發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-29 23:26

  本文選題：勞動合同期限 + 決定機(jī)理�。� 參考：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：簽訂勞動合同是勞資關(guān)系制度化、法制化的重要措施,勞動合同期限是締結(jié)勞動合同所必須約定的基本內(nèi)容。中國民營經(jīng)濟(jì)原來存在勞動合同簽約率低和簽約短期化問題,2008年國家出于保護(hù)廣大勞動者利益,對《勞動合同法》進(jìn)行了重大修改,增加了對企業(yè)不簽訂勞動合同的處罰規(guī)定,加強(qiáng)了對固定期限勞動合同的使用限制,對實(shí)行無固定期限勞動合同作了規(guī)定。此后,民營企業(yè)勞動合同簽約率低的現(xiàn)象得到有效改變,但勞動合同短期化現(xiàn)象仍然存在。 對于民營企業(yè)勞動合同的期限的決定、不同勞動合同期限對企業(yè)勞資關(guān)系的影響、勞動合同短期化是否與勞資矛盾增加、勞資關(guān)系和諧相關(guān)等問題,國內(nèi)外無論從理論上還是從經(jīng)驗(yàn)上都缺乏系統(tǒng)研究,政府制定相應(yīng)勞動政策也缺乏實(shí)證依據(jù)。為此,本文通過對浙江民營企業(yè)調(diào)研,對中國民營企業(yè)里不同期限類型勞動合同的決定機(jī)理及及其效應(yīng)進(jìn)行理論和經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析,以期探明問題,為科學(xué)制定勞動政策提供參考。 本文在已有勞動合同期限的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,首先分析了決定勞動合同期限的兩大主體：企業(yè)和勞動者的行為決策,并用成本-收益分析和阱弈論分析勞動合同期限的決定因索。其次,提出勞動合同期限和諧效應(yīng)和效率效應(yīng)的分析框架和勞動合同期限效應(yīng)的形成機(jī)理,闡明產(chǎn)業(yè)短期和長期勞動合同的效應(yīng)的內(nèi)在邏輯。最后,通過對浙江溫州和臺州地區(qū)30家企業(yè)的問卷調(diào)查和訪談會,并運(yùn)用SPSS對問卷數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,采用Heckman兩步法和Oaxaca-Blinder分解對所提出的理論進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證和分析。 本文的主要結(jié)論是： 第一,民營企業(yè)里無勞動合同員工、長期勞動合同員工、短期勞動合同員工三者之間存在明顯的特征差異,整體上人力資本水平高的勞動者簽訂長期勞動合同的概率高,而人力資本水平低的勞動者進(jìn)入無勞動合同工作的概率高。分析發(fā)現(xiàn),勞動力市場經(jīng)驗(yàn)越豐富的勞動者,被選入長期勞動合同的概率越高,受教育水平越高的勞動者,選擇無勞動合同的概率越低；此外,女性及已婚的勞動者選擇長期勞動合同的概率高。 第二,民營企業(yè)里那些簽訂長期勞動合同的員工與簽訂短期勞動合同、無勞動合同的員工在工作上存在明顯的特征差異。結(jié)果顯示,非制造業(yè)企業(yè)理傾向于使用長期勞動合同,制造業(yè)企業(yè)使用短期勞動合同和不簽訂勞動合同的概率更高。對技術(shù)知識要求較高的崗位簽訂長期勞動合同的概率更高,僅要求技術(shù)知識較低的崗位簽訂短期勞動合同的概率更高。 第三,民營企業(yè)過高的履約成本會導(dǎo)致勞動合同期限短期化,并使得短期合同轉(zhuǎn)為長期合同更為困難,從而使短期合同“墊腳石”(Stepping Stones)的作用不明顯,制約勞動合同期限的效能。 第四,長期勞動合同與短期勞動合同存在不同的和諧效應(yīng)。只有在長期勞動合同工中有顯著的和諧效應(yīng)，表明長期勞動合同更有利于勞資關(guān)系的和諧發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:The signing of labor contract is an important measure for the institutionalization and legalization of labor relations. The term of the labor contract is the basic content that must be agreed upon by the labor contract. The Chinese private economy has the problem of low contract signing rate and short-term signing of the contract. In 2008, the state has made great efforts to protect the labor contract law for the protection of the interests of the workers. The amendment has increased the penalties for the non signing of labor contracts for enterprises, strengthened the restrictions on the use of fixed term labor contracts and made provisions for the implementation of unfixed term labor contracts. After that, the low contracting rate of labor contracts in private enterprises has been effectively changed, but the short-term phenomenon of labor contracts still exists.
For the time limit of the labor contract of the private enterprises, the influence of the duration of different labor contracts on the relationship between enterprises, the increase of labor contract and the increase of labor and capital, the harmonious relationship between labor and capital, the lack of systematic research in both theory and experience both at home and abroad, and the lack of empirical evidence for the government to formulate corresponding labor policies To this end, through the investigation of private enterprises in Zhejiang, this paper makes a theoretical and Empirical Analysis on the mechanism and its effect of different term types of labor contracts in private enterprises in China, in order to find out the problems and provide reference for scientific labor policy.
On the basis of relevant literature research on the maturity of labor contract, this paper first analyzes the two main bodies that decide the term of the labor contract: the decision of the behavior of the enterprise and the worker, and the determination of the time limit of the labor contract with the cost-benefit analysis and the chess game theory. Secondly, the paper puts forward the division of the term harmony effect and the efficiency effect of the labor contract. The formation mechanism of the term effect of the framework and labor contract is analyzed, and the internal logic of the effect of the short-term and long-term labor contract is clarified. Finally, through the questionnaire survey and interview of 30 enterprises in Wenzhou and Taizhou, Zhejiang, and the statistical analysis of the questionnaire data using SPSS, the Heckman two step method and the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition are used. The proposed theory is verified and analyzed.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
First, there is obvious characteristic difference between the employees of no labor contract, long-term labor contract employees and short-term labor contract employees in private enterprises. The probability of the laborers with high human capital level to sign long-term labor contract is high on the whole, and the probability of the workers with low human capital level to enter the work of non labor contract is high. At present, the more experienced workers in the labor market, the higher the probability of being elected to the long-term labor contract, the higher the education level, the lower the probability of choosing the non labor contract; in addition, the probability of the female and married workers to choose the long-term labor contract is higher.
Second, there are obvious differences between the employees who signed the long-term labor contract and the short-term labor contract and the employees without the labor contract. The result shows that the non manufacturing enterprise is inclined to use the long-term labor contract, and the probability of using short term labor contract and not signing labor contract is higher in the manufacturing enterprises. The probability of signing a long-term labor contract with higher technical knowledge is higher, and only a higher probability of signing short-term labor contracts is required for a post with lower technical knowledge.
Third, the high performance cost of the private enterprises will lead to the short term of the labor contract and make it more difficult to turn the short-term contract into a long-term contract, which makes the short term contract "Stepping Stones" not obvious and restricts the effectiveness of the term of the labor contract.
Fourth, there are different harmonious effects between the long-term labor contract and the short-term labor contract. Only in the long-term labor contract, there is a significant harmony effect, which indicates that the long-term labor contract is more conducive to the harmonious development of the labor relations.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F249.26;F276.5

