發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-22 08:22

【摘要】：2009年10月23日,在經(jīng)過(guò)了十年的準(zhǔn)備之后,我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板股票市場(chǎng)在深圳證券交易所正式開(kāi)板。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)與主板相對(duì)應(yīng),相補(bǔ)充,它為短期內(nèi)沒(méi)有辦法達(dá)到主板上市條件的那些中小企業(yè)和新興企業(yè)提供融資渠道和發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì),同時(shí),它也為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本提供了一個(gè)正常的退出機(jī)制。 創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO即是指這些企業(yè)在創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)首次公開(kāi)發(fā)行股票,進(jìn)行融資的行為。但是,由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市企業(yè)存在著科技含量高,規(guī)模較小,未來(lái)增長(zhǎng)潛力大的特征,因此,很難找到相匹配的上市企業(yè)作為IPO定價(jià)的參考。并且,最終確定的IPO價(jià)格是發(fā)行人、承銷(xiāo)商以及投資者等利益相關(guān)者的力量相互作用、相互權(quán)衡的結(jié)果。因此,傳統(tǒng)的估值方法在創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)用存在著局限性,而一級(jí)市場(chǎng)的定價(jià)是否合理直接影響到二級(jí)市場(chǎng)以及整體市場(chǎng)的有效性。因此,確定利益相關(guān)者行為的影響對(duì)研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO定價(jià)具有非常重要的意義。 本文在系統(tǒng)的闡述傳統(tǒng)IPO定價(jià)理論的基礎(chǔ)上,分析其適用性,并結(jié)合我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)的基本特征以及利益相關(guān)者的行為,將創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO定價(jià)的影響因素分為內(nèi)在價(jià)值因素、外部市場(chǎng)因素以及利益相關(guān)者行為因素。通過(guò)因子分析法和逐步回歸法,對(duì)各個(gè)因素的量化指標(biāo)與創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO溢價(jià)倍數(shù)進(jìn)行多元回歸分析,從而針對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)IPO定價(jià)構(gòu)建多因素模型,重點(diǎn)對(duì)上市過(guò)程中利益相關(guān)者對(duì)IPO定價(jià)的影響程度進(jìn)行分析。實(shí)證分析表明,私募基金發(fā)行前持股比例對(duì)IPO溢價(jià)倍數(shù)具有顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)性,而詢(xún)價(jià)對(duì)象家數(shù)對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO溢價(jià)倍數(shù)具有顯著的正向作用,承銷(xiāo)商聲譽(yù)與IPO溢價(jià)倍數(shù)并不存在顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系。這一結(jié)論說(shuō)明,在我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)IPO定價(jià)中支持私募基金的“聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)假說(shuō)”,即私募創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)為了獲得資本市場(chǎng)上的良好聲譽(yù),會(huì)傾向于壓低發(fā)行價(jià)格,從而使所投資的企業(yè)比較順利的上市,從而有利于其后續(xù)融資。同時(shí),本文也支持機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的“從眾效應(yīng)”假說(shuō),但并不支持高聲譽(yù)的承銷(xiāo)商具有“信息生產(chǎn)”和“認(rèn)證”的能力的假說(shuō)。最后,本文針對(duì)IPO過(guò)程中存在的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)問(wèn)題、詢(xún)價(jià)機(jī)構(gòu)誠(chéng)信問(wèn)題以及私募創(chuàng)投機(jī)構(gòu)行為問(wèn)題提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:On October 23, 2009, after ten years of preparation, China's gem stock market officially opened in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The gem market corresponds to the main Board and complements it by providing financing channels and development opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises and emerging enterprises that do not have access to the listing conditions of the main Board in the short term, and at the same time, It also provides a normal exit mechanism for venture capital. Growth Enterprise Market (IPO) refers to the initial public offering of stocks and financing of these enterprises in the gem market. However, due to the characteristics of high scientific and technological content, small scale and large growth potential in the future, it is difficult to find matching listed enterprises as the reference for IPO pricing. Furthermore, the final IPO price is the result of the interaction of stakeholders such as issuers, underwriters and investors. Therefore, the application of the traditional valuation method in the gem IPO market is limited, and whether the pricing of the primary market is reasonable or not has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the secondary market and the overall market. Therefore, to determine the impact of stakeholder behavior on the gem IPO pricing has a very important significance. On the basis of expounding the traditional IPO pricing theory systematically, this paper analyzes its applicability, and combines with the basic characteristics of gem market and the behavior of stakeholders, divides the influencing factors of gem IPO pricing into intrinsic value factors. External market factors and stakeholder behavioral factors. By means of factor analysis and stepwise regression, the multivariate regression analysis is carried out between the quantitative index of each factor and the IPO premium multiple of gem, so as to construct a multifactor model for IPO pricing in gem market. The impact of stakeholders on IPO pricing in the process of listing is analyzed. The empirical analysis shows that the proportion of private equity holdings has a significant negative correlation with the IPO premium multiple before issuance, while the number of people asking for price has a significant positive effect on the IPO premium multiple of gem. There is no significant correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO premium multiple. This conclusion indicates that in order to gain good reputation in the capital market, private equity firms tend to lower the issuing price in order to support the "reputation effect hypothesis" of private equity funds in IPO pricing in China's gem market. In order to make the investment of enterprises relatively smooth listing, thus conducive to its subsequent financing. At the same time, this paper also supports the "herd effect" hypothesis of institutional investors, but does not support the hypothesis that highly reputable underwriters have the ability of "information production" and "certification". Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the problem of information asymmetry in the process of IPO, the credit problem of inquiry institution and the behavior problem of private venture capital institution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51

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