【摘要】：作為解決企業(yè)委托——代理問題的重要手段,股權(quán)激勵通過使經(jīng)營者持有公司的股份,將經(jīng)營者的個人利益與企業(yè)所有者的利益捆綁在一起,促使經(jīng)營者竭盡全力地為企業(yè)利益最大化服務(wù)。股權(quán)激勵誕生于20世紀50年代的美國,之后在西方資本市場相對成熟的國家廣泛實施,并且取得了巨大的成功。西方實踐經(jīng)驗表明股權(quán)激勵的確能夠推動公司進行價值創(chuàng)造,促進業(yè)績增長。但是,與其在國外的發(fā)展歷程相比,股權(quán)激勵真正開始在我國實施的時間不長。從1993年深圳萬科最先開始嘗試推行股權(quán)激勵到2005年《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法(試行)》的頒布,我國上市公司經(jīng)歷了一段時間的摸索期。直到2005年,中國證券市場實施了具有重要意義的股權(quán)分置改革,促使了股票市場的結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型。同年,證監(jiān)會出臺了《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法(試行)》,新修訂的《證券法》與《公司法》頒布實施。2005年之后,《國有控股上市公司(境內(nèi))實施股權(quán)激勵試行辦法》、《股權(quán)激勵有關(guān)事項備忘錄》等也陸續(xù)出臺。在一系列政策法規(guī)的推動下,阻礙中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵實施的障礙被逐一清除,上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的熱情高漲,中國的股權(quán)激勵迎來了一個蓬勃發(fā)展的“春天”。此后,理論界和實務(wù)界也對股權(quán)激勵的相關(guān)問題展開了深入的研究。但是到目前為止,對于股權(quán)激勵在我國市場環(huán)境下實施的具體效果如何,股權(quán)激勵與公司業(yè)績之間是否存在相關(guān)關(guān)系等問題,還沒有形成一個定論。因此,為了推進我們對股權(quán)激勵的全面認識,完善上市公司的股權(quán)激勵方案,本文認為非常有必要對我國股權(quán)激勵的實施效果進行系統(tǒng)、深入地研究。 基于以上目的,本文吸收了前人的研究成果,采用實證研究的方法,以國內(nèi)實施股權(quán)激勵計劃的62家公司為研究對象,對股權(quán)激勵與公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系進行實證分析。全文共分為五部分：一、引言,簡要介紹選題的理論背景、研究目的、研究意義,并且通過對國內(nèi)外股權(quán)激勵的文獻進行總結(jié)、歸納、評述,提煉出本文的研究方向和研究重點；二、股權(quán)激勵概述,主要闡述了股權(quán)激勵的概念、意義、基本模式以及股權(quán)激勵在我國實施的基本概況,為后文的理論分析做鋪墊；三、股權(quán)激勵與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系的理論分析,首先引入委托——代理理論及人力資本理論,對股權(quán)激勵制度的運行機制進行了深入地分析,然后對利益匯聚假說和掘壕自守假說進行函數(shù)分析,探析股權(quán)激勵比例與公司業(yè)績之間的相關(guān)性,最后對股票期權(quán)和限制性股票進行全方面地比較,分析二者激勵效果的差異；四、實證分析,在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了三個具體假設(shè)并建立了回歸模型,然后選取股權(quán)激勵上市公司2009年的截面數(shù)據(jù),運用SPSS統(tǒng)計軟件,采用獨立樣本T檢驗以及配對樣本T檢驗的方法,驗證股權(quán)激勵實施的整體效果,采用線性回歸的方法,分別驗證了股權(quán)激勵比例與公司業(yè)績的關(guān)系、股權(quán)激勵模式與公司業(yè)績的關(guān)系,最后得到實證結(jié)果；五、研究結(jié)論及建議,對實證結(jié)果進行解釋和分析,針對股權(quán)激勵實施過程中存在的問題,提出幾條可行性的建議。 通過上述理論研究和實證研究,得出了以下結(jié)論：(1)股權(quán)激勵的實施雖然在一定程度上促進了上市公司業(yè)績的提升,但是業(yè)績提升的幅度較小,提升效果并不顯著。這主要是由于我國資本市場有效性不足,上市公司內(nèi)部人控制的情況比較嚴重,股權(quán)激勵的考核指標不夠科學,競爭性的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場尚未建立起來,現(xiàn)行法律法規(guī)比較滯后等原因造成的。(2)股權(quán)激勵比例與公司業(yè)績呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,股權(quán)激勵比例越大,公司業(yè)績表現(xiàn)越好；(3)采用限制性股票激勵的公司其業(yè)績好于采用股票期權(quán)的公司,限制性股票的激勵效果略好于股票期權(quán)。 本文的主要創(chuàng)新點在于實證部分。以往關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵的實證論文大多選取高管層持股的上市公司作為樣本,但本文認為,由于中國的特殊國情,實行股權(quán)激勵的公司不能用高管層持股的公司來替代。因為高管層持有本公司股票的來源非常廣泛,并不一定是實施股權(quán)激勵的結(jié)果。因此,利用高管層持股的公司來分析股權(quán)激勵的實施效果,得到的結(jié)論可能有失偏頗。本文選取了推出股權(quán)激勵計劃的上市公司為研究樣本,利用股權(quán)激勵方案中高管激勵股權(quán)的比例作為自變量進行實證分析,使實證結(jié)果更加準確,更具有說服力。作者希望本文的分析及建議能夠有助于推進我們對股權(quán)激勵的全面認識,有助于完善上市公司的股權(quán)激勵方案,有助于提高公司的經(jīng)營效率,推動企業(yè)的持續(xù)、健康、穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:As an important means to solve the entrustment _ agency problem of enterprises, the incentive of equity grants the business operators to hold the shares of the company, bundle the personal interests of the operators with the interests of the owners of the enterprises, and impel the operators to make every effort to maximize the interests of the enterprises. Equity incentives were born in the 1950s in the United States, followed by the widespread implementation of Western capital markets in relatively mature countries, and great success has been achieved. Western practice shows that equity incentives can indeed drive companies to value creation and promote performance growth. However, compared with the development of foreign countries, equity incentives really start to be implemented in our country not long. China's listed companies have experienced a period of groping period since the first attempt was made in 1993 to promote the promulgation of the Stock Option Incentive Management Method (Trial)> of the Listed Company in 2005. Up to 2005, China's securities market implemented an important stock-equity reform and promoted the structural transformation of the stock market. In the same year, the CSRC promulgated the Measures for the Management of Stock Right of Listed Companies (Trial)>, the New Revision of the Securities Law and the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China. and so on. Under the promotion of a series of policies and regulations, the obstacles to the implementation of the equity incentive of listed companies in China are cleared one by one, and the enthusiasm of the listed companies to implement the equity incentive is high, and China's equity incentive has ushered in a vigorous development "Spring". After that, theoretical and practical circles have also carried out an in-depth study on the related issues of equity incentive. However, so far, it has not reached a conclusion about the specific effect of equity incentive in China's market environment, whether there is related relationship between equity incentive and equity. Therefore, in order to promote our comprehensive understanding of equity incentive and perfect the equity incentive scheme of listed companies, this paper