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 孫睿君;李子奈;;不同期限類型勞動合同的工資決定機(jī)制及差異——基于中國家庭住戶收入調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2010年02期

2 謝奕;;論我國無固定期限勞動合同制度——以用人單位單方解除制度為視角[J];重慶工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會科學(xué)版);2010年04期

3 蔡健暉;;解雇自由抑或解雇保護(hù)——試析無固定期限勞動合同的制度困境[J];福建師范大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版);2011年01期

4 梅宇;張峻銘;;淺析勞動合同期限[J];法制與社會;2011年01期

5 孫瑜;;企業(yè)應(yīng)重視提升員工滿意度[J];北方經(jīng)貿(mào);2008年07期

6 程延園;楊柳;;《勞動合同法》實(shí)施對我國企業(yè)人力資源管理的影響——基于人力資源經(jīng)理的觀點(diǎn)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2010年07期

7 李湛;曹萍;;市場型和關(guān)聯(lián)型金融體系下企業(yè)勞動合同期限的比較研究[J];暨南學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版);2009年05期

8 王明亮;劉三林;張成科;;勞動合同期限的制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)思考[J];理論導(dǎo)刊;2012年01期

9 李向陽;魏佳琪;;勞動合同期限對企業(yè)勞動關(guān)系的影響分析[J];商業(yè)時(shí)代;2010年25期

10 田野;焦艷玲;;無固定期限勞動合同制度研究——在職業(yè)安定與靈活用工之間[J];天津大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會科學(xué)版);2011年03期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 袁玉玲;員工滿意度評價(jià)及FD公司實(shí)證分析[D];南京理工大學(xué);2006年

2 周健康;濰坊中百配送公司員工工作滿意度研究[D];山東大學(xué);2008年

3 羅藝堯;《勞動合同法》實(shí)施后企業(yè)人力資源管理的相關(guān)問題與對策研究[D];山東大學(xué);2010年

4 尚彬彬;考慮勝任力和滿意度的員工與崗位匹配問題研究[D];東北大學(xué);2008年

，

本文編號：1822054