【摘要】：近年來(lái),隨著國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行全部完成了兩地上市,國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的治理結(jié)構(gòu)得到了進(jìn)一步的完善。但是,眾所周知,股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)改革只是國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理整個(gè)系統(tǒng)工程的一部分,不能解決國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的一切問(wèn)題。本文從公司治理的理論基礎(chǔ)談起,分析了公司的內(nèi)部治理和外部治理,在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理與公司治理的共同點(diǎn)以及國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的特殊性,比較了現(xiàn)代商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的國(guó)際模式,從而提出了我國(guó)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司內(nèi)部治理的措施。全文共分四個(gè)部分:第一部分,對(duì)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理進(jìn)行法律界定,闡述國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的整個(gè)發(fā)展歷程;分析了因國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行具有的特殊性質(zhì)其治理具有的特殊性,分析了國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行完善公司治理所必須遵循的一般原則,分析了國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的理論目標(biāo)。第二部分,介紹了我國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理的現(xiàn)狀,在此基礎(chǔ)上,筆者分析了我國(guó)當(dāng)前我國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理所存在的問(wèn)題,并著重分析了國(guó)有股東一股獨(dú)大、內(nèi)部人控制、內(nèi)部治理機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置不完善、信息披露透明度低、缺乏有效的約束激勵(lì)機(jī)制等五個(gè)問(wèn)題。第三部分,運(yùn)用比較分析法,分別介紹了英美、德日四國(guó)商業(yè)銀行公司治理方面的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn),以期借鑒。最終目的是為我國(guó)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理不足尋找完善的途徑。第四部分,針對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理存在的問(wèn)題,有針對(duì)性的提出完善我國(guó)針對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理的思路,并提出相應(yīng)的建議:建立明晰的產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、促進(jìn)股權(quán)主體多元化、完善公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)、強(qiáng)化信息披露、建立科學(xué)的約束和激勵(lì)機(jī)制�？傊�,國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的公司治理是一項(xiàng)系統(tǒng)的復(fù)雜工程,需要長(zhǎng)期的不斷努力去建設(shè)和完善此項(xiàng)工程。需要內(nèi)部治理與外部治理互動(dòng)、相互作用。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the completion of the dual listing of state-owned commercial banks, the governance structure of state-owned commercial banks has been further improved. However, it is well known that the reform of ownership structure is only a part of the whole system project of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks, and it cannot solve all the problems of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. This paper starts with the theoretical basis of corporate governance, analyzes the internal and external governance of the company, and on this basis, analyzes the common ground between corporate governance and corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks and the particularity of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. This paper compares the international model of the corporate governance structure of modern commercial banks and puts forward the internal governance measures of the state-owned commercial banks in China. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part defines the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks, expounds the whole development process of the state-owned commercial banks, analyzes the particularity of its governance because of the special nature of the state-owned commercial banks. This paper analyzes the general principles which must be followed by the state-owned commercial banks to perfect the corporate governance, and analyzes the theoretical objectives of the corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks. The second part introduces the current situation of internal governance of commercial banks in China. On this basis, the author analyzes the problems existing in the internal governance of commercial banks in our country, and focuses on the analysis of the state-owned shareholders' dominance and insider control. There are five problems, such as imperfect setting of internal governance organization, low transparency of information disclosure and lack of effective constraint incentive mechanism. The third part, using comparative analysis, introduces the advanced experiences of commercial banks in Anglo-American, Germany and Japan, in order to learn from them. The ultimate aim is to find a perfect way to improve the internal governance of state-owned commercial banks. The fourth part, aiming at the problems existing in the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks in China, puts forward the idea of perfecting the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks in China, and puts forward the corresponding suggestions: to establish a clear structure of property rights. To promote the diversification of the main body of equity, to perfect the internal governance structure of the company, to strengthen the information disclosure, and to establish a scientific restraint and incentive mechanism. In a word, the corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks is a systematic and complex project, which needs to be built and perfected continuously for a long time. Need internal governance and external governance interaction and interaction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.281

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本文編號(hào)：2179631