我國(guó)光伏上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策在WTO反補(bǔ)貼協(xié)定下的合規(guī)性研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-12-15 00:41
【摘要】：為支持光伏電的發(fā)展,我國(guó)自2013年起開(kāi)始實(shí)施光伏上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策。上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策分為中央和地方兩個(gè)層級(jí),既包括人大制定的法律,也包括各級(jí)政府出臺(tái)的地方性文件。從內(nèi)容上看,該政策主要包括三部分內(nèi)容:一是要求電網(wǎng)企業(yè)按照中央政府制定的標(biāo)桿電價(jià)保價(jià)收購(gòu)光伏電;二是要求電網(wǎng)企業(yè)按照中央政府的規(guī)定保量收購(gòu)光伏電;三是允許地方政府對(duì)光伏電給予地方補(bǔ)貼。雖然該政策在福利經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的"外部性"理論下具有一定合理性,且有利于光伏電的發(fā)展,但因其具有政府干預(yù)市場(chǎng)的性質(zhì),故其仍受到WTO《補(bǔ)貼與反補(bǔ)貼措施協(xié)議》("SCM協(xié)定")的規(guī)制。本文旨在結(jié)合SCM規(guī)則及有關(guān)專(zhuān)家組和上訴機(jī)構(gòu)報(bào)告,分析我國(guó)現(xiàn)行光伏上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策在SCM協(xié)定下的合規(guī)性。SCM協(xié)定規(guī)定了兩種補(bǔ)貼類(lèi)型,即可訴性補(bǔ)貼和禁止性補(bǔ)貼。構(gòu)成可訴性補(bǔ)貼的措施需滿足以下三個(gè)條件:1)該措施屬于政府或公共機(jī)構(gòu)提供的財(cái)政資助;2)該措施給予相關(guān)受眾以利益;3)該措施需具有專(zhuān)向性。構(gòu)成禁止性補(bǔ)貼的措施除需滿足以上條件外,還需滿足"視出口實(shí)績(jī)?yōu)闂l件而給予補(bǔ)貼"或"使適用國(guó)產(chǎn)貨物而非進(jìn)口貨物的情況為條件而給予補(bǔ)貼"這一條件。筆者認(rèn)為,我國(guó)大部分地區(qū)實(shí)施的上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策符合以上三個(gè)條件,屬于可訴性補(bǔ)貼。第一,負(fù)責(zé)執(zhí)行上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策的電網(wǎng)企業(yè)因受到政府的"有意義控制"而屬于"公共機(jī)構(gòu)",而其購(gòu)買(mǎi)光伏電的行為屬于SCM第1.1(a)(1)條中"政府購(gòu)買(mǎi)商品"這一類(lèi)型的"財(cái)政資助"。第二,光伏上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策使光伏發(fā)電企業(yè)獲得利益。根據(jù)WTO上訴機(jī)構(gòu)在"加拿大-可再生能源"案中的觀點(diǎn),判斷是否獲益應(yīng)在相關(guān)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)中選擇比較基準(zhǔn)。由于光伏電在供給側(cè)和需求側(cè)都不能被傳統(tǒng)能源所發(fā)的電所替代,因此在分析是否獲益時(shí),相關(guān)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)應(yīng)為"光伏電市場(chǎng)",而比較基準(zhǔn)則應(yīng)為光伏電市場(chǎng)上的招標(biāo)電價(jià)。通過(guò)對(duì)比光伏招標(biāo)電價(jià)和光伏標(biāo)桿電價(jià),發(fā)現(xiàn)大部分地區(qū)的招標(biāo)電價(jià)低于標(biāo)桿電價(jià),符合"給予利益"的要件要求。第三,光伏上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策具有專(zhuān)向性,因?yàn)槠鋬H適用于光伏發(fā)電企業(yè)。除此之外,部分地方政府根據(jù)上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策給予光伏發(fā)電企業(yè)的地方性補(bǔ)貼構(gòu)成禁止性補(bǔ)貼,因其要求只有使用本地光伏設(shè)備達(dá)到一定比例的企業(yè)才可以獲得其補(bǔ)貼。根據(jù)以上分析可知,我國(guó)現(xiàn)行光伏上網(wǎng)電價(jià)政策之所以可以被認(rèn)定為補(bǔ)貼,主要原因在于政府標(biāo)桿電價(jià)高于招標(biāo)電價(jià)。而之所以會(huì)出現(xiàn)這種情況,很大程度是因?yàn)槲覈?guó)目前的光伏發(fā)電技術(shù)還未完全成熟,仍處于發(fā)展階段而尚未達(dá)到規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)。如果斷然降低標(biāo)桿電價(jià),雖符合了 SCM的規(guī)則,但不利于我國(guó)光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。此種狀況體現(xiàn)了 SCM協(xié)定與可再生能源發(fā)展之間存在的潛在沖突。學(xué)界提出了三種化解該沖突的方案:一是通過(guò)談判恢復(fù)并修改不可訴補(bǔ)貼;二是將GATT第20條適用于SCM協(xié)定;三是適用演進(jìn)性思路對(duì)SCM協(xié)定進(jìn)行解釋。筆者認(rèn)為,第三種方案是目前為止最可行的解決方案。
[Abstract]:In order to support the development of photovoltaic power, China has started to implement the PV grid price policy since 2013. The on-line electricity price policy is divided into two levels: central and local, including both the laws of the people's congresses and local documents issued by the governments at all levels. From the content, the policy mainly includes three parts: one is to ask the power grid enterprise to buy the photovoltaic power according to the benchmark price of the benchmark price set by the central government, and 2 is to ask the power grid enterprise to purchase the photovoltaic power according to the regulations of the central government; The third is to allow local governments to grant local subsidies to photovoltaic electricity. Although the policy has a certain rationality under the "Externality" of welfare economics and is beneficial to the development of the photovoltaic power, it is still subject to the regulation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") because of the nature of the government intervention market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the compliance of the current price policy of PV in China under the SCM agreement in combination with the SCM rules and the report of the expert group and the Appellate Body. The SCM agreement provides for two types of subsidies, which can be sued for sexual and prohibitive subsidies. the measures to form a actionable subsidy should meet the following three