論我國企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序的完善
本文選題:企業(yè)并購 + 反壟斷 ; 參考:《華東政法大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文
【摘要】:自上世紀(jì)末開始,投資的自由化使得各國經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展,而企業(yè)并購在此過程中逐漸成為一種世界性的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象。對世界上許多國家來說,企業(yè)并購已經(jīng)成為企業(yè)擴張、提高規(guī)模經(jīng)濟效益和國際競爭力的有效途徑,這是因為企業(yè)并購具有很多積極作用,如增強企業(yè)實力、調(diào)節(jié)生產(chǎn)、擴大市場份額、優(yōu)化資源配置以及推動技術(shù)和經(jīng)濟發(fā)展。與此同時,企業(yè)并購也可能會形成壟斷,在推動經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的過程中無疑會出現(xiàn)排除或限制市場競爭的現(xiàn)象,造成損害消費者福利,甚至危及社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的后果。因此,世界各國都從反壟斷法意義上來監(jiān)督和調(diào)控并購行為,在我國的法律中,對企業(yè)并購行為的控制也是我國反壟斷法的內(nèi)容之一。各國對企業(yè)并購所采取的反壟斷監(jiān)管措施大體是一致的,即都要求并購企業(yè)進行并購申報,區(qū)別在于事前申報還是事后申報,申報結(jié)束后主管機關(guān)對符合條件的申報進行立案,然后再根據(jù)反壟斷審查的具體規(guī)定進行審查,最后做出是否對該項并購予以批準(zhǔn)的決定。本文主要通過研究找出我國企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序中存在的問題,從而找出完善這些問題的途徑,進而提升反壟斷審查程序的公平公正價值,保證程序正義得以實現(xiàn)。在強調(diào)程序正義的同時,也要強調(diào)效率,要實現(xiàn)程序正義與效率的平衡。我國的反壟斷審查采用的是行政審批模式,這樣有利于提高效率,在保證效率的同時,要強調(diào)程序正義。完善程序規(guī)則不僅能夠提高執(zhí)法透明度,限制執(zhí)法人員任意的行為,也可以指導(dǎo)執(zhí)法行為,減少投資的不確定性,同時也可以增強實體規(guī)則的操作性,為企業(yè)并購審查提供合理且確定的期待?疾焓澜绺鲊姆磯艛喾,我們能夠發(fā)現(xiàn),有的國家的程序制度相當(dāng)具體,而實體制度相對單一并有繼續(xù)簡化的趨向,出現(xiàn)這樣的趨勢大概是為了補足實體規(guī)則適用性不強的缺點。相較于歐美在企業(yè)并購反壟斷監(jiān)管上的歷史發(fā)展,我國對并購的反壟斷監(jiān)管立法還處于低級水平,在立法上還存在很多不足之處。本文選取了企業(yè)并購領(lǐng)域相當(dāng)重要而現(xiàn)有研究又相對薄弱的企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序展開討論,通過對比歐盟和美國在企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序上的規(guī)定,尋找歐美在反壟斷審查程序立法上的先進理念,從而為我國反壟斷審查制度的完善提供借鑒。本文內(nèi)容共有四章。第一章對企業(yè)并購相關(guān)概念、企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查的必要性和審查程序完善的必要性進行概述,主要包括企業(yè)并購所涉及到的兼并和并購的區(qū)別,進一步明確我國進行反壟斷審查的必要性和對企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序完善的必要性。本文第二章主要是針對歐盟和美國法律體系中有關(guān)企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查制度的介紹。主要系統(tǒng)介紹了美國和歐盟反壟斷審查的程序性規(guī)定和執(zhí)法機構(gòu)等內(nèi)容,并通過對比找出美國和歐盟反壟斷并購審查程序上的異同。本文第三章主要通過商務(wù)部官方網(wǎng)站上公布的一個企業(yè)并購的案例來介紹我國企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查制度的現(xiàn)狀。主要系統(tǒng)的介紹了我國反壟斷審查的程序性規(guī)定、審查機構(gòu)和立法現(xiàn)狀。本文第四章主要總結(jié)我國企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序中存在的弊端并提出相關(guān)的完善建議。本章主要是對前文所分析的我國反壟斷審查程序規(guī)定指出其不足,就如何完善我國企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序,進而提升反壟斷審查程序公平公正提出本人的意見,期望在完善我國反壟斷審查程序上有所作用。主要包括:第一,完善反壟斷審查法律制度,制定一部單獨的企業(yè)并購指南;第二,完善反壟斷執(zhí)法機構(gòu)設(shè)置,明確具體職責(zé)和分工;第三,細(xì)化聽證程序,進一步保障審查程序的公正性和中立性;第四,增加審查過程的公開性,保證審查過程的透明性。
[Abstract]:Since the end of the last century, the liberalization of investment has made the economy of all countries develop rapidly, and mergers and acquisitions have gradually become a worldwide economic phenomenon in this process. For many countries in the world, mergers and acquisitions have become an effective way for enterprises to expand and improve their economies of scale and international competitiveness. This is due to the merger and acquisition of enterprises. There are many positive effects, such as strengthening the strength of the enterprise, adjusting production, expanding market share, optimizing the allocation of resources and promoting the development of technology and economy. At the same time, mergers and acquisitions may also form a monopoly. In the process of promoting economic development, there will be no doubt that market competition will be excluded or restricted, resulting in damage to consumer welfare and even the welfare of consumers. The consequences of social and economic development are endangered. Therefore, all countries in the world supervise and control mergers and acquisitions in the sense of antitrust law. In the law of