本文選題：高管薪金薪酬 + 管理層持股��； 參考：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：自公司出現(xiàn)以來，委托代理關(guān)系這一問題一直都是理論界和實務(wù)界的難題，資產(chǎn)的所有者將其擁有的資產(chǎn)委托給經(jīng)營者管理，但是所有權(quán)還是在所有者的手中，，經(jīng)營者在委托人給定的授權(quán)范圍之內(nèi)對企業(yè)的資產(chǎn)行使占有、支配和使用的權(quán)力。股東是企業(yè)所有權(quán)的擁有者，他不僅享有剩余索取權(quán)，同時也承擔(dān)著相應(yīng)風(fēng)險，他們所關(guān)心的是企業(yè)價值的最大化；但對于擁有經(jīng)營權(quán)的管理人員，掌握企業(yè)資產(chǎn)的控制權(quán)，他們所關(guān)心的是自身效用的最大化。這時就需要有一種中間的力量來緩解兩者之間的矛盾。管理層的激勵就是解決這一矛盾的關(guān)鍵因素，薪酬激勵和股權(quán)的激勵是上市公司管理者最主要的兩種激勵方式。 1999年我國國有企業(yè)開始管理者激勵的改革，實行經(jīng)營管理者收入與企業(yè)的經(jīng)營業(yè)績掛鉤、試行管理者年薪制、持有股權(quán)等。2005年9月股權(quán)分置改革方案的實施和啟動，使得我國上市公司因股權(quán)激勵制度產(chǎn)生的同股不同權(quán)、同股不同利的弊端得以解決，2006年新修訂的《公司法》、《證券法》在企業(yè)資本制度、回購公司股票、企業(yè)高級管理人員在任職期間內(nèi)轉(zhuǎn)讓股票等方面均有所突破，從而使我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵實施的法律障礙得以消除，為我國上市公司高管股權(quán)激勵帶來美好前景。高管持股能夠改善委托代理關(guān)系，激勵企業(yè)的經(jīng)營者，進(jìn)而提高公司的整體業(yè)績。 本文從我國上市公司高管激勵制度的激勵效果方面，利用相關(guān)分析、回歸分析檢驗高管薪金薪酬、高管持股與高管變更的關(guān)系,研究結(jié)果表明，高管持股與高管變更顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，高管薪金薪酬與高管變更負(fù)相關(guān)，且高管人員持股對高管變更的激勵效果顯著強(qiáng)于薪金薪酬激勵，表明高管股權(quán)激勵在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中發(fā)揮著越來越重要的激勵作用。
[Abstract]:Since the emergence of the company, the problem of principal-agent relationship has always been a difficult problem in the theoretical and practical circles. The owner of the asset entrusts its assets to the manager for management, but the ownership is still in the hands of the owner. The operator exercises the power of possession, domination and use of the assets of the enterprise within the scope of authorization given by the principal. The shareholder is the owner of the enterprise ownership, he not only has the residual claim right, but also bears the corresponding risk. What they are concerned about is the maximization of the enterprise value, but for the managers who have the management right, they have the control right of the enterprise assets. What they care about is the maximization of their own utility. At this point, there needs to be a middle force to ease the conflict between the two. The incentive of management is the key factor to solve this contradiction. Compensation incentive and equity incentive are the two most important incentives for managers of listed companies. In 1999, China's state-owned enterprises began to reform the incentive of managers, implementing the link between the income of managers and the business performance of enterprises, trying out the annual salary system of managers, holding equity shares, etc. In September 2005, the implementation and initiation of the reform scheme of split share structure was carried out. In order to solve the problems of different rights and interests of the same shares and different interests of the listed companies due to the stock incentive system, the newly revised Company Law in 2006, the Securities Law, in the enterprise capital system, repurchase the shares of the company. The senior managers of enterprises have made some breakthroughs in the transfer of stocks during their term of office, thus removing the legal barriers to the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies in our country, and bringing a bright prospect for the equity incentive of senior executives of listed companies in our country. Executive ownership can improve the principal-agent relationship, stimulate the managers, and then improve the overall performance of the company. This paper uses correlation analysis and regression analysis to test the relationship between executive salary compensation, executive stock ownership and executive change from the aspect of incentive effect of executive incentive system of listed companies in China. Executive stock ownership and executive change significantly negative correlation, executive pay and executive change negative correlation, and executive stock ownership on executive change incentive effect is significantly stronger than salary incentive. It shows that executive equity incentive plays a more and more important role in modern enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F224

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