommendations are given.
【作者單位】： 南京審計(jì)大學(xué)政府審計(jì)學(xué)院;南京審計(jì)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(16BJY119)
【分類號(hào)】：F326.11
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本文編號(hào)：2104358