China, the control of mergers and acquisitions is also one of the contents of our anti-monopoly law. The anti-monopoly measures adopted by various countries are generally consistent, that is, the merger and acquisition enterprises are required. To declare the merger and acquisition, the difference lies in pre declaration or post declaration. After the end of the declaration, the competent authorities make a case for the declaration of conformity, and then review the specific provisions of the antitrust review, and finally make a decision on whether to approve the merger and acquisition. This article is mainly to find out the anti monopoly of the merger and acquisition of our enterprises. To examine the problems existing in the procedure, and to find ways to improve these problems, and to improve the fair and fair value of the antitrust review process, and to ensure the realization of procedural justice. While emphasizing procedural justice, we should also emphasize efficiency and realize the balance between procedural justice and efficiency. In this way, it is beneficial to improve efficiency and to emphasize procedural justice while guaranteeing efficiency. The improvement of procedural rules can not only improve the transparency of law enforcement, restrict the arbitrary behavior of law enforcement personnel, but also guide law enforcement behavior, reduce uncertainty of investment, and also enhance the operational nature of the substantive rules, and provide a comprehensive review for the merger and acquisition of enterprises. We can find that the procedural system of some countries is quite specific, and the entity system is relatively simple and has a tendency to continue to simplify. This trend is probably to make up for the lack of the strong applicability of the substantive rules. Compared to the European and American anti monopoly regulation of mergers and acquisitions in the European and American enterprises, we can find that the system of the anti-monopoly law of some countries is quite specific. In the historical development, China's anti monopoly supervision legislation on merger and acquisition is still at a low level, and there are still many shortcomings in the legislation. This paper has selected a discussion on the antitrust review procedure of enterprise merger and acquisition, which is quite important in the field of merger and acquisition and is relatively weak in existing research, and compares the EU and the United States in the review of the anti monopoly review of the merger and acquisition of enterprises. In order to find out the advanced ideas of European and American legislation on antitrust review procedure in order to provide reference for the improvement of the anti-monopoly review system in China, there are four chapters in this article. The first chapter summarizes the concept of enterprise merger and acquisition, the necessity of the review of the anti monopoly of enterprise merger and acquisition and the necessity of the perfection of the review procedure. The difference between merger and acquisition involved in the enterprise merger and acquisition, further clarifying the necessity of China's antitrust review and the necessity of improving the anti monopoly review procedure of enterprise merger and acquisition. The second chapter is mainly about the introduction of the antitrust review system of merger and acquisition in the European Union and the American legal system. The main system introduces the beauty of the system. The procedural regulations and law enforcement agencies of the antitrust review of the EU and the EU, and through comparison, find out the similarities and differences between the United States and the EU. The third chapter introduces the present situation