本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 過度投資��； 參考：《南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)濟(jì)高速發(fā)展也帶來了過度投資現(xiàn)象的出現(xiàn)，企業(yè)作為投資的主體，其投資效率一直是公司治理的核心。投資行為直接影響公司經(jīng)營發(fā)展的方向和未來現(xiàn)金流增長的速度乃至企業(yè)價(jià)值。 股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種制約過度投資的方法，于2005年底得到了我國法律上的認(rèn)可，實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司也從最初的43家到2011年末的114家。但是同時(shí)必須也注意到股權(quán)激勵(lì)才剛剛在我國實(shí)施，股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度與公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)制度還處在磨合階段，因此我國上市公司是否適合股權(quán)激勵(lì)的制度或者如何建立我國自己的股權(quán)激勵(lì)都是國內(nèi)學(xué)者對股權(quán)激勵(lì)研究的核心內(nèi)容。 本文針對股權(quán)激勵(lì)對上市公司的過度投資的影響研究，在股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論和過度投資驅(qū)動(dòng)理論的基礎(chǔ)上，結(jié)合我國上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)的現(xiàn)狀，引入股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)的沖突并給與理論分析提出假設(shè)。 實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)部分，，對于過度投資的識(shí)別，本文采用了Richardson（2006）預(yù)期投資模型選取了2006-2011的上市公司作為初始研究樣本進(jìn)行研究，采用面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析統(tǒng)計(jì)，方程的殘差表示實(shí)際投資額與預(yù)期投資額的差值，殘差為正則為過度投資，從而篩選出過度投資的數(shù)據(jù)。在檢驗(yàn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)對過度投資影響分析中，首先對股權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)行內(nèi)生性檢驗(yàn)。在確定股權(quán)激勵(lì)不存在內(nèi)生性后，股權(quán)激勵(lì)與過度投資直接的回歸方程顯示，股權(quán)激勵(lì)對過度投資不存在顯著影響。引入本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)，股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)的沖突概念后，股權(quán)激勵(lì)對過度投資存在了顯著的抑制作用。然后本文選取了股東控股模式、股權(quán)性質(zhì)、股權(quán)制衡度和公司成長性四個(gè)指標(biāo)看其如何影響股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)的沖突，從而影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)對過度投資的效果。 本文的主要幾個(gè)結(jié)論：①股權(quán)激勵(lì)對過度投資存在顯著的抑制作用；②股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在沖突；③絕對控股下，即股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)并不存在沖突，相對控股模式下，股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在很大的沖突，抑制了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果；④非國家終極控股公司的股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在著沖突；⑤股權(quán)制衡度抑制了沖突（雖然是非顯著的）；⑥公司成長速度越高，股東控制權(quán)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)的沖突越高。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of economy also brings the phenomenon of excessive investment. As the main body of investment, the investment efficiency of enterprises is always the core of corporate governance. Investment behavior directly affects the direction of business development, the growth rate of cash flow and even the enterprise value. As a method of restricting excessive investment, equity incentive has been approved by law in our country at the end of 2005. The companies that implement equity incentive also have 114 companies from the beginning of 43 to the end of 2011. But at the same time, we must also notice that equity incentive has just been implemented in our country, and the equity incentive system is still in the running-in stage with the equity structure of the company and the enterprise system. Therefore, whether the listed companies in China are suitable for equity incentive system or how to establish their own equity incentive is the core content of domestic scholars' research on equity incentive. Based on the theory of equity incentive and the theory of overinvestment, this paper studies the influence of equity incentive on the overinvestment of listed companies, and combines the present situation of equity structure and equity incentive of listed companies in our country. The conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive is introduced and theoretical analysis is given. In the empirical test part, for the identification of overinvestment, this paper adopts Richardson's expected investment model to select the listed companies in 2006-2011 as the initial research sample, and uses panel data to analyze and statistics. The residuals of the equation represent the difference between the actual investment and the expected investment, and the residuals are regular as overinvestment, and the data of overinvestment are screened out. In the analysis of the impact of equity incentive on excessive investment, the endogenous test of equity incentive is carried out. After determining that there is no endogenous equity incentive, the regression equation between equity incentive and overinvestment shows that there is no significant effect of equity incentive on overinvestment. After the introduction of the concept of conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive, equity incentive has a significant inhibitory effect on overinvestment. Then this paper selects four indicators of shareholder controlling mode, equity nature, equity balance degree and company growth to see how they affect the conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive, thus affecting the effect of equity incentive on overinvestment. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) there is a significant inhibition of overinvestment by the equity incentive of 1: 2 there is a conflict between the shareholder's control right and the equity incentive, that is, there is no conflict between the shareholder's right of control and the equity incentive under absolute control. Under the relative holding mode, there is a great conflict between the shareholder control right and the equity incentive, which inhibits the effect of the equity incentive. (4) there is a conflict between the shareholder control right and the equity incentive of the non-state ultimate holding company. (5) the degree of equity balance restrains the conflict (although the higher the growth rate of the unremarkable company, the higher the conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 李鑫;;中國上市公司過度投資行為、程度與形成機(jī)理[J];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2007年06期

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