1993年《公司法》頒布至今共修改過(guò)兩回。來(lái)自于美國(guó)公司法的“股東本位”理論是公司法的理論基礎(chǔ),“股東本位”理論認(rèn)為股東控制應(yīng)該是公司權(quán)力的核心。中國(guó)《公司法》的實(shí)施有很大的問(wèn)題,公司治理的三大組織：股東會(huì)、董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)相互之間的制衡關(guān)系沒(méi)有形成。股份公司,尤其是上市公司的不平衡的持股結(jié)構(gòu)加重了這一問(wèn)題。大股東持有公司很高比例的股份,尤其是國(guó)家作為大股東高比例持股時(shí)問(wèn)題更加嚴(yán)重�，F(xiàn)行的公司治理以及公司投票制度使得高比例持股的股東能夠侵害小股東權(quán)利、控制董事會(huì)監(jiān)事會(huì)乃至整個(gè)公司。公司法可以改變其關(guān)于公司投票制度的規(guī)定來(lái)改善這一情況。政治學(xué)上的投票理論以及“股東本位”理論最近的發(fā)展并不能解釋或者解決中國(guó)現(xiàn)在的問(wèn)題。政治學(xué)的投票理論所提供的解決方案是沒(méi)有操作性的,允許所有與公司投票有利害關(guān)系的人投票這一方案是不可行的�！肮蓶|本位”理論提供的解決方案對(duì)于中國(guó)的問(wèn)題完全沒(méi)有沒(méi)有效果,阻止股東表達(dá)除公司財(cái)產(chǎn)最大化以外的意愿不能平衡公司內(nèi)三大組織的關(guān)系。國(guó)有股份公司的問(wèn)題有其政治根源,而其他私有股份公司的問(wèn)題則是因?yàn)楣痉ū旧泶嬖诼┒�。這些漏洞使得大股東可以不受控制的破壞內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)。中國(guó)應(yīng)該尋找... 

【文章來(lái)源】：南京大學(xué)江蘇省 211工程院校 985工程院校 教育部直屬院校

【文章頁(yè)數(shù)】：99 頁(yè)

【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士

【文章目錄】：
中文摘要
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Underpinnings of Voting and Corporate Voting
    2.1 Voting in the Political Arena
        2.1.1 Basic structure of political voting
        2.1.2 Common Voting Methods
        2.1.3 Theoretical Underpinnings of Political Voting
    2.2. Voting in the Corporate Arena
        2.2.1 Governance in corporations
        2.2.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of One Share. One Vote
        2.2.3. Latest Development on the Shareholder Primacy Norm
    2.3 Summary
3. China's Current Status and Problems
    3.1. The Governance Structure in Chinese Company Law
        3.1.1. The Shareholders' Meeting and Shareholders' Rights
        3.1.2. Directors and Board of Directors
        3.1.3. Board of Supervisors
    3.2. The Current Problems in Corporate Governance
        3.2.1. The Relationship Between Majority and Minority Shareholders
        3.2.2. The Relationship Between Shareholders and the Board of Directors
        3.2.3 The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors
    3.3. Political Voting Theory and Shareholder Heterogeneity Cannot Explain and Solve the Problems in China
        3.3.1. Political Voting Theory and China's Problems
        3.3.2. Shareholder Heterogeneity and China's Problems
    3.4. China Needs To Focus On Completing the Current System
    3.5 Summary
4. A Comparative Analysis
    4.1. Other prevailing models in the world
        4.1.1. The German Model
        4.1.2. The Japanese Model
    4.2. The Problems of Applying Other Models in China
        4.2.1. The Unique Characteristics of the Chinese Economy
        4.2.2. Shareholder Primacy Should Not Be Replaced
    4.3. China's Way of Innovation
        4.3.1. State Owned Shares To Be Held By Wholly State Owned Companies
        4.3.2. Introducing Banks and Employees into Corporate Voting
    4.4 Summary
5. Conclusion
Bibliography
Acknowledgements


【參考文獻(xiàn)】：
期刊論文
[1]公司概念在近代中國(guó)的起源與演進(jìn)[J]. 顏冰,張靜.  求是學(xué)刊. 2010(04)



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