本文選題：公司 + 董事�。� 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2004年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代公司法上的一個重要特征就是企業(yè)所有與企業(yè)經(jīng)營的分離，并由此導(dǎo)致了股東大會中心主義向董事會中心主義的變遷。在這種歷史現(xiàn)實(shí)面前，一般股東是不可能直接參與公司的具體經(jīng)營和管理的，而董事會的經(jīng)營權(quán)限則日益膨脹。權(quán)利與義務(wù)如影同行。在擴(kuò)張權(quán)利的同時，若不強(qiáng)化與其相對應(yīng)的義務(wù)，則權(quán)利難免有被濫用之虞。因此在鼓勵公司經(jīng)營者充分施展其才干，以創(chuàng)造更多的公司盈利和股東投資回報(bào)的同時，適度強(qiáng)化經(jīng)營者特別是董事對于公司和股東所負(fù)擔(dān)的法律義務(wù)，避免和減少經(jīng)營者的濫用權(quán)力行為，實(shí)屬理之當(dāng)然。世界諸國的公司法無不對董事義務(wù)作出規(guī)定，我國也不例外。但應(yīng)當(dāng)承認(rèn)，我國《公司法》關(guān)于董事的義務(wù)和責(zé)任的規(guī)定是不完善的。本文從分析董事義務(wù)確立的基礎(chǔ)也就是公司與董事的關(guān)系入手，通過介紹大陸法系、英美法系國家董事義務(wù)制度的內(nèi)容，對我國公司立法中董事義務(wù)的規(guī)定進(jìn)行評析并對我國董事義務(wù)制度的完善提出相應(yīng)的立法建議。本論文共分為三個部分。 第一章論述了董事義務(wù)確立的基礎(chǔ)。在法律上如何確立董事的義務(wù)取決于董事與公司的關(guān)系。基于不同的董事與公司之間的關(guān)系，董事的義務(wù)也不盡相同。首先，介紹了英美法系關(guān)于董事與公司的法律關(guān)系的學(xué)說，即信托關(guān)系說和代理關(guān)系說并分別進(jìn)行了評析。其次，介紹了大陸法系關(guān)于董事與公司的法律關(guān)系的學(xué)說，即委任關(guān)系說，，并進(jìn)行了評析。還對英美法系的代理關(guān)系說與大陸法系傳統(tǒng)的委任關(guān)系說進(jìn)行了比較，得出兩者對于董事與公司關(guān)系的認(rèn)識從本質(zhì)上說并非對立而 WP=46 是十分接近的觀點(diǎn)。最后，通過比較分析，得出委任關(guān)系與信托關(guān)系實(shí)質(zhì)上是統(tǒng)一的，不能將現(xiàn)代公司法上的公司與董事關(guān)系嚴(yán)格地還原為信托、代理或委任等傳統(tǒng)私法上的法律關(guān)系。我國董事義務(wù)確立的基礎(chǔ)即公司與董事之間的法律關(guān)系由我國的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)決定，構(gòu)成一種公司法上的董事權(quán)力責(zé)任關(guān)系和權(quán)利義務(wù)關(guān)系。 第二章為董事義務(wù)制度的內(nèi)容。首先歸納出董事義務(wù)制度的一般內(nèi)容。董事對公司主要負(fù)有兩大義務(wù)，即注意義務(wù)和忠實(shí)義務(wù)。注意義務(wù)產(chǎn)生的根源是公司與董事間的委任關(guān)系，其實(shí)質(zhì)是一種管理義務(wù)。其含義是：董事須以一個合理的謹(jǐn)慎的人在相似的情形下所應(yīng)表現(xiàn)的謹(jǐn)慎、勤勉和技能履行其職責(zé)，否則依據(jù)法律和章程就要承擔(dān)相應(yīng)的責(zé)任。對其評判要兼顧主客觀兩方面。主觀上，董事應(yīng)依誠信原則竭力處理公司事務(wù)；客觀上，董事應(yīng)盡到與其具有相同知識、經(jīng)驗(yàn)的人所應(yīng)履行的注意程度。對注意程度的判斷，各國一般采用客觀性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。所謂忠實(shí)義務(wù)，即董事必須竭盡忠誠地為公司工作并誠實(shí)地履行職責(zé)。其理論基礎(chǔ)是董事與公司間的信托關(guān)系。其在實(shí)質(zhì)上要求董事經(jīng)營和管理公司的業(yè)務(wù)，毫無保留地代表全體股東為公司最大利益努力工作，當(dāng)其自身利益與公司整體利益發(fā)生沖突時，后者優(yōu)先。注意義務(wù)與忠實(shí)義務(wù)的關(guān)系是相互聯(lián)系、相互區(qū)別。經(jīng)過比較分析，筆者得出結(jié)論，兩者均屬信義義務(wù)，其結(jié)合利于促使董事為公司利益最大化努力工作。其次，結(jié)合美國董事義務(wù)制度的內(nèi)容介紹了獨(dú)立董事制度中董事應(yīng)有的義務(wù)內(nèi)容。目的在于為我國獨(dú)立董事制度義務(wù)內(nèi)容的確立提供借鑒。 第三章為我國董事義務(wù)制度的評析及其完善。首先介紹了我國董事義務(wù)制度的特點(diǎn)和我國現(xiàn)行立法中董事義務(wù)規(guī)定的不足之處。我國董事義務(wù)制度的特點(diǎn)是強(qiáng)調(diào)公司機(jī)關(guān)設(shè)置上相互制 WP=47 衡，對董事必須履行的積極義務(wù)和不得從事的利益沖突交易之規(guī)定傾向于原則規(guī)定而缺少具體范圍限定和操作程序規(guī)定。我國《公司法》的規(guī)定與公司法乃至整個民商法體系中對董事責(zé)任與義務(wù)應(yīng)然的要求相比，還遠(yuǎn)不夠成熟、完善。就注意義務(wù)來說，我國《公司法》未對董事的注意義務(wù)加以規(guī)定，造成立法上的漏洞；就忠實(shí)義務(wù)來說，規(guī)定了忠實(shí)義務(wù)的內(nèi)涵與外延，規(guī)定了違反忠實(shí)義務(wù)的法律責(zé)任。其他法律的規(guī)定則較零散，制定機(jī)關(guān)也不統(tǒng)一。從積極性規(guī)定看董事忠實(shí)義務(wù)，我國沒有明確完善的忠實(shí)義務(wù)規(guī)定，這加大了公司、股東監(jiān)督董事的難度。從消極性規(guī)定看董事忠實(shí)義務(wù)，其不足之處在于：第一，忠實(shí)義務(wù)的范圍比較窄；第二，對違反自我交易制度的法律后果缺乏規(guī)定；第三，其他缺陷。其次，筆者分別從完善董事的注意義務(wù)和忠實(shí)義務(wù)兩個方面對完善我國董事義務(wù)制度提出建議。關(guān)于完善董事注意義務(wù)的立法建議，有三種途徑：一是在修訂《民法典》時，明確董事與公司存在委任關(guān)系和信托關(guān)系；二是修改《公司法》，概括性地確立董事的注意義務(wù)，并明確判斷的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；三是制定法規(guī)要求各公司在其章程中明確董事對公司所應(yīng)負(fù)的具體注意義務(wù)及判斷的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。關(guān)于完善董事忠實(shí)義務(wù)的立法建議，從四個方面加以論述：第一，應(yīng)完善董事競業(yè)禁止義務(wù)制度；第二，應(yīng)完善董事自我交易制度；第三，應(yīng)完善董事濫用公司財(cái)產(chǎn)禁止制度；第四，應(yīng)完善股東訴權(quán)制度。最后，筆者對當(dāng)前《公司法》修改草案進(jìn)行了簡要評析，并建議草案的起草者和設(shè)計(jì)者能夠進(jìn)一步修改草案相關(guān)內(nèi)容，使草案中關(guān)于董事義務(wù)制度的規(guī)定更加科學(xué)化和完善化。
[Abstract]:It is an important feature of modern company law to separate all the enterprises from the business , and thus lead to the change of the central principle of the shareholders ' meeting to the center of the board of directors . In the face of this historical reality , the general shareholders are not directly involved in the specific operation and management of the company , and the business authority of the board of directors is not perfect .








