淺析基層法院如何實(shí)現(xiàn)審判獨(dú)立
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-22 08:37
【摘要】：最高人民法院前院長(zhǎng)肖揚(yáng)同志曾經(jīng)在最高法院的工作報(bào)告中指出：人民法院受理的案件80%在基層,80%的法官和其他工作人員也在基層。基層法院是中國(guó)人民司法體制的基礎(chǔ),是實(shí)現(xiàn)公民合法權(quán)益的前沿,也是保障全社會(huì)實(shí)現(xiàn)公平和正義的基石,基層法院司法制度運(yùn)行情況直接決定著中國(guó)法院體制的品質(zhì)。 司法獨(dú)立的原則在我國(guó)的憲政制度上得到了確認(rèn),但理論上的確認(rèn)并不等于實(shí)踐上的遵從。司法獨(dú)立原則在我國(guó)的司法實(shí)踐中受到了來自于外部的種種壓力,這種壓力在基層法院尤其明顯,在我國(guó)基層法院的司法活動(dòng)中出現(xiàn)了地方化、行政化等問題,其突出表現(xiàn)在法院與地方黨委、政府、人大等機(jī)關(guān)的關(guān)系中。致使法院在行使司法權(quán)的過程中過度強(qiáng)調(diào)主動(dòng)服務(wù)而忽略了司法本身所具有的被動(dòng)屬性。因此從基層法院的執(zhí)法環(huán)境出發(fā)研究司法獨(dú)立的相關(guān)內(nèi)容具有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。筆者試圖通過對(duì)基層法院司法獨(dú)立制度運(yùn)行現(xiàn)狀的調(diào)查研究,運(yùn)用實(shí)證分析法,以揭示出中國(guó)法院目前存在的有礙司法獨(dú)立的普遍問題,從而提出促進(jìn)我國(guó)司法獨(dú)立制度發(fā)展的有效措施。司法獨(dú)立在我國(guó)有廣義狹義之分,本文所指的司法獨(dú)立僅限于法院的審判獨(dú)立。 本文主要從以下三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行論述： 第一,審判獨(dú)立理論的起源與發(fā)展。本部分從審判獨(dú)立理論的歷史發(fā)展角度出發(fā),對(duì)司法獨(dú)立原則理論的起源與發(fā)展、傳入我國(guó)后對(duì)封建司法制度的影響以及新中國(guó)成立后在憲政體制下司法獨(dú)立理論的發(fā)展?fàn)顩r進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的闡述。 第二,我國(guó)基層法院審判獨(dú)立的現(xiàn)狀。本部分主要從我國(guó)審判權(quán)受到外界的種種束縛,獨(dú)立行使審判權(quán)時(shí)受到外部掣肘出發(fā),進(jìn)行調(diào)查研究,認(rèn)真剖析司法獨(dú)立所面臨的來自人大、黨委、政府、媒體以及法院內(nèi)部等各方面的壓力,從這些干預(yù)所依據(jù)的法律作為突破,深刻剖析處于權(quán)力金字塔底端的基層法院獨(dú)立行使審判權(quán)所面臨的種種壓力。 第三,基層法院審判獨(dú)立的改革構(gòu)想。根據(jù)第二部分所指出的種種困難,在充分考慮我國(guó)司法機(jī)關(guān)憲政地位的基礎(chǔ)上,分別從基層法院與地方黨委,與人大,與政府,與傳媒、以及上級(jí)法院、法院內(nèi)設(shè)機(jī)構(gòu)的關(guān)系出發(fā),詳細(xì)論述如何在堅(jiān)持我國(guó)憲政的根本原則下,找到破除困境的有效途徑,使司法獨(dú)立達(dá)到至少最低限度的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。明確了在中國(guó)特殊的國(guó)情下,司法不僅僅是一個(gè)司法問題,還是一個(gè)政治問題。這就決定了中國(guó)構(gòu)建健全的司法獨(dú)立是一個(gè)龐大的社會(huì)系統(tǒng)工程,必須完善司法獨(dú)立所要求的執(zhí)法環(huán)境和條件。
[Abstract]:Comrade Xiao Yang, former president of the Supreme people's Court, once pointed out in a report on the work of the Supreme Court that 80% of the cases accepted by the people's Court are also at the grassroots level. The basic courts are the basis of the Chinese people's judicial system, the frontier of realizing the citizens' legitimate rights and interests, and the cornerstone of ensuring the fairness and justice of the whole society. The operation of the grass-roots courts' judicial system directly determines the quality of the Chinese court system. The principle of judicial independence has been confirmed in the constitutional system of our country, but the confirmation in theory is not equal to the compliance in practice. In the judicial practice of our country, the principle of judicial independence has been subjected to various kinds of external pressure, which is especially obvious in the grass-roots courts. In our country, the judicial activities of the grass-roots courts have appeared localization, administrative problems, and so on. Its outstanding performance is in the court and the local party committee, the government, the people's Congress and so on organ relations. In the process of exercising judicial power, the court overemphasizes the active service and neglects the passive attribute of the judicature itself. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the relevant contents of judicial independence from the law enforcement environment of grass-roots courts. The author attempts to investigate the current situation of the judicial independence system of the grass-roots courts and use the empirical analysis method to reveal the common problems that hinder the judicial independence in Chinese courts at present. Therefore, the effective measures to promote the development of judicial independence system in China are put forward. Judicial independence is divided into broad sense and narrow sense in our country. This paper mainly discusses the following three aspects: first, the origin and development of the theory of judicial independence. In this part, from the perspective of the historical development of the theory of judicial independence, the origin and development of the theory of the principle of judicial independence are discussed. After being introduced into our country, the influence on the feudal judicial system and the development of the theory of judicial independence under the constitutional system after the founding of New China were expounded in detail. Second, the status quo of the trial independence of our country's basic level courts. This part mainly starts from the outside restraints on the judicial power of our country, from the external constraints in the independent exercise of judicial power, carries out investigations and studies, and seriously analyzes the judicial independence that comes from the people's Congress, party committees, and governments. From the breakthrough of the law on which the intervention is based, the pressure from the media and inside the court is deeply analyzed that the grassroots courts at the bottom of the pyramid of power are faced with the pressure of exercising their judicial power independently. Third, the reform conception of the trial independence of the basic level court. According to the difficulties pointed out in the second part, on the basis of fully considering the constitutional status of the judicial organs in our country, the grassroots courts and the local party committees, the people's congresses, the government, the media, and the higher courts, Starting from the relationship between the internal organs of the court, this paper discusses in detail how to find an effective way to break down the predicament and make the judicial independence reach the minimum standard under the fundamental principle of constitutional government in our country. In China's special situation, justice is not only a judicial issue, but also a political issue. This determines that it is a huge social system engineering for China to build a sound judicial independence, and it is necessary to perfect the law enforcement environment and conditions required by judicial independence.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D926.2
