本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：代理成本　出處：《吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：兩權(quán)分離導(dǎo)致了現(xiàn)代企業(yè)代理成本的出現(xiàn),成為了公司治理過程中的一個(gè)非常突出的問題。為了解決這一問題,大多數(shù)上市公司將股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)長期戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的一種手段。但無論是國外學(xué)者還是國內(nèi)學(xué)者通過對(duì)已經(jīng)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司研究發(fā)現(xiàn),從長期來看,股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司經(jīng)營業(yè)績的增長并沒有特別明顯的效果。就實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)有何原因,學(xué)者們看法不一,他們對(duì)是否實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)持完全相反的兩種意見。支持實(shí)施激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的學(xué)者認(rèn)為上市公司之所以實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)是為了促使股東與企業(yè)高管達(dá)成一致的目標(biāo),從而減輕企業(yè)的代理成本;反對(duì)者則認(rèn)為股權(quán)激勵(lì)會(huì)導(dǎo)致高管借此謀取個(gè)人利益從而危害公司利益。目前現(xiàn)有的大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)主要集中公司業(yè)績與實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否有正相關(guān)關(guān)系,很少有從實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的動(dòng)因分析的。本文采用案例分析法、文獻(xiàn)研究法以及比較分析法三種研究方法。第一章是引言部分,對(duì)本文的研究背景及意義進(jìn)行了闡述,進(jìn)行國內(nèi)外研究綜述,介紹本文的研究框架及方法,同時(shí)還強(qiáng)調(diào)了本文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新點(diǎn);第二章介紹股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)概念與理論基礎(chǔ),即激勵(lì)理論、委托代理理論和人力資本理論;第三章對(duì)安科生物兩次股權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)行了相應(yīng)介紹,并分析了該公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的動(dòng)因與內(nèi)容,在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了第二期股權(quán)激勵(lì)相比第一期股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃有何變化以及造成這種變化的原因;第四章對(duì)安科生物股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行分析,圍繞著財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)、市場反應(yīng)、投資水平三個(gè)角度,從償債能力、盈利能力、發(fā)展能力、營運(yùn)能力、經(jīng)營業(yè)績、研發(fā)支出等方面對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行全面地分析及評(píng)價(jià),在此基礎(chǔ)上指出了激勵(lì)方案的優(yōu)點(diǎn)及存在的問題;第五章針對(duì)安科生物股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案存在的問題提出了相關(guān)建設(shè)性對(duì)策與建議。
[Abstract]:The separation of two rights leads to the emergence of agency cost in modern enterprises and becomes a very prominent problem in the process of corporate governance.In order to solve this problem, most listed companies use equity incentive as a means to achieve their long-term strategic objectives.However, whether foreign scholars or domestic scholars through the implementation of equity incentive plans of listed companies found that, from a long-term perspective, equity incentives on the growth of corporate performance is not particularly significant effect.Scholars are divided on why equity incentives are being implemented, with two opposing views on whether to implement them.Scholars who support the implementation of incentive plan believe that the reason why listed companies implement equity incentive is to promote shareholders and corporate executives to reach an agreed goal, thereby reducing the agency costs of enterprises;Opponents argue that equity incentives can lead executives to use them for personal gain and harm the company.At present, most of the existing literatures mainly focus on whether there is a positive correlation between corporate performance and the implementation of equity incentive, and few of them are analyzed from the motivation of implementing equity incentive.This paper adopts three research methods: case analysis, literature research and comparative analysis.The first chapter is the introduction, the research background and significance of this paper are described, the domestic and foreign research review, the introduction of this research framework and methods, but also stressed the main innovative points of this paper;The second chapter introduces the related concepts and theoretical basis of equity incentive, that is, incentive theory, principal-agent theory and human capital theory.On the basis of the analysis of the motivation and content of the equity incentive, this paper analyzes the change of the second phase of the equity incentive compared with the first phase of the equity incentive plan and the reasons for the change.On the basis of the analysis and evaluation of the effect of equity incentive, the advantages and problems of the incentive scheme are pointed out.In the fifth chapter, some constructive countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to solve the problems existing in Amco's equity incentive scheme.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.72;F272.92

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 鄒琪;劉錦虹;洪侃;羅丹;;科技型企業(yè)研發(fā)投入對(duì)企業(yè)績效影響的實(shí)證研究[J];金融與經(jīng)濟(jì);2014年09期

2 李爭光;趙西卜;曹豐;盧曉璇;;機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性與企業(yè)績效——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];審計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2014年05期

3 夏蕓;;管理者權(quán)力、股權(quán)激勵(lì)與研發(fā)投資——基于中國上市公司的實(shí)證分析[J];研究與發(fā)展管理;2014年04期

4 郭曉鳳;周玉晶;白雪;;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的相關(guān)性研究[J];金融經(jīng)濟(jì);2014年14期

5 張麗萍;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)的業(yè)績效應(yīng)——來自我國上市公司的實(shí)證研究[J];經(jīng)營與管理;2014年06期

6 周嘉南;雷霆;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)影響上市公司權(quán)益資本成本了嗎?[J];管理評(píng)論;2014年03期

7 宋麗麗;;我國中小板上市企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績效的相關(guān)性研究[J];經(jīng)營管理者;2014年07期

8 文學(xué)舟;梅強(qiáng);;基于主成分分析的三種擔(dān)保機(jī)構(gòu)經(jīng)營績效比較及評(píng)價(jià)——以江蘇擔(dān)保實(shí)踐為例[J];華東經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2013年06期

9 朱禮華;孫業(yè)亮;;人力資本理論與人力資源管理實(shí)踐的融合——基于歷史演變的視角[J];現(xiàn)代管理科學(xué);2013年02期

10 范合君;初梓豪;;股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司績效倒U型影響[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究;2013年02期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 盧雄鷹;中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題研究[D];華東師范大學(xué);2013年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 張娟;上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)行權(quán)條件的問題研究[D];財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所;2013年

，

本文編號(hào)：1711829