論知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法與反不正當(dāng)競爭法的關(guān)系
本文關(guān)鍵詞:論知識產(chǎn)權(quán)法與反不正當(dāng)競爭法的關(guān)系 出處:《蘇州大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
更多相關(guān)文章: 工具論 公共政策 特權(quán) 模仿 擴(kuò)充保護(hù)
【摘要】:現(xiàn)代知識產(chǎn)權(quán)起源于十五世紀(jì)歐洲封建統(tǒng)治者授予的特權(quán),獲得這種特權(quán)的人可以在相關(guān)商品的市場上處于壟斷地位,自由競爭被人為扼制。隨著封建特權(quán)及壟斷逐漸被廢除,知識產(chǎn)權(quán)也逐漸地從特權(quán)向私權(quán)演化,但是現(xiàn)代知識產(chǎn)權(quán)作為調(diào)節(jié)市場競爭關(guān)系的政策的功能沒有變,其根本目的在于促進(jìn)公共利益的實(shí)現(xiàn),本質(zhì)上仍然是一種特權(quán)。在權(quán)利界線以內(nèi),他人未經(jīng)許可使用既是侵權(quán)也是不正當(dāng)競爭。界線外是公眾的自由,當(dāng)然公眾的自由也是有限度的,這個限度就在于不得影響他人的消極自由。一般情況下,市場競爭下的模仿行為是被允許的,但保護(hù)知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的核心在于禁止模仿,,二者在模仿問題上形成了沖突,對知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù),關(guān)鍵也在于解決這一問題。要將市場競爭下的模仿行為和知識產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域的模仿行為區(qū)別開,關(guān)鍵是把握好模仿行為的度。這個度的本質(zhì)在于這種模仿是否構(gòu)成了不正當(dāng)競爭,是否有違利益平衡原則。知識產(chǎn)權(quán)侵權(quán)行為本質(zhì)上也是一種不正當(dāng)競爭,只是法律授予專利權(quán)人、商標(biāo)所有權(quán)人和著作權(quán)人以專有權(quán),使權(quán)利人擁有了制止侵權(quán)行為的法律武器。但是因?yàn)闊o形財產(chǎn)的抽象性,其本身界限的不確定性,國家不可能、也不愿意對所有的無形財產(chǎn)給予相關(guān)主體以某種專有權(quán)或者以專門的法律進(jìn)行規(guī)制;诜床徽(dāng)競爭也具備阻止模仿的功能,人們就把尋求保護(hù)的目光轉(zhuǎn)向于此以擴(kuò)張知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù)。反不正當(dāng)競爭法的原則性條款并不表明它是對知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的補(bǔ)充保護(hù),而僅僅是對反不正當(dāng)競爭禁止模仿行為的本質(zhì)的描述。知識產(chǎn)權(quán)制度為利害關(guān)系人提供保護(hù),是為了鼓勵對知識創(chuàng)造的投資,而鼓勵到何種程度則受制于公共利益。知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的目標(biāo)從來就不在于為知識財產(chǎn)主體提供一種完全性的保護(hù),這有違它的公共政策目標(biāo),反不正當(dāng)競爭法也只是擴(kuò)充了相關(guān)知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù),這個擴(kuò)張的程度要符合公共政策的目標(biāo)。
[Abstract]:To the modern intellectual property rights originated in Europe in fifteenth Century the feudal rulers of privilege, the privilege of people can obtain a monopoly in the relevant commodity market, free competition by artificial control. With the feudal privilege and monopoly was abolished gradually, intellectual property rights also gradually from privilege to private rights evolution, but the modern intellectual property rights as the regulation of market competition between the function of policy has not changed, its fundamental purpose is to promote the realization of public interest, the essence is still a privilege. Within the boundary of the right, the unauthorized use of others is both a tort and an unfair competition. Outside the line is the freedom of the public, of course, the freedom of the public is also limited, and this limit is not to affect the negative freedom of others. Generally speaking, imitation behavior under market competition is allowed, but the core of protecting intellectual property is to prohibit imitation. The two parties form conflict on imitation. The key to protect intellectual property is to solve this problem. In order to distinguish the imitation behavior from the market competition and the imitative behavior in the field of intellectual property, the key is to grasp the degree of the imitation behavior. The essence of this degree is whether this imitation constitutes an unfair competition, or whether it violates the principle of balance of interests. The infringement of intellectual property is also a kind of unfair competition. Only the law grants the patentor, the trademark owner and the copyright owner the exclusive right, so that the obligee has the legal weapon to stop the infringement. However, because of the uncertainty of the intangible property and its own boundaries, the state can not and will not give all the intangible property to the related subjects with some exclusive rights or special laws. Because anti unfair competition also has the function of preventing imitation, people turn to the protection of intellectual property. The principle clause of anti unfair competition law does not indicate that it is a supplementary protection for intellectual property, but a description of the essence of the prohibition of imitation behavior against unfair competition. The intellectual property system provides protection to stakeholders to encourage investment in knowledge creation, and to the extent to which it is encouraged by the public interest. The goal of intellectual property protection is never a complete intellectual property as the subject, this is contrary to public policy goals, anti unfair competition law is the expansion of intellectual property protection, the extent of the expansion to meet the goal of public policy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:蘇州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:D923.4;D922.294
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