holds that it is necessary to systematically and deeply study the effect of equity incentive in our country. Based on the above objective, this paper absorbs the previous research results, adopts the method of empirical research, takes 62 companies in domestic implementation of equity incentive plan as the research object, and carries out the real research on the relationship between the equity incentive and the stock market. The thesis is divided into five parts: one, introduction, brief introduction to the theoretical background, research purpose and research significance of the subject, and summarize, summarize and comment on the literature of the domestic and foreign equity incentive, and summarize the research direction and research focus of this paper. In this paper, the concept, significance, basic model of equity incentive and the basic general situation of equity incentive in our country are mainly discussed, and the theoretical analysis of the post-text is laid down. The theoretical analysis of the relationship between equity and incentive is first introduced into the theory of delegation _ agent and human resources. In this paper, the operating mechanism of the equity incentive system is analyzed in depth, then the function analysis is carried out on the benefit convergence hypothesis and the trench self-defense hypothesis, and the correlation between the equity incentive ratio and the stock price is analyzed, and finally the stock option and the restricted stock are all aspects. On the basis of theoretical analysis, three specific assumptions are put forward and the regression model is set up, then the cross-section data of the listed company in 2009 is selected, and the SPSS system is used to analyze the cross-section data of the listed company in 2009. By using the method of independent sample T-test and paired sample T-test, the whole effect of equity incentive implementation is verified, and the relationship between equity incentive ratio and stock price is verified by means of linear regression, and the relationship between equity incentive model and equity is finally obtained. The paper explains and analyzes the empirical results, and puts forward several feasibility in view of the problems existing in the implementation of equity incentive. Through the above theoretical research and empirical research, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) Although the implementation of the equity incentive has promoted the promotion of the listed stock market to a certain extent, the amplitude of the performance promotion is small, The promotion effect is not significant. This is mainly due to the shortage of the capital market of our country, the situation of the internal control of the listed company is serious, the appraisal index of the equity incentive is not scientific, the competitive professional manager market has not been established, the current laws and regulations are relatively stagnant (2) The proportion of equity incentive is positively related to the stock price, the larger the proportion of equity incentive is, the better the performance is, and (3) the company with restricted stock incentive is better than the company with stock option and the incentive effect of restricted stock. slightly better than stock options. The main innovation point lies in the empirical part. In the past, most of the empirical papers on equity incentive choose the listed companies with high-level holdings as samples, but this paper thinks that because of the special conditions of China, companies that carry out the equity incentive are not able to use them A company with a high-level stake is replaced. Because the high-pipe layer holds a very broad source of shares in the company's shares, it does not It is the result of carrying out the equity incentive. Therefore, using the company holding the high-pipe layer to analyze the effect of equity incentive, The conclusion may be biased. This paper has chosen the listed company which launched the equity incentive plan as the research sample, using the proportion of the high-level incentive equity in the equity incentive scheme as the independent variable, so as to make the empirical results. It is more accurate and convincing. The author hopes that the analysis and suggestion of this paper can help to promote the comprehensive understanding of the equity incentive, help perfect the equity incentive scheme of the listed company, help to improve the company's operating efficiency and promote the enterprise.
【學位授予單位】：江西財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F272;F832.51;F224

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 劉廣生;馬悅;;中國上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵的效果[J];中國軟科學;2013年07期

相關(guān)碩士學位論文 前3條

1 孫蕾;上市公司股權(quán)激勵對公司績效影響的實證研究[D];安徽大學;2012年

2 史航;中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵問題研究[D];河南大學;2012年

3 宋敘詠;我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵實施效果研究[D];財政部財政科學研究所;2012年

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本文編號：2284575

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