【摘要】：本文研究CEO或董事長(zhǎng)的親緣關(guān)系對(duì)家族企業(yè)創(chuàng)新的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),CEO或董事長(zhǎng)的親緣關(guān)系能顯著提高家族企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新水平,而且這種效應(yīng)隨著非家族CEO和董事長(zhǎng)持股比例的增加而減弱,隨著2008年強(qiáng)化員工保護(hù)的《勞動(dòng)合同法》的實(shí)施而減弱。本文的研究結(jié)果支持創(chuàng)新保護(hù)和創(chuàng)新激勵(lì)理論,即與非家族CEO和董事長(zhǎng)相比較,家族CEO或董事長(zhǎng)對(duì)創(chuàng)新失敗的容忍度更高,而且能分享企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期創(chuàng)新成果,進(jìn)而有助于企業(yè)創(chuàng)新。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the influence of CEO or chairman's kinship on family business innovation. The study found that the affinity of CEO or chairman can significantly improve the innovation level of family business, and this effect weakens with the increase of non-family CEO and the proportion of chairman holding shares. With the implementation of the Labor contract Law, which strengthened employee protection in 2008, it weakened. The research results of this paper support the innovation protection and innovation incentive theory, that is, compared with non-family CEO and chairman, family CEO or chairman has higher tolerance for innovation failure, and can share the long-term innovation results. In turn, it will help enterprises to innovate.
【作者單位】： 武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(71272229;71372126;71572133;71672134)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.91;F273.1;F276.5
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本文編號(hào)：2425283