招商銀行股權(quán)激勵制度分析與設(shè)計(jì)
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-12 16:54
【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵制度作為一種在知識經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代必要的激勵制度創(chuàng)新,在我國資本市場進(jìn)行了股權(quán)分置改革之后具備了現(xiàn)實(shí)操作的可能性。招商銀行作為國有控股上市金融公司在股權(quán)激勵制度探索和實(shí)踐中走出了一大步,總結(jié)和研究招商銀行股權(quán)激勵制度的得失對于股權(quán)激勵制度在我國國有控股企業(yè)中是否繼續(xù)推行有著重大研究和借鑒意義。 本文通過對招商銀行股權(quán)激勵方案做了簡要介紹,并就推出的過程和激勵制度設(shè)計(jì)本身進(jìn)行了理論分析,指出了在推行過程中的可取之處和目前看來的不足之處。進(jìn)而通過對招商銀行2005年到2011年間年度公司業(yè)績表現(xiàn)與招商銀行在A股和H股股市表現(xiàn)的對比,研究招商銀行業(yè)績表現(xiàn)與股價(jià)的相關(guān)性。發(fā)現(xiàn)招商銀行實(shí)行高層管理人員H股股票增值權(quán)計(jì)劃以來,公司業(yè)績表現(xiàn)與股價(jià)并未表現(xiàn)出高度相關(guān)性,而且通過與民生銀行4年業(yè)績數(shù)據(jù)的對比,H股股票增值權(quán)計(jì)劃的實(shí)施與公司業(yè)績表現(xiàn)也并無重大區(qū)別。通過分析和對比,發(fā)現(xiàn)產(chǎn)生以上問題的主要原因在于我國證券資本市場有效性不足,股價(jià)并未充分反映所有市場信息；高層管理人員股權(quán)激勵制度設(shè)計(jì)本身并不具備推動股價(jià)持續(xù)上漲的內(nèi)在動力,激勵對象不滿足股權(quán)激勵制度運(yùn)行所要求的假設(shè)條件,難以形成良性循環(huán)閉環(huán)；企業(yè)高層管理人員并未形成有效的市場競爭,而且該類人員的選拔以及聘任并非完全的市場行為,即使設(shè)立股權(quán)激勵制度對于他們的激勵和約束作用有限。 招商銀行股權(quán)激勵制度在運(yùn)行中存在一定的弊端和不足,解決辦法在于找到引發(fā)矛盾的原因,有針對性地進(jìn)行改進(jìn)和修正,繼續(xù)完善股權(quán)激勵制度實(shí)施所需要的法律制度保障條件；進(jìn)一步修正股權(quán)激勵制度掛鉤條件和取得方式；繼續(xù)推進(jìn)具有活力的人力資源競爭性市場與擁有公平機(jī)會的產(chǎn)品競爭性市場的建立。在公司經(jīng)營管理規(guī)范化進(jìn)程中,落實(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)制度的進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化,通過將企業(yè)三個(gè)不同層次、不同激勵需求的人員區(qū)分開來,分別設(shè)計(jì)股權(quán)激勵制度,切實(shí)加強(qiáng)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵計(jì)劃所需要的員工工作授權(quán)度和主人翁意識的培養(yǎng)。 通過對高層管理人員股權(quán)激勵制度的分析,豐富了招商銀行股權(quán)激勵體系分析,為業(yè)務(wù)骨干人員及重要管理人員以及普通員工股權(quán)激勵方案的設(shè)計(jì)提供了參照和實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)。因此,在設(shè)計(jì)和改進(jìn)股權(quán)激勵體系過程中,吸取了高層管理人員股權(quán)激勵的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)：只有把股權(quán)激勵制度的設(shè)計(jì)與規(guī)范公司經(jīng)營管理結(jié)合起來,既考慮了股權(quán)激勵制度設(shè)計(jì)的合理性又研究了激勵對象本身的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好、需求層次等特定因素,才能設(shè)計(jì)出來切實(shí)可用的股權(quán)激勵方案,用好用活股權(quán)激勵制度這一利器,最終更有利于公司業(yè)績的提升。
[Abstract]:As a necessary innovation of the incentive system in the era of knowledge economy, the equity incentive system has the possibility of practical operation after the reform of the split share structure in the capital market of our country. As a state-owned holding listed financial company, China Merchants Bank has taken a big step forward in the exploration and practice of equity incentive system. Summing up and studying the gain and loss of equity incentive system of China Merchants Bank is of great significance for the further implementation of equity incentive system in state-owned holding enterprises in China. This paper gives a brief introduction to the equity incentive scheme of China Merchants Bank, and makes a theoretical analysis of the process of introduction and the design of the incentive system itself, and points out the advantages and disadvantages in the process of implementation. Then, by comparing the annual performance of China Merchants Bank from 2005 to 2011 and the performance of China Merchants Bank in A-share and H-share stock market, the correlation between CMB performance and stock price is studied. It is found that since China Merchants Bank implemented the H-share appreciation right Plan for senior managers, the performance of the company has not shown a high correlation with the stock price, and through the comparison with Minsheng Bank's performance data for four years, There is no significant difference between the implementation of H-share equity appreciation right plan and the performance of the company. Through analysis and comparison, it is found that the main reason for the above problems lies in the insufficient validity of the securities capital market in our country, and the stock price does not fully reflect all the market information; The design of the stock right incentive system of senior management does not have the internal motive force to push the stock price rising continuously, the incentive object does not meet the assumption condition required by the stock right incentive system operation, it is difficult to form the benign circle closed loop; The senior managers of enterprises have not formed effective market competition, and the selection and employment of this kind of personnel is not a complete market behavior, even though the establishment of equity incentive system is limited to their incentive and restraint role. The stock right incentive system of China Merchants Bank has some drawbacks and shortcomings in its operation. The solution lies in finding out the causes of the contradictions, and improving and revising them in a targeted way. To continue to improve the equity incentive system implementation of the necessary legal system to ensure conditions; We should further revise the linked conditions and acquisition methods of the equity incentive system, and continue to promote the establishment of a competitive market for human resources with vitality and a competitive market for products with fair opportunities. In the process of standardizing the management of the company, the further optimization of the property right system is carried out, and the equity incentive system is designed separately by distinguishing the three different levels of the enterprise and the people with different incentive needs. Effectively strengthen the implementation of equity incentive plan required by the staff degree of empowerment and ownership of the training. Through the analysis