本文編號(hào)：2196571
[Abstract]:Comrade Xiao Yang, former president of the Supreme people's Court, once pointed out in a report on the work of the Supreme Court that 80% of the cases accepted by the people's Court are also at the grassroots level. The basic courts are the basis of the Chinese people's judicial system, the frontier of realizing the citizens' legitimate rights and interests, and the cornerstone of ensuring the fairness and justice of the whole society. The operation of the grass-roots courts' judicial system directly determines the quality of the Chinese court system. The principle of judicial independence has been confirmed in the constitutional system of our country, but the confirmation in theory is not equal to the compliance in practice. In the judicial practice of our country, the principle of judicial independence has been subjected to various kinds of external pressure, which is especially obvious in the grass-roots courts. In our country, the judicial activities of the grass-roots courts have appeared localization, administrative problems, and so on. Its outstanding performance is in the court and the local party committee, the government, the people's Congress and so on organ relations. In the process of exercising judicial power, the court overemphasizes the active service and neglects the passive attribute of the judicature itself. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the relevant contents of judicial independence from the law enforcement environment of grass-roots courts. The author attempts to investigate the current situation of the judicial independence system of the grass-roots courts and use the empirical analysis method to reveal the common problems that hinder the judicial independence in Chinese courts at present. Therefore, the effective measures to promote the development of judicial independence system in China are put forward. Judicial independence is divided into broad sense and narrow sense in our country. This paper mainly discusses the following three aspects: first, the origin and development of the theory of judicial independence. In this part, from the perspective of the historical development of the theory of judicial independence, the origin and development of the theory of the principle of judicial independence are discussed. After being introduced into our country, the influence on the feudal judicial system and the development of the theory of judicial independence under the constitutional system after the founding of New China were expounded in detail. Second, the status quo of the trial independence of our country's basic level courts. This part mainly starts from the outside restraints on the judicial power of our country, from the external constraints in the independent exercise of judicial power, carries out investigations and studies, and seriously analyzes the judicial independence that comes from the people's Congress, party committees, and governments. From the breakthrough of the law on which the intervention is based, the pressure from the media and inside the court is deeply analyzed that the grassroots courts at the bottom of the pyramid of power are faced with the pressure of exercising their judicial power independently. Third, the reform conception of the trial independence of the basic level court. According to the difficulties pointed out in the second part, on the basis of fully considering the constitutional status of the judicial organs in our country, the grassroots courts and the local party committees, the people's congresses, the government, the media, and the higher courts, Starting from the relationship between the internal organs of the court, this paper discusses in detail how to find an effective way to break down the predicament and make the judicial independence reach the minimum standard under the fundamental principle of constitutional government in our country. In China's special situation, justice is not only a judicial issue, but also a political issue. This determines that it is a huge social system engineering for China to build a sound judicial independence, and it is necessary to perfect the law enforcement environment and conditions required by judicial independence.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D926.2
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 謝麗琴;英國(guó)司法獨(dú)立發(fā)展歷程的啟示[J];常熟理工學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2005年01期
2 王德志;以保障法官獨(dú)立為核心推進(jìn)司法改革[J];法商研究(中南政法學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào));1999年01期
3 汪建成,孫遠(yuǎn);論司法的權(quán)威與權(quán)威的司法[J];法學(xué)評(píng)論;2001年04期
4 馬嶺;從《監(jiān)督法》(草案)引出的思考和建議[J];法學(xué);2003年01期
5 葉太東;何吉莉;;媒體監(jiān)督與司法獨(dú)立的沖突和協(xié)調(diào)略談[J];法制與社會(huì);2009年36期
6 王芳,潘運(yùn)軍;論我國(guó)憲政體制下的司法獨(dú)立[J];甘肅行政學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2005年02期
7 葉嘵川;宋艷輝;葉樂鋒;;專制主義與中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)法律文化[J];石家莊經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2005年05期
8 李富金;基層法院的司法管理體制改革[J];華東政法學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2005年01期
9 胡志斌;;合理配置基層法院法官資源的探討[J];海南大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(人文社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2010年04期
10 廖永安;關(guān)于錯(cuò)案責(zé)任追究制度的反思[J];江蘇社會(huì)科學(xué);1999年03期
，本文編號(hào)：2196571
本文鏈接：http://www.sikaile.net/falvlunwen/gongjianfalunwen/2196571.html
最近更新
教材專著