conditions: 1) the measure falls within the financial support provided by the Government or the public body; 2) the measure gives the relevant audience the benefit; 3) the measure needs to be of a special nature. In addition to meeting the above conditions, the measures to form the prohibition subsidy shall meet the requirements of the "Subsidies as a condition of the performance of the export" or the "Subsidies for conditions for the application of domestic and non-imported goods". The author holds that in most parts of our country, the electricity price policy in most parts of China is in accordance with the above three conditions, and it is a kind of actionable subsidy. First, the grid enterprise responsible for carrying out the on-line electricity price policy belongs to the "public institutions" due to the "meaningful control" of the government, and the behavior of the purchase of the photovoltaic power belongs to the "financial support" of the type "Government's purchase of goods" in the SCM (1) (a) (1). Second, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid makes the photovoltaic power generation enterprise gain the benefit. According to the view of the WTO Appellate Body in the "Canada-Renewable Energy" case, it is judged whether the benefit should select the comparative benchmark in the relevant product market. Since both the supply side and the demand side of the photovoltaic power cannot be replaced by the electricity generated by the conventional energy source, the relevant product market shall be the "photovoltaic electricity market" when the analysis is beneficial, and the comparison basis shall be the bidding price on the photovoltaic power market. By comparing the price of the PV bidding and the price of the PV, it is found that the price of the bidding in most areas is lower than that of the benchmark price, which is in accordance with the requirements of the requirements of the "give an interest to". Third, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid has a special orientation, as it is only applicable to the photovoltaic power generation enterprise. In addition, some local governments, on the basis of the on-line electricity price policy, provide the local subsidies of the PV power generation enterprises to form the prohibitive subsidies, because they require the use of local photovoltaic devices to reach a certain proportion of enterprises to obtain their subsidies. According to the above analysis, the current price policy of the current photovoltaic grid in China can be recognized as the subsidy, mainly because the government's benchmark price is higher than the bidding price. This situation is due to the fact that the current photovoltaic power generation technology in our country is not fully mature yet still in the development stage and has not reached the scale economic effect. It is not conducive to the long-term development of the PV industry in China. Such a situation represents a potential conflict between the SCM agreement and the development of renewable energy. Three solutions to the conflict are proposed in the academic circle: one is to recover and modify the non-actionable subsidies through negotiation; the second is to apply the Article 20 of GATT to the SCM agreement; and the third is to explain the SCM agreement with an evolutionary approach. In the author's view, the third option is the most feasible solution so far.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D996.1
本文編號(hào)：2379619
[Abstract]:In order to support the development of photovoltaic power, China has started to implement the PV grid price policy since 2013. The on-line electricity price policy is divided into two levels: central and local, including both the laws of the people's congresses and local documents issued by the governments at all levels. From the content, the policy mainly includes three parts: one is to ask the power grid enterprise to buy the photovoltaic power according to the benchmark price of the benchmark price set by the central government, and 2 is to ask the power grid enterprise to purchase the photovoltaic power according to the regulations of the central government; The third is to allow local governments to grant local subsidies to photovoltaic electricity. Although the policy has a