of the antitrust review system in the state-owned enterprises' Merger and acquisition mainly through a case of enterprise merger and acquisition published on the official website of the Ministry of Commerce. The system introduces the procedural regulations of China's anti-monopoly review, the present situation of the review institutions and the legislation. The fourth chapter mainly summarizes the drawbacks in the review procedure of the merger and acquisition of enterprises in our country and puts forward some relevant suggestions. In order to improve our anti trust review procedure fair and fair, it is expected to improve our antitrust review procedure. The first is to improve the legal system of antitrust review, to establish a separate guide for enterprise merger and acquisition, and second, to perfect the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies. Set up the specific responsibilities and division of labor; third, refine the hearing procedure, further guarantee the fairness and neutrality of the review procedure; fourth, increase the openness of the review process, and ensure the transparency of the review process.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:D922.294
【相似文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 羅文麗;;反壟斷審查新動態(tài)[J];中國物流與采購;2012年07期
2 曹岳峰;;淺論經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查制度在我國的實踐[J];經(jīng)營管理者;2014年03期
3 韓菁菁;;反壟斷審查須科學(xué)界定“相關(guān)市場”——從可口可樂收購匯源的反壟斷審查說起[J];時代經(jīng)貿(mào);2008年10期
4 ;“2008 年企業(yè)并購中的反壟斷審查國際研討會”征文啟事[J];政治與法律;2008年02期
5 傅明;;反壟斷法配套規(guī)則待完善[J];上海國資;2009年03期
6 鎖放;;論經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查中的破產(chǎn)抗辯制度[J];商場現(xiàn)代化;2009年27期
7 鄒沁君;;經(jīng)營者集中的反壟斷審查問題研究——以可口可樂并購匯源為例[J];經(jīng)營管理者;2009年18期
8 胡甲慶;;論合并反壟斷審查中的臨界損失分析[J];國際經(jīng)貿(mào)探索;2010年03期
9 李俊峰;;中國企業(yè)合并反壟斷審查的展開——對商務(wù)部“異議案例”公開信息的研究[J];國際經(jīng)貿(mào)探索;2010年09期
10 康亮;李帥;;論我國反壟斷審查機制的得失——以松下收購三洋案為切入點[J];中北大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2011年02期
相關(guān)會議論文 前2條
1 董正偉;;解讀企業(yè)并購中的反壟斷審查程序[A];2009中華全國律師協(xié)會經(jīng)濟專業(yè)委員會年會論文集[C];2009年
2 趙勇;;TRIPs框架下歐盟與美國知識產(chǎn)權(quán)許可的反壟斷審查比較研究:最新的進展[A];WTO法與中國論叢(2011年卷)[C];2010年
相關(guān)重要報紙文章 前10條
1 本報記者 周濤 金晶;外資收購珠海中富 反壟斷審查無異議[N];經(jīng)濟觀察報;2007年
2 本報記者 上官衛(wèi)國;反壟斷審查規(guī)則細(xì)化[N];中國證券報;2006年
3 陳姍姍;“兩拓”合并案需接受中方反壟斷審查[N];第一財經(jīng)日報;2008年
4 記者 明金維;正常的反壟斷審查不是保護主義[N];新華每日電訊;2009年
5 明金維;正常的反壟斷審查不是保護主義[N];中國工商報;2009年
6 ;反壟斷審查相關(guān)問題國際研討會在海南召開[N];國際商報;2010年
7 記者李高超;中國反壟斷審查對外資無歧視[N];國際商報;2010年
8 本報記者 于春美;加鉀并購案 商務(wù)部或啟反壟斷審查[N];新農(nóng)村商報;2010年
9 記者 辛紅;商務(wù)部反壟斷審查 年立案數(shù)首次過百[N];法制日報;2010年
10 本報記者 晏耀斌;“反壟斷審查實施條例”年底上報國務(wù)院[N];中國經(jīng)營報;2013年
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 謝珩;企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查比較研究[D];中國政法大學(xué);2011年
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前10條
1 達麗雅;外資并購反壟斷審查法律制度研究[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2013年
2 劉芳;論我國企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查程序的完善[D];華東政法大學(xué);2015年
3 馬靜;論企業(yè)合并反壟斷審查中的破產(chǎn)公司抗辯制度[D];中國政法大學(xué);2009年
4 李長文;企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查問題研究[D];大連海事大學(xué);2009年
5 張鵬偉;經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查程序探討[D];上海交通大學(xué);2008年
6 萬磊;公司跨國并購的反壟斷審查制度研究[D];外交學(xué)院;2009年
7 李_";經(jīng)營者集中的反壟斷審查實體制度研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年
8 徐yN;經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查程序問題研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2010年
9 劉愛明;論我國經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查程序的完善[D];對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué);2007年
10 潘姝;企業(yè)并購反壟斷審查實體標(biāo)準(zhǔn)研究[D];南昌大學(xué);2011年
,本文編號:2025094
本文鏈接:http://www.sikaile.net/falvlunwen/jingjifalunwen/2025094.html