本文選題：公司治理 + 監(jiān)事會�。� 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國《公司法》自制定以來，公司內(nèi)部機關(guān)的設(shè)計，采決策權(quán)、執(zhí)行權(quán)與監(jiān)督權(quán)三權(quán)分立的精神。以股東會為公司最高意思機關(guān)，其下再分設(shè)董事會和監(jiān)事會以分掌公司的業(yè)務(wù)執(zhí)行權(quán)及監(jiān)察權(quán)。長久以來我國公司股權(quán)多由少數(shù)人所掌控，再加上公司法就董事和監(jiān)事的選任的規(guī)定不完善，造成大股東不僅控制了董事的選任，甚至監(jiān)事也要依附于大股東的勢力，才能夠當(dāng)選。因而造成長久以來為人所詬病的“監(jiān)事不監(jiān)視”的現(xiàn)象，究其根本原因在于我國公司監(jiān)事會獨立性的缺失。 權(quán)利的制衡與監(jiān)督是公司治理的基本原則，監(jiān)事會制度是實現(xiàn)權(quán)利制衡的重要制度安排。我國《公司法》規(guī)定監(jiān)事會為公司內(nèi)設(shè)監(jiān)督機構(gòu)，自《公司法》頒布實施以來，監(jiān)事會制度運行狀況并不盡如人意。面對這種情況，獨立董事和外部監(jiān)事的制度設(shè)計是否應(yīng)當(dāng)引入到我國的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中引發(fā)了學(xué)者的討論，各方眾說紛紜。在這種趨勢下，認(rèn)真梳理和檢討我國監(jiān)事會制度是十分必要的。眾所周知，，監(jiān)督機制是維護(hù)公司健康和穩(wěn)定運作的重要保障，監(jiān)督又要求效率與成本之間的優(yōu)化平衡，綜合觀之，監(jiān)事會制度在有效的監(jiān)督公司的經(jīng)營行為和控制監(jiān)督的成本，以達(dá)到有效地監(jiān)督與合理的管理成本之間的平衡方面發(fā)揮著重要作用。 本文擬從我國公司監(jiān)事會制度的運行現(xiàn)狀切入，企圖找出目前我國公司監(jiān)事會形同虛設(shè)的癥結(jié)所在，認(rèn)為由于法律與制度設(shè)計上的原因，使得現(xiàn)行公司的組織構(gòu)架與公司監(jiān)事會的獨立性出現(xiàn)了問題。然而，無論獨立董事制度亦或者外部監(jiān)事制度，外部性是形式，獨立性才是其根本性質(zhì)。因而，與其引入外部監(jiān)事與獨立董事制度造成公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)控機構(gòu)疊床架屋的不效率，引發(fā)公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)控權(quán)限的混淆，影響公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)控的實效性。不如，從我國公司監(jiān)事會制度運行的現(xiàn)實問題入手，分析我國公司監(jiān)事會缺乏獨立性的深層次原因，找出解決我國公司監(jiān)事會獨立性缺失問題的方法對策，將其在法律制度層面加以規(guī)定以保障其執(zhí)行實施。 由此觀之，完善我國公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)控制度，應(yīng)該從強化我國公司監(jiān)事會的獨立性著手，使監(jiān)事會獨立發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的職能。本文正是從我國公司監(jiān)事會制度運行的現(xiàn)實狀況入手，來分析我國公司監(jiān)事會獨立性缺失的原因，針對監(jiān)事會獨立性缺失的原因提出相應(yīng)的解決辦法，同時借鑒獨立監(jiān)事及獨立董事等制度，在制度設(shè)計中如何保持其獨立性的可取之處,從而就如何保障我國公司監(jiān)事會的獨立性提出一些法律層面的具體建議。 希望本文對我國公司監(jiān)事會獨立性缺失問題的現(xiàn)狀有一個較為清晰的勾勒，為如何制定完善的保障監(jiān)事會獨立性的法律規(guī)范做出一點有益的探索，從而使我國公司監(jiān)事會更好的發(fā)揮其職能，以利于現(xiàn)代公司治理制度的發(fā)展與完善。
[Abstract]:Since the company law was established in our country, the design of the internal organs of the company adopts the spirit of separation of the three powers of decision making, execution and supervision. The shareholders' meeting shall be the supreme body of the company, and the board of directors and the board of supervisors shall be set up under the board of directors and the board of supervisors to administer the company's business execution and supervision powers. For a long time, the stock rights of companies in our country were mostly controlled by a few people, and the provisions of the Company Law on the selection and appointment of directors and supervisors were not perfect, resulting in the majority shareholders not only controlling the selection and appointment of directors, but even supervisors depending on the influence of major shareholders. To be elected. Therefore, the phenomenon of "supervisor not monitoring", which has been criticized for a long time, lies in the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country. The balance and supervision of rights is the basic principle of corporate governance, and the system of board of supervisors is an important institutional arrangement to realize the balance of rights. The company law of our country stipulates that the board of supervisors shall set up the supervisory organization for the company. Since the promulgation and implementation of the company law, the system of the board of supervisors is not satisfactory. Faced with this situation, whether the system design of independent directors and external supervisors should be introduced into the corporate governance structure of our country has aroused the discussion of scholars. Under this trend, it is very necessary to comb and review the system of board of supervisors in our country. As we all know, the supervision mechanism is an important guarantee to maintain the health and stability of the company. Supervision requires an optimal balance between efficiency and cost. In a comprehensive view, the board of supervisors system can effectively supervise the company's business behavior and control the cost of supervision. It plays an important role in achieving the balance between effective supervision and reasonable management costs. This paper tries to find out the crux of our company's board of supervisors from the point of view of the current operating situation of the board of supervisors system in our country, and thinks that due to the reasons of legal and institutional design, The organizational structure of the current company and the independence of the board of supervisors appear problems. However, whether the independent director system or the external supervisor system, externality is the form, independence is its fundamental nature. Therefore, instead of introducing the system of external supervisors and independent directors, it causes the inefficiency of the overlapping structure of the internal monitoring organizations of the company, and causes confusion of the authority of the internal monitoring of the company, which affects the effectiveness of the internal monitoring of the company. Starting with the practical problems in the operation of the board of supervisors system in our country, this paper analyzes the deep-seated reasons for the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country, and finds out the countermeasures to solve the problem of the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country. It is regulated at the level of the legal system to guarantee its enforcement. Therefore, to perfect the internal supervision system of our company, we should start with strengthening the independence of the board of supervisors of our company, and make the board of supervisors play its proper function independently. This paper analyzes the reasons for the lack of independence of the board of supervisors in our country, and puts forward corresponding solutions to the reasons for the lack of independence of the board of supervisors, starting with the actual situation of the running of the board of supervisors system in our country. At the same time, draw lessons from the independent supervisor and independent director system, how to maintain its independence in the system design, and put forward some specific suggestions on how to protect the independence of the board of supervisors in our country. I hope this paper has a clear outline of the lack of the independence of the board of supervisors in our country, and make some useful exploration for how to establish the perfect legal norms to guarantee the independence of the board of supervisors. In order to make our company board of supervisors better play its functions, in order to facilitate the development and improvement of modern corporate governance system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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本文編號：1974777