certain rationality under the "Externality" of welfare economics and is beneficial to the development of the photovoltaic power, it is still subject to the regulation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") because of the nature of the government intervention market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the compliance of the current price policy of PV in China under the SCM agreement in combination with the SCM rules and the report of the expert group and the Appellate Body. The SCM agreement provides for two types of subsidies, which can be sued for sexual and prohibitive subsidies. the measures to form a actionable subsidy should meet the following three conditions: 1) the measure falls within the financial support provided by the Government or the public body; 2) the measure gives the relevant audience the benefit; 3) the measure needs to be of a special nature. In addition to meeting the above conditions, the measures to form the prohibition subsidy shall meet the requirements of the "Subsidies as a condition of the performance of the export" or the "Subsidies for conditions for the application of domestic and non-imported goods". The author holds that in most parts of our country, the electricity price policy in most parts of China is in accordance with the above three conditions, and it is a kind of actionable subsidy. First, the grid enterprise responsible for carrying out the on-line electricity price policy belongs to the "public institutions" due to the "meaningful control" of the government, and the behavior of the purchase of the photovoltaic power belongs to the "financial support" of the type "Government's purchase of goods" in the SCM (1) (a) (1). Second, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid makes the photovoltaic power generation enterprise gain the benefit. According to the view of the WTO Appellate Body in the "Canada-Renewable Energy" case, it is judged whether the benefit should select the comparative benchmark in the relevant product market. Since both the supply side and the demand side of the photovoltaic power cannot be replaced by the electricity generated by the conventional energy source, the relevant product market shall be the "photovoltaic electricity market" when the analysis is beneficial, and the comparison basis shall be the bidding price on the photovoltaic power market. By comparing the price of the PV bidding and the price of the PV, it is found that the price of the bidding in most areas is lower than that of the benchmark price, which is in accordance with the requirements of the requirements of the "give an interest to". Third, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid has a special orientation, as it is only applicable to the photovoltaic power generation enterprise. In addition, some local governments, on the basis of the on-line electricity price policy, provide the local subsidies of the PV power generation enterprises to form the prohibitive subsidies, because they require the use of local photovoltaic devices to reach a certain proportion of enterprises to obtain their subsidies. According to the above analysis, the current price policy of the current photovoltaic grid in China can be recognized as the subsidy, mainly because the government's benchmark price is higher than the bidding price. This situation is due to the fact that the current photovoltaic power generation technology in our country is not fully mature yet still in the development stage and has not reached the scale economic effect. It is not conducive to the long-term development of the PV industry in China. Such a situation represents a potential conflict between the SCM agreement and the development of renewable energy. Three solutions to the conflict are proposed in the academic circle: one is to recover and modify the non-actionable subsidies through negotiation; the second is to apply the Article 20 of GATT to the SCM agreement; and the third is to explain the SCM agreement with an evolutionary approach. In the author's view, the third option is the most feasible solution so far.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D996.1
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，本文編號(hào)：2379619
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