發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-02-24 12:31

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新 知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán) 權(quán)利歸屬 利益分配 機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)　出處：《電子科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,持續(xù)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新已經(jīng)成為企業(yè)尋找和維持其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的重要來源。通過技術(shù)創(chuàng)新,企業(yè)可以實(shí)現(xiàn)產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的差異化,降低生產(chǎn)成本并生產(chǎn)出不同的產(chǎn)品來滿足不同消費(fèi)者的需求。而技術(shù)創(chuàng)新也有由原來的應(yīng)用研究向應(yīng)用基礎(chǔ)研究和基礎(chǔ)研究延伸的趨勢(shì),其難度越來越大。大學(xué)是知識(shí)的發(fā)源地,具有知識(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。企業(yè)和大學(xué)合作進(jìn)行應(yīng)用研究和應(yīng)用基礎(chǔ)研究,可以有效彌補(bǔ)企業(yè)缺乏技術(shù)研發(fā)能力的不足,在企業(yè)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新中起到了重要作用,已經(jīng)成為大學(xué)服務(wù)于社會(huì)的重要方式,成為國(guó)家創(chuàng)新體系的重要組成部分。產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的順利開展依賴于產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新成果的合理分配,需要良好的分配機(jī)制規(guī)范、激勵(lì)雙方的合作。在我國(guó)的產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新中,大約有50%的合作由于利益分配不合理而失敗了。研究產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的技術(shù)成果的權(quán)益分配機(jī)制,對(duì)于促進(jìn)產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的順利開展有著積極的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文應(yīng)用了博弈論的理論分析和案例分析的方法,對(duì)產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新進(jìn)行研究。具體而言,論文的主要工作如下:(1)歸納了產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)益分配的研究現(xiàn)狀,分析了產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的階段劃分,即研究開發(fā)階段、商業(yè)化階段;(2)結(jié)合博弈論、委托代理理論等理論基礎(chǔ),根據(jù)產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的過程和階段劃分,分析了產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新中的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈行為,也就是大學(xué)和企業(yè)在產(chǎn)學(xué)合作過程中其地位、作用在發(fā)生變化,在合作的不同階段扮演不同的角色;(3)利用委托代理理論和博弈論,構(gòu)建了產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)益分配的博弈模型,分析和求解了研究開發(fā)、商業(yè)化2個(gè)階段的均衡解和最優(yōu)解,得出了研究開發(fā)、商業(yè)化階段的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)利歸屬及應(yīng)用科技成果的收益分配的理論解;(4)對(duì)E大學(xué)和M集團(tuán)的產(chǎn)學(xué)合作進(jìn)行分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)理論求解的研究結(jié)論比較符合實(shí)際情況,驗(yàn)證了理論研究結(jié)論,同時(shí)企業(yè)的實(shí)踐也豐富、擴(kuò)展了理論研究。本文利用博弈論、委托代理理論,對(duì)產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)權(quán)利歸屬和利益分配進(jìn)行了模型構(gòu)建、理論求解、案例分析,希望能為產(chǎn)學(xué)合作創(chuàng)新的利益分配提供有益的借鑒。
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, continuous technological innovation has become an important source for enterprises to find and maintain their competitive advantage. Through technological innovation, enterprises can realize the differentiation of products and services. Reducing production costs and producing different products to meet the needs of different consumers, and technological innovation also has a trend from the original applied research to applied basic research and basic research. Universities are the birthplace of knowledge and have the advantages of knowledge discovery. Cooperation between enterprises and universities in applied research and applied basic research can effectively make up for the lack of technological R & D capability of enterprises. It has played an important role in the technological innovation of enterprises and has become an important way for universities to serve society. As an important part of the national innovation system, the smooth development of the cooperation innovation depends on the rational distribution of the achievements of the industry-learning cooperation innovation, which requires a good distribution mechanism to encourage the cooperation between the two sides. About 50% of the cooperation has failed because of the unreasonable distribution of benefits. It has positive theoretical and practical significance for promoting the smooth development of industry-learning cooperative innovation. This paper applies the theoretical analysis of game theory and the method of case analysis to study the innovation of industry-learning cooperation. The main work of this paper is as follows: (1) the paper summarizes the current situation of the research on the innovation of industry-learning cooperation and the distribution of intellectual property rights and interests, and analyzes the division of the stages of the industry-learning cooperative innovation, that is, the stage of research and development, the stage of commercialization, and the game theory. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the dynamic game behavior in the innovation of industry-learning cooperation based on the division of the process and stages, that is, the role of universities and enterprises in the process of industry-learning cooperation is changing. Based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper constructs a game model of intellectual property rights and interests distribution of industry-learning cooperation and innovation, and analyzes and solves the research and development. The equilibrium solution and optimal solution of the two stages of commercialization, and the theoretical analysis of the ownership of intellectual property rights in R & D, and the distribution of income from the application of scientific and technological achievements in the commercial stage. (4) the analysis of the industrial and academic cooperation between E University and M Group. It is found that the conclusion of theoretical solution is more in line with the actual situation, which verifies the conclusion of theoretical research, and at the same time, the practice of enterprises is also rich, expanding the theoretical research. This paper uses game theory, principal-agent theory, This paper sets up a model, theoretical solution and case analysis of intellectual property right ownership and benefit distribution of industrial and academic cooperation innovation, hoping to provide a useful reference for the benefit distribution of industrial and academic cooperation innovation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F204

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本文編號(hào)：1530248