本文選題：公職人員 + 經(jīng)濟犯罪�。� 參考：《太原科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪不僅給國家?guī)砹司薮蟮慕?jīng)濟損失，而且還會侵蝕黨的執(zhí)政基礎(chǔ)，影響惡劣。十八大以來，大批官員的落馬，進一步彰顯了政府打擊公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪的決心。然而，在中國由于制度障礙、理論障礙、觀念障礙和技術(shù)障礙的存在使得財產(chǎn)申報制度在短期內(nèi)還難以實行；現(xiàn)金交易和以物行賄的存在也使得僅僅依靠反洗錢技術(shù)監(jiān)測公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪存在較大漏洞；同時舉報受理機構(gòu)不明確、舉報程序不規(guī)范、對舉報人保護的規(guī)定不完善等問題的存在也使得舉報這一制度在監(jiān)測公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪中沒有起到應(yīng)有的重要作用。因此尋求一種適應(yīng)于我國現(xiàn)狀的公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪監(jiān)測手段已勢在必行。 本文以公職人員家庭為基本監(jiān)測單元，從經(jīng)濟犯罪公職人員家庭的異常特征入手，，構(gòu)建了公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪監(jiān)測模型，并出于監(jiān)測的角度提出遏制公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪的對策建議，主要研究內(nèi)容如下： （1）通過典型案例分析，從銀行賬戶、心理、消費、待人處事和工作五個方面探究了不法公職人員具有的異常特征，并針對其中的異常消費特征進行了重點分析。 （2）基于不法公職人員總體異常特征，構(gòu)建公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪監(jiān)測指標(biāo)體系。首先，通過專家評分、層次分析等方法對指標(biāo)進行量化和權(quán)重的設(shè)計；其次，以三個案例對監(jiān)測指標(biāo)的適用性進行了驗證。 （3）基于不法公職人員異常消費特征，構(gòu)建公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪監(jiān)測模型。首先，提出以家庭為基本單元，從收入和消費兩條主線進行監(jiān)測的思路；其次，結(jié)合賬戶監(jiān)測和消費監(jiān)測，分別從收入、消費方向和消費總額出發(fā)制定了三條監(jiān)測準(zhǔn)則。 （4）對所構(gòu)建的監(jiān)測模型進行了仿真驗證。首先，通過實驗的方法模擬生成收入、消費等監(jiān)測數(shù)據(jù)；其次，運用擴展線性支出模型對監(jiān)測準(zhǔn)則的閥值進行確定；第三，通過經(jīng)濟犯罪公職人員發(fā)現(xiàn)覆蓋度、經(jīng)濟犯罪公職人員監(jiān)測誤報率和漏報率對監(jiān)測結(jié)果進行評價。 最后，基于監(jiān)測角度從完善財產(chǎn)申報制度，暢通舉報渠道和完善舉報形式等方面提出遏制公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪的對策建議。
[Abstract]:Economic crimes of public officials not only bring huge economic losses to the country, but also erode the ruling foundation of the Party. Since the 18th National Congress, the fall of a large number of officials has further demonstrated the government's determination to crack down on public officials' economic crimes. However, in China, the property declaration system is difficult to implement in the short term due to the existence of institutional, theoretical, conceptual and technical obstacles. The existence of cash transactions and bribery in rem also makes it possible to rely solely on anti-money laundering techniques to monitor economic crimes committed by public officials. At the same time, the reporting agencies are not clear and the reporting procedures are not standardized. The imperfection of the protection of whistleblowers makes the reporting system not play an important role in the monitoring of economic crimes of public officials. Therefore, it is imperative to seek a method to monitor the economic crimes of public officials in our country. Taking the family of public officials as the basic monitoring unit, this paper starts with the abnormal characteristics of the families of public officials in economic crimes, and constructs a monitoring model of economic crimes of public officials. From the angle of monitoring, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to curb the economic crimes of public officials. The main contents of the study are as follows: 1) through the typical case analysis, this paper probes into the abnormal characteristics of illegal public officials from five aspects of bank account, psychology, consumption, dealing with people and working, and focuses on the analysis of abnormal consumption characteristics. Based on the general abnormal characteristics of illegal public officials, the monitoring index system of public officials' economic crimes is constructed. Firstly, the index is quantified and weight is designed by expert scoring and hierarchical analysis. Secondly, the applicability of the monitoring index is verified by three cases. Based on the abnormal consumption characteristics of illegal public officials, the monitoring model of economic crimes for public officials is constructed. Firstly, this paper puts forward the idea of monitoring from two main lines of income and consumption, taking the family as the basic unit. Secondly, combined with account monitoring and consumption monitoring, three monitoring criteria are formulated from the perspective of income, consumption direction and total consumption. Finally, the monitoring model is simulated and verified. First, through the experimental method to simulate the generation of income, consumption and other monitoring data; secondly, the use of extended linear expenditure model to determine the threshold of the monitoring criteria; third, through the economic crime of public officials found coverage, Economic crime public officials monitor false positive rate and false report rate to evaluate the monitoring results. Finally, from the angle of monitoring, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to curb the economic crimes of public officials from the aspects of perfecting the property declaration system, unblocking the reporting channels and perfecting the reporting forms.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：太原科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D924.3

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