本文選題：打車軟件 + 低于成本價銷售��； 參考：《天津大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：打車軟件以其方便快捷的特點,一定程度上解決了我國出租車市場分配不均的問題。但經(jīng)過兩年多的發(fā)展,打車軟件行業(yè)內(nèi)部兼并不斷,競爭愈演愈烈。從最盛期的30余款打車軟件逐漸形成快的打車和嘀嘀打車兩家獨大的局面。快的打車和嘀嘀打車為了爭奪市場更是開展了價格補貼戰(zhàn),從現(xiàn)金補貼發(fā)展為打車紅包、優(yōu)惠券、積分換禮品等“暗補貼”模式。目前,我國《反不正當(dāng)競爭法》中尚無對類打車軟件補貼行為不正當(dāng)競爭的規(guī)定,面對激烈的打車軟件競爭市場,我國的法律規(guī)制相對滯后,《反不正當(dāng)競爭法》的一般條款不盡完善。本文以《反不正當(dāng)競爭法》第11條為基礎(chǔ),從經(jīng)營者主觀目的及商品成本構(gòu)成兩大構(gòu)成要件來分析打車軟件的補貼行為的性質(zhì)。打車軟件基于其正向外部性以及軟件產(chǎn)品的使用相關(guān)性,其大范圍補貼行為具有明顯的掠奪性特征,但是由于軟件類產(chǎn)品的特點及打車軟件行業(yè)競爭的新模式使得傳統(tǒng)的判定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)顯得力不從心。因此,依照目前《反不正當(dāng)競爭法》第11條的規(guī)定,打車軟件的補貼行為不能構(gòu)成低于成本價銷售。但是,針對打車軟件的補貼現(xiàn)象,我們還應(yīng)當(dāng)警惕采用如此大規(guī)模的補貼進行推廣是否在無形之中抬高了打車軟件行業(yè)的交易成本。營銷創(chuàng)新的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及政府監(jiān)管的尺度都應(yīng)將是否有利于民生發(fā)展作為首要原則,打車軟件產(chǎn)生的根本原因也是為了使廣大用戶平等的享有社會公共資源,不能淪為盲目競爭而變相的增加了社會交易成本。
[Abstract]:Because of its convenient and quick characteristics, the taxi hailing software solves the problem of uneven distribution of taxi market in China to a certain extent. But after more than two years of development, ride-hailing software industry continued to merge, competition intensified. From the peak of more than 30 ride-hailing software gradually formed a fast taxi and Didi Didi two major situation. In order to compete for the market, fast taxi hailing and Didi taxi have launched a price subsidy war, from cash subsidies to taxi red envelopes, coupons, points for gifts and other "hidden subsidy" mode. At present, there is no unfair competition regulation on the subsidy of tax-hailing software in the Anti-unfair Competition Law of our country. In the face of the fierce competition market of ride-hailing software, China's legal regulation lags behind, and the general provisions of Anti-unfair Competition Law are not perfect. Based on Article 11 of the Anti-unfair Competition Law, this paper analyzes the nature of the subsidy behavior of the taxi hailing software from the subjective purpose of the operator and the composition of the commodity cost. Based on its positive externalities and the relevance of the use of software products, ride-hailing software has a predatory nature in its extensive subsidy behavior. However, due to the characteristics of software products and the new model of competition in taxi-hailing software industry, the traditional criteria appear to be inadequate. Therefore, according to the current article 11 of the Anti-unfair Competition Act, the subsidization of ride-hailing software cannot constitute a sale below the cost price. However, in view of the subsidy phenomenon of ride-hailing software, we should also be on the alert whether the use of such a large-scale subsidy to promote the promotion of ride-hailing software industry in the invisible increase in transaction costs. The standard of marketing innovation and the scale of government supervision should regard whether it is beneficial to the development of people's livelihood as the first principle. The root cause of the taxi software is also to make the vast number of users equal access to social and public resources. Can not be reduced to blind competition and the disguised increase in social transaction costs.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.294

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本文編號：1898104