本文選題：銀行治理 + 資本緩沖��； 參考：《浙江工商大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：由美國次貸危機引發(fā)的金融危機導(dǎo)致全球金融市場受到了極大的沖擊。在此次金融危機中,以商業(yè)銀行為主的金融機構(gòu)的穩(wěn)定性面臨嚴峻的考驗,而商業(yè)銀行體系的親周期效應(yīng)和資本監(jiān)管的順周期性被認為是加深此次金融危機的重要原因。因此,巴塞爾委員會在2010年新版的巴塞爾協(xié)議(Basel Ⅲ)中提出的"資本緩沖"的宏觀審慎監(jiān)管工具以及2011年我國銀監(jiān)會提出包括資本緩沖的計提等一系列監(jiān)管措施在內(nèi)的新資本監(jiān)管方案均旨在通過資本緩沖的計提來應(yīng)對商業(yè)銀行資本波動帶來的風險。然而,影響商業(yè)銀行資本緩沖計提的因素有很多,且作用機制較為復(fù)雜。目前對于商業(yè)銀行資本緩沖影響因素的研究主要圍繞經(jīng)濟周期對資本緩沖的影響來展開,但少有文獻探討銀行治理這一重要的內(nèi)部因素對銀行資本緩沖水平的影響。作為影響銀行內(nèi)部一系列重要決策的關(guān)鍵性因素,銀行治理因素對商業(yè)銀行資本緩沖水平的影響是不容忽視的。本文在歸納梳理以往商業(yè)銀行治理相關(guān)文獻的基礎(chǔ)上,主要從銀行治理的委托代理問題的角度出發(fā),對銀行治理對資本緩沖水平的影響機制進行理論上的分析,并選取我國信息披露較為完整的38家商業(yè)銀行,包括國有銀行、股份制商業(yè)銀行及城市商業(yè)銀行3類目前我國主要的商業(yè)銀行2008年至2014年的相關(guān)年報數(shù)據(jù),以商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會質(zhì)量及高管股權(quán)激勵三個變量作為商業(yè)銀行治理的代理變量,分別從銀行治理與資本緩沖、銀行治理與資本緩沖的周期性特征以及銀行治理對資本緩沖的分解效應(yīng)三個方面建立實證模型并展開實證分析。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)集中度較高或存在高管持股現(xiàn)象的商業(yè)銀行,往往傾向于持有較低的資本緩沖水平;而獨立董事人數(shù)占董事會總?cè)藬?shù)比例較高的商業(yè)銀行資本緩沖水平較高。因此,適當降低商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)集中度、保持適度的高管持股比例以及提高獨立董事在董事會人數(shù)中的占比對于提高商業(yè)銀行資本緩沖水平,進而提高其對經(jīng)營風險的管控能力,維護我國金融體系的穩(wěn)定具有重要的意義。
[Abstract]:The financial crisis caused by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States caused a great impact on the global financial market. In this financial crisis, the stability of the financial institutions, which are mainly commercial banks, is facing a severe test, and the pro-cycle effect of the commercial banking system and the procyclicality of capital supervision are considered to be the important reasons for deepening the financial crisis. Therefore, The "capital buffer" macro-prudential regulatory tools proposed by the Basel Committee in the 2010 new edition of Basel III and a series of regulatory measures proposed by the Banking Regulatory Commission of China in 2011 include capital buffer provisions and other regulatory measures. The new capital supervision programs are designed to deal with the risk of capital fluctuation of commercial banks through capital buffer. However, there are many factors that affect the capital buffer of commercial banks, and the mechanism is complex. At present, the research on the influencing factors of capital buffering in commercial banks is mainly focused on the impact of economic cycle on capital buffering, but there is little literature to discuss the influence of bank governance, an important internal factor, on the capital buffer level of banks. As a key factor affecting a series of important decisions, the influence of bank governance on the capital buffer level of commercial banks can not be ignored. On the basis of summarizing and combing the related literatures of commercial bank governance, this paper analyzes theoretically the influence mechanism of bank governance on capital buffer level from the perspective of principal-agent problem of bank governance. And select 38 commercial banks with complete information disclosure, including state-owned banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. The three variables of commercial bank equity structure, board quality and executive equity incentive are taken as proxy variables of commercial bank governance, respectively from bank governance and capital buffering. The periodic characteristics of bank governance and capital buffer and the decomposition effect of bank governance on capital buffer are analyzed. The results show that commercial banks with high concentration of equity or with the phenomenon of executive ownership tend to hold lower capital buffers, while the commercial banks with higher proportion of independent directors to the total number of board members tend to hold higher capital buffers. Therefore, reducing the degree of equity concentration of commercial banks properly, keeping a moderate proportion of senior management shares and increasing the proportion of independent directors in the number of board of directors can improve the capital buffer level of commercial banks, and then improve their ability to control the operating risks. It is of great significance to maintain the stability of our financial system.
【學位授予單位】：浙江工商大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.33;F830.42;F271

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本文編號：1961542