The first chapter discusses the foundation of the establishment of the director ' s obligation . How to establish the director ' s obligation in law depends on the relationship between the director and the company . According to the relationship between the director and the company , the director ' s obligation is different .

















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Finally , through comparative analysis , it is concluded that the relationship between the appointment and the trust is uniform , and the relationship between the company and the director in the modern company law can not be reduced to the legal relation on the traditional private law such as trust , agency or appointment . The legal relationship between the company and the director is determined by the economic foundation of our country , and constitutes a relationship between the power responsibility and the rights and obligations of the directors in the Company Law .








The second chapter is the content of the director ' s obligation system . First , the general contents of the director ' s obligation system are summarized . The director has two major obligations to the company , namely , pay attention to the obligation and the loyalty obligation .
On the basis of comparative analysis , the author concludes that both belong to the trust relationship between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company .








The third chapter is the analysis and perfection of the system of director ' s duty in our country . Firstly , it introduces the characteristics of our director ' s obligation system and the deficiency of the director ' s obligation in our country ' s current legislation .

















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It is not enough mature and perfect for the directors ' duty and obligation in the company law and the whole civil and commercial law system .
In terms of the faithful obligations , the connotation and extension of the faithful obligations are stipulated , which lays down the legal responsibility for the breach of the faithful obligation . The provisions of other laws are scattered , and the establishment of the organs is not unified . From the initiative regulation the director ' s duty is not established , and the difficulty of the company and shareholders to supervise the directors is strengthened . The deficiency of the directors ' duty to the directors from the provisions of the negative polarity is that the scope of the first and faithful obligations is narrower ;
Second , the lack of provisions on the legal consequences of a breach of the self - trading system ;
Thirdly , the author puts forward some suggestions on improving the director ' s duty system from two aspects of perfecting director ' s duty of attention and duty of loyalty .
The second is to amend the Company Law Firm to establish the notice obligation of the directors in general , and to make clear the standard of judgment ;
The third is to set up the laws and regulations to require the companies to make clear the specific attention obligation and the judgment standard of the directors to the company in their articles of association . The legislative suggestions on improving the loyalty of directors are discussed from four aspects : First , the system of director ' s competitive prohibition obligation should be perfected ;
Secondly , we should perfect the self - trading system of directors ;
Third , we should improve the company ' s property prohibition system .
Fourthly , we should perfect the system of shareholder ' s right of recourse . Finally , the author makes a brief comment on the draft amendment of the Company Law , and suggests that the drafter and the designer of the draft can further revise the relevant content of the draft , so as to make the regulation of the director ' s obligation system more scientific and perfect .
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號】：D912.29

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王宇維;公司董事自我交易規(guī)制研究[D];中國政法大學(xué);2007年

本文編號：1973205