本文選題：反壟斷法 + 縱向價(jià)格壟斷�。� 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是市場(chǎng)活力的來源,是保證市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)良性發(fā)展的前提條件。然而現(xiàn)行市場(chǎng)中存在大量限制排除競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的行為,其中縱向價(jià)格壟斷被廣泛運(yùn)用且隱蔽性極強(qiáng)。由于縱向壟斷的經(jīng)濟(jì)效果具有雙面性,各國(guó)對(duì)其本質(zhì)及其危害性認(rèn)識(shí)上有多方面考慮。不同的學(xué)派經(jīng)濟(jì)理論認(rèn)識(shí)也不一致,這些都影響著不同國(guó)家對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)政策的制定以及立法原則的選擇。日前國(guó)家發(fā)改委對(duì)茅臺(tái)和五糧液“限價(jià)令”的重罰和上海法院對(duì)“強(qiáng)生縱向限價(jià)案”的審判更是引來理論界廣泛的討論。國(guó)外對(duì)縱向價(jià)格壟斷主要分為三種態(tài)度：一是美國(guó)、韓國(guó),適用“合理原則”,運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)效率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作出是否違法的判定。二是歐盟及成員國(guó),采取“原則禁止+豁免”原則。三是日本、澳大利亞等國(guó),適用“本身違法”原則。我國(guó)《反壟斷法》對(duì)縱向價(jià)格壟斷協(xié)議的規(guī)定,與歐盟較為接近,核心包括“原則禁止”和“例外豁免”兩個(gè)方面,但在法律實(shí)務(wù)方面,近2年我國(guó)也逐步引入了合理分析機(jī)制。本文認(rèn)為：對(duì)縱向價(jià)格壟斷行為,以上3種原則各有利弊,不宜生硬套用“合理分析原則”,而是應(yīng)依據(jù)我國(guó)國(guó)情,對(duì)合理原則進(jìn)行改良,以“強(qiáng)生案”的二審判決為先導(dǎo),采用寬嚴(yán)相濟(jì)的“簡(jiǎn)明合理原則”,同時(shí)輔助建構(gòu)以市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)為主的分析模式。本論文從以下四個(gè)方面展開論述：第一部分,對(duì)縱向價(jià)格壟斷行為的基本問題進(jìn)行探討,分別敘述了縱向價(jià)格壟斷行為的含義、特征、分類,最后對(duì)縱向價(jià)格壟斷行為的經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了分析。第二部分,總結(jié)了國(guó)外對(duì)縱向價(jià)格壟斷行為的規(guī)制經(jīng)驗(yàn),該部分對(duì)美國(guó)、歐盟、日本的規(guī)制原則進(jìn)行了剖析,對(duì)本身違法原則、合理原則、原則禁止+例外豁免原則進(jìn)行了比較,總結(jié)了可供我國(guó)借鑒的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。第三部分,首先提出我國(guó)立法的原則,然后通過分析“白酒案”和“強(qiáng)生案”,總結(jié)我國(guó)司法和行政對(duì)縱向價(jià)格壟斷行為規(guī)制所適用的原則,提出本人的觀點(diǎn)。第四部分,就目前我國(guó)在縱向價(jià)格壟斷適用原則上存在的問題提出了建議�？隙怂痉C(jī)關(guān)適用“簡(jiǎn)明合理原則”符合中國(guó)國(guó)情,并從立法技術(shù)、具體標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、豁免條件和執(zhí)法實(shí)踐等方面提出了具體規(guī)制建議。
[Abstract]:Competition is the source of market vitality and the precondition to ensure the benign development of market economy. However, there are a lot of behaviors to restrict and exclude competition in the current market, in which vertical price monopoly is widely used and hidden. As the economic effect of vertical monopoly is dual, many countries consider its essence and harmfulness. Different schools of economics have different understanding of economic theories, which influence the choice of economic policy, competition policy and legislative principle. The severe penalty imposed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on Mao Tai and Wuliangye's "Price limit order" and the trial of "Johnson Longitudinal Price limit case" by the Shanghai Court have attracted extensive discussion in the theoretical circle. The foreign countries mainly divide into three kinds of attitude to vertical price monopoly: first, the United States, South Korea, apply "reasonable principle", use the economic efficiency standard to make the judgment whether illegal or not. Second, the EU and its member states adopt the principle of prohibition of exemption. Third, Japan, Australia and other countries, apply the principle of "violation of the law itself." The provisions of China's Anti-monopoly Law on vertical price monopoly agreements are close to those of the European Union, the core of which is "prohibition of principle" and "exemption from exceptions", but in legal practice. In the past two years, China has also gradually introduced a reasonable analysis mechanism. This paper holds that the above three principles have their own advantages and disadvantages for the vertical price monopoly, so it is not appropriate to apply the "reasonable analysis principle" rigidly, but to improve the reasonable principle according to the national conditions of our country, with the second instance judgment of "Johnson case" as the forerunner. It adopts the principle of simplicity and reasonableness of combining leniency and severity, and at the same time helps to construct an analytical model based on market structure. This paper discusses from the following four aspects: the first part discusses the basic problems of vertical price monopoly behavior, respectively narrates the meaning, characteristics, classification of vertical price monopoly behavior. Finally, the economic effect of vertical price monopoly is analyzed. The second part summarizes the foreign regulatory experience of vertical price monopoly behavior, this part of the United States, the European Union, Japan's regulatory principles are analyzed, to their own illegal principles, reasonable principles, This paper compares the principle of prohibition of exemption from exceptions and summarizes the experience that can be used for reference by our country. The third part first puts forward the principle of legislation in our country, then through the analysis of "Liquor case" and "Johnson case", summarizes the principles applicable to the regulation of vertical price monopoly behavior in our country's judicature and administration, and puts forward my views. In the fourth part, some suggestions are put forward on the application principle of vertical price monopoly in our country. This paper affirms that the application of the principle of "conciseness and reasonableness" by the judicial organs is in line with the national conditions of China, and puts forward some specific regulations from the aspects of legislative technology, specific standards, exemption conditions and law enforcement practice.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D922.294

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本文編號(hào)：2110841