【摘要】：中國(guó)上市公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制,起初采用的是“二元制”模式下的監(jiān)事會(huì)制。但是,就制度實(shí)踐的情況來看,上市公司的監(jiān)事會(huì)并沒有發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的監(jiān)督作用,被虛化、被架空,甚至被被監(jiān)督者控制。2001年,中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)頒布《關(guān)于在上市公司建立獨(dú)立董事制度的指導(dǎo)意見》,強(qiáng)制要求上市公司引入獨(dú)立董事制度,作為內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制一種改良和補(bǔ)充,新《公司法》對(duì)這一制度進(jìn)行確認(rèn)。 但是,移植一種的新的監(jiān)督機(jī)制,并不意味著解決另外一種監(jiān)督機(jī)制的有效性問題。有學(xué)者也提出質(zhì)疑,獨(dú)立董事與我國(guó)現(xiàn)行公司治理結(jié)中的監(jiān)事會(huì)的職能相互重疊,容易產(chǎn)生“搭便車”的心理,兩個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)之間的扯皮、推諉,很可能將僅有的一些監(jiān)督績(jī)效降低為零。 本文從中外上市公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)的相互比較出發(fā),闡述具有中國(guó)特色的獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)并存的公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制,。筆者通過博弈和實(shí)證分析認(rèn)為,作為過渡經(jīng)濟(jì)的產(chǎn)物,兩者肩負(fù)相似的使命和責(zé)任,其存在具有一定的合理性,雖然兩者在性質(zhì)和職能上存在一定的重疊,但是只要完善相關(guān)制度,獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)也能產(chǎn)生良好的制度合力,提高公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督效率。
[Abstract]:At first, the internal supervision mechanism of listed companies in China adopted the supervision committee system under the mode of "dualistic system". However, as far as the practice of the system is concerned, the board of supervisors of listed companies has not played its due supervisory role, has been false, elevated, and even controlled by supervisors. In 2001, the CSRC issued the guidance on the Establishment of Independent Director system in listed companies, forcing listed companies to introduce independent director system as an improvement and supplement to the internal supervision mechanism. The new Company Law confirms this system. However, transplanting a new supervision mechanism does not mean solving the effectiveness of another supervision mechanism. Some scholars have also questioned that the functions of independent directors and the board of supervisors in the current corporate governance of our country overlap each other, which is easy to produce the psychology of "hitchhiking". The bullshit and prevarication between the two organizations are likely to reduce some of the supervision performance to zero. Based on the comparison of internal supervision institutions of listed companies between China and foreign countries, this paper expounds the internal supervision mechanism of independent directors and board of supervisors with Chinese characteristics. Through game and empirical analysis, the author holds that, as the product of transitional economy, the two shoulder similar missions and responsibilities, and their existence is reasonable. Although there is a certain overlap in the nature and functions of the two, as long as the relevant systems are improved, the independent directors and the board of supervisors can also produce good institutional joint force and improve the efficiency of internal supervision of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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