of the stock right incentive system of senior management personnel, it enriches the analysis of equity incentive system of China Merchants Bank, and provides reference and practical experience for the design of equity incentive scheme for key business personnel and important managers as well as ordinary employees. Therefore, in the process of designing and improving the equity incentive system, we have learned the experience and lessons of the senior managers' equity incentive: only by combining the design of the equity incentive system with the standardization of the management of the company, Considering not only the rationality of the design of equity incentive system, but also the risk preference, demand level and other specific factors of the incentive object itself, we can design a practical and usable equity incentive scheme and make good use of the active equity incentive system as a sharp weapon. Ultimately more conducive to the company's performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.33
本文編號：2327656
[Abstract]:As a necessary innovation of the incentive system in the era of knowledge economy, the equity incentive system has the possibility of practical operation after the reform of the split share structure in the capital market of our country. As a state-owned holding listed financial company, China Merchants Bank has taken a big step forward in the exploration and practice of equity incentive system. Summing up and studying the gain and loss of equity incentive system of China Merchants Bank is of great significance for the further implementation of equity incentive system in state-owned holding enterprises in China. This paper gives a brief introduction to the equity incentive scheme of China Merchants Bank, and makes a theoretical analysis of the process of introduction and the design of the incentive system itself, and points out the advantages and disadvantages in the process of implementation. Then, by comparing the annual performance of China Merchants Bank from 2005 to 2011 and the performance of China Merchants Bank in A-share and H-share stock market, the correlation between CMB performance and stock price is studied. It is found that since China Merchants Bank implemented the H-share appreciation right Plan for senior managers, the performance of the company has not shown a high correlation with the stock price, and through the comparison with Minsheng Bank's performance data for four years, There is no significant difference between the implementation of H-share equity appreciation right plan and the performance of the company. Through analysis and comparison, it is found that the main reason for the above problems lies in the insufficient validity of the securities capital market in our country, and the stock price does not fully reflect all the market information; The design of the stock right incentive system of senior management does not have the internal motive force to push the stock price rising continuously, the incentive object does not meet the assumption condition required by the stock right incentive system operation, it is difficult to form the benign circle closed loop; The senior managers of enterprises have not formed effective market competition, and the selection and employment of this kind of personnel is not a complete market behavior, even though the establishment of equity incentive system is limited to their incentive and restraint role. The stock right incentive system of China Merchants Bank has some drawbacks and shortcomings in its operation. The solution lies in finding out the causes of the contradictions, and improving and revising them in a targeted way. To continue to improve the equity incentive system implementation of the necessary legal system to ensure conditions; We should further revise the linked conditions and acquisition methods of the equity incentive system, and continue to promote the establishment of a competitive market for human resources with vitality and a competitive market for products with fair opportunities. In the process of standardizing the management of the company, the further optimization of the property right system is carried out, and the equity incentive system is designed separately by distinguishing the three different levels of the enterprise and the people with different incentive needs. Effectively strengthen the implementation of equity incentive plan required by the staff degree of empowerment and ownership of the training. Through the analysis of the stock right incentive system of senior management personnel, it enriches the analysis of equity incentive system of China Merchants Bank, and provides reference and practical experience for the design of equity incentive scheme for key business personnel and important managers as well as ordinary employees. Therefore, in the process of designing and improving the equity incentive system, we have learned the experience and lessons of the senior managers' equity incentive: only by combining the design of the equity incentive system with the standardization of the management of the company, Considering not only the rationality of the design of equity incentive system, but also the risk preference, demand level and other specific factors of the incentive object itself, we can design a practical and usable equity incentive scheme and make good use of the active equity incentive system as a sharp weapon. Ultimately more conducive to the company's performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.33
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