本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 管理層�。� 參考：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)告訴我們,股權(quán)激勵(lì)是解決現(xiàn)代公司委托代理問題的一種行之有效的長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制。股權(quán)激勵(lì)已經(jīng)成為美國(guó)、日本等發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家上市公司吸引人才、留住人才、促進(jìn)公司長(zhǎng)期可持續(xù)發(fā)展的重要措施,同時(shí)也為這些發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家創(chuàng)造了無(wú)數(shù)財(cái)富。 我國(guó)在20世紀(jì)90年代就開始研究管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題,但我國(guó)的特殊制度背景一直制約著股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的施行。從2005年5月股權(quán)分置改革開始全面推行,繼而《公司法》、《證券法》的修訂,到2006年《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法(試行)》等股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)操作法規(guī)相繼出臺(tái),這些規(guī)范和法律政策逐漸清除了阻礙我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制實(shí)施的障礙,使得我國(guó)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)進(jìn)入實(shí)際可操作階段。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì),自2006年初正式實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)開始至2010年底已經(jīng)有200多家上市公司推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃草案,同時(shí)我國(guó)上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)問題也越來(lái)越受到實(shí)務(wù)界、理論界和監(jiān)管層的關(guān)注。 本文采用規(guī)范研究和案例研究相結(jié)合的研究方法,主要內(nèi)容如下：第一部分主要講述本文的研究背景與意義,國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,本文的邏輯框架以及研究方法。第二部分介紹股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)概念、基本要素,并詳細(xì)分析我國(guó)常用的幾種股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式,比較它們的特點(diǎn)及適用的公司。重點(diǎn)講述了委托代理理論、人力資本產(chǎn)權(quán)理論、現(xiàn)代企業(yè)契約理論三大理論,為下文我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的研究分析做好理論上的鋪墊。第三部分選取2006-2010年我國(guó)上市公司公布的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃草案為研究對(duì)象,首先從行業(yè)分布、最終控制人性質(zhì)、公司規(guī)模等方面分析我國(guó)上市公司的特征,然后分析股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案各要素存在的特征。第四部分對(duì)光明乳業(yè)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃進(jìn)行全面、系統(tǒng)分析和評(píng)價(jià),包括股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施背景分析及股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案要素分析評(píng)價(jià)。第五部分根據(jù)第三部分統(tǒng)計(jì)分析的特征,對(duì)比光明乳業(yè)成功案例,總結(jié)出我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)存在的問題,主要有：股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式單一化、缺乏完善的業(yè)績(jī)考核指標(biāo)體系、行權(quán)價(jià)格設(shè)置過(guò)低等問題。第六部分針對(duì)我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施中存在的問題,結(jié)合我國(guó)實(shí)際情況提出完善我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的對(duì)策建議。第七部分是結(jié)論,總結(jié)本文的研究成果,指出研究局限和進(jìn)一步研究方向。 本文通過(guò)對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)存在問題的分析和建議,有助于企業(yè)根據(jù)自己公司的實(shí)際情況設(shè)計(jì)恰當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)方案,豐富和完善我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度,促進(jìn)我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效實(shí)施。 本文創(chuàng)新之處：第一,國(guó)內(nèi)股權(quán)激勵(lì)數(shù)據(jù)都是2010年之前的,且沒有全面分析公司特征和方案特征。本文全面、系統(tǒng)研究了2006-2010年我國(guó)公布股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃草案的全部上市公司的特征和方案各要素特征,為股權(quán)激勵(lì)今后的研究提供參考；第二,采用規(guī)范研究和案例研究相結(jié)合的方法,對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)踐具有一定的指導(dǎo)意義；第三,針對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司現(xiàn)階段股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案設(shè)計(jì)存在的問題,提出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策及建議。
[Abstract]:The practical experience of the developed countries in the West tells us that equity incentive is an effective long-term incentive mechanism to solve the problem of modern company principal-agent. Equity incentive has become an important measure to attract talents, retain talents and promote the sustainable development of the company for a long period of time. The developed countries have created countless wealth.
In 1990s, China began to study the problem of equity incentive in management, but the special system background of China has been restricting the implementation of equity incentive mechanism. From the reform of the share division reform in May 2005, it began to carry out comprehensively, followed by the company law, the revision of the securities law, and the equity incentive management method (Trial) in 2006, and so on. These regulations and legal policies have gradually cleared up obstacles to the implementation of equity incentive mechanism in China's listed companies and made the equity incentive in our country enter the practical operation stage. According to statistics, more than 200 listed companies have launched their shares since the beginning of 2006. The draft of incentive plan has been increasingly concerned by the practical circles, theorists and regulators in China's listed companies.
The main contents of this paper are as follows: the first part is mainly about the background and significance of the research, the current situation at home and abroad, the logical framework of this paper and the research methods. The second part introduces the related concepts and basic elements of equity incentive, and analyzes in detail several common ways in China. Equity incentive model, comparing their characteristics and applicable companies, focusing on the principal-agent theory, human capital property rights theory, modern enterprise contract theory three theories, the theoretical paving for the research and analysis of China's equity incentive below. The third part selects the equity incentive plan published by Listed Companies in China for 2006-2010 years. The draft is the research object. First, the characteristics of the listed companies in China are analyzed from the distribution of industry, the nature of the final controller and the scale of the company. Then the characteristics of the various elements of the equity incentive plan are analyzed. The fourth part is a comprehensive and systematic analysis and evaluation of the equity incentive plan of the bright dairy industry, including the background analysis of the implementation of equity incentive and the implementation of the equity incentive plan. The fifth part, according to the characteristics of the statistical analysis of the third part, compares the success cases of the bright dairy industry, and summarizes the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme for the listed companies in China, which are mainly: the simplification of the mode of equity incentive, the lack of a perfect performance appraisal index system, and the low setting of the right price. The sixth part, in view of the problems existing in the implementation of China's equity incentive, combined with the actual situation in China, proposed the countermeasures and suggestions to improve the equity incentive mechanism of Listed Companies in our country. The seventh part is the conclusion, summarizes the research results of this paper, and points out the limitations and further research direction of the research.
Through the analysis and suggestion of the problems in the design of the equity incentive scheme for the management of the listed companies in China, this paper will help the enterprise to design the appropriate incentive plan according to the actual situation of its own company, enrich and perfect the equity incentive system in our country, and promote the effective implementation of the equity incentive of the listed companies in our country.
The innovation of this article: first, the domestic equity incentive data are all before 2010, and do not fully analyze the characteristics of the company and the characteristics of the scheme. This paper systematically studies the characteristics of all listed companies in the 2006-2010 year announcement of the draft equity incentive plan in China and the characteristics of the various elements of the scheme, so as to provide reference for the future research on equity incentive. Second, the method of combining normative research and case study has a certain guiding significance to the practice of equity incentive. Third, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward in view of the problems existing in the design of equity incentive scheme at the present stage of China's listed companies.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6

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