發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-16 16:21

  本文選題：法制利益 + 效用與均衡分析��； 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2009年博士論文

【摘要】： 中國(guó)改革開(kāi)放之后，利益格局和利益結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)生了改變，使得利益分化和利益沖突日益激烈，社會(huì)因?yàn)橹贫劝才诺牟缓侠砀冻隽藷o(wú)效率的成本支出。而法律作為制度控制的基本手段，在利益整合中具有獨(dú)特的優(yōu)勢(shì)，如何通過(guò)法律制度途徑去尋找實(shí)現(xiàn)利益整合的手段和機(jī)制，解決利益沖突，使各個(gè)利益群體的利益訴求都得以在服從中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)大局的前提下得以實(shí)現(xiàn)，共同分享改革發(fā)展的成果，通過(guò)合理的法律安排實(shí)現(xiàn)有效的法制利益，從而使經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)的發(fā)展出現(xiàn)生機(jī)勃勃、富有效率的局面，是中國(guó)建設(shè)一個(gè)流動(dòng)暢通、利益協(xié)調(diào)、保障有力的社會(huì)主義和諧社會(huì)亟待解決的問(wèn)題。 本文主要針對(duì)法制利益提出構(gòu)建和諧社會(huì)的理論建議，以法制和利益作為研究對(duì)象，研究法制如何通過(guò)制度安排來(lái)合理分配利益資源的機(jī)制和運(yùn)行程序。從中國(guó)的現(xiàn)實(shí)形勢(shì)來(lái)看，通過(guò)有效的法律制度安排來(lái)容納和規(guī)范不同利益主體的利益表達(dá)和利益博弈，是解決中國(guó)現(xiàn)在的利益矛盾的重要手段�；诖�，文章建立了一個(gè)法制利益理論，采用經(jīng)濟(jì)理論的研究方法來(lái)分析法制利益的理論框架，采用抽象分析(效用論部分)與數(shù)理分析(成本收益函數(shù)部分)相結(jié)合、規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合、比較研究與綜合研究相結(jié)合、靜態(tài)分析與動(dòng)態(tài)分析(演化)相結(jié)合以及機(jī)制分析和博弈分析方法等，，對(duì)法制利益的實(shí)現(xiàn)和法制利益解決中國(guó)當(dāng)前矛盾利益機(jī)制調(diào)整的發(fā)生過(guò)程都做了深刻探討，尋找能夠使得一個(gè)國(guó)家通過(guò)改善其法律制度來(lái)提高所提供的服務(wù)質(zhì)量以獲取收益的路徑，試圖得到政府改革法律體系和司法以促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和社會(huì)發(fā)展的方法，并且找出“合意的”法律秩序的建立方式和方法，以及取得在現(xiàn)代的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中發(fā)揮主要作用的機(jī)制效益，希冀能夠在一定程度上對(duì)中國(guó)構(gòu)建和諧社會(huì)中的立法觀念和法制安排合理性提供有益的建議。 文章首先界定與論述了法制利益，它是從利益體系中剝離出來(lái)的、可以以法定形式存在并得以實(shí)現(xiàn)的利益。然后對(duì)法制利益的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行了研究，主要對(duì)馬克思主義有關(guān)法和利益的理論以及西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界和法學(xué)界有關(guān)法和利益的理論進(jìn)行分別闡述。分析篇中利用了效用理論與均衡分析作為法制利益理論的規(guī)范性分析，得出了法律制度就猶如商品市場(chǎng)中的價(jià)格信號(hào)，是社會(huì)生活中多重利益主體理性博弈的均衡浮標(biāo)的結(jié)論，而社會(huì)賦予的權(quán)利的豐富程度是與法律制度的嚴(yán)苛程度呈正方向相關(guān)。接著對(duì)法制利益的形成機(jī)制分析、影響機(jī)制分析和運(yùn)行機(jī)制進(jìn)行了分析，并提出了評(píng)估該機(jī)制效益的方法，主要可以通過(guò)實(shí)證評(píng)價(jià)法和法制效益評(píng)估的定量評(píng)價(jià)法來(lái)進(jìn)行。在研究了法制成本投入之后，主要針對(duì)立法程序中各個(gè)利益主體之間的博弈進(jìn)行了分析，將演化博弈論應(yīng)用于制度形成之中，分析了大陸法系與英美法系的法律體系。實(shí)例分析法制利益是以中國(guó)房屋拆遷制度為考察對(duì)象，利用法制利益論分析房屋拆遷各方的利益和訴求，提出中國(guó)現(xiàn)行房屋拆遷立法的途徑�，F(xiàn)實(shí)篇中對(duì)中國(guó)的法制利益進(jìn)行了現(xiàn)狀分析和相關(guān)分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)和法律指標(biāo)之間存在著顯著的線性正相關(guān)的關(guān)系，接著找出了中國(guó)法制利益現(xiàn)實(shí)模式中存在的問(wèn)題，并最終提出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策，提出了通過(guò)法制利益的協(xié)調(diào)與整合來(lái)構(gòu)建社會(huì)主義和諧社會(huì)的措施。
[Abstract]:After China's reform and opening to the outside world, the interests structure and interest structure have changed, making the benefit differentiation and the conflict of interest increasingly fierce. The society has paid the inefficiency cost expenditure because of the unreasonable system arrangement. As the basic means of the system control, the law has the unique advantage in the benefit integration and how to pass the legal system way. To find the means and mechanism to realize the benefit integration, solve the conflict of interests, make the interests of each interest group be realized under the premise of the overall situation of China's economic construction, share the results of the reform and development together, and realize the effective legal interests through reasonable legal arrangements, so that the development of the economy and society will emerge. A vibrant and efficient situation is an urgent problem for China to build a harmonious socialist society with a smooth flow of interests and coordination of interests.
This article mainly aims at the theoretical suggestion of building a Harmonious Society for the benefit of the legal system. Taking the legal system and the interests as the research object, this paper studies how the legal system can rationally allocate the mechanism and operation procedure of the benefit resources through the system arrangement. From the reality of China, the effective legal system arrangement is used to accommodate and standardize the different interests. The interest expression and interest game are the important means to solve the present contradiction of China's interests. Based on this, the article establishes a theory of legal interests, uses the research method of economic theory to analyze the theoretical framework of the legal interests, and combines the abstract analysis (utility theory) with the numerical analysis (cost income function part) to standardize the research. Combining with empirical research, combining comparative study with comprehensive research, combining static analysis with dynamic analysis (Evolution), mechanism analysis and game analysis, this paper has made a deep discussion on the realization of legal interests and the process of legal interests to solve the process of adjustment of China's current contradiction interest mechanism. By improving the legal system to improve the quality of service provided to gain the way to gain income, it tries to get the way for the government to reform the legal system and the judiciary to promote economic growth and social development, and to find out the ways and means of establishing a "consensual" legal order, as well as to play a major role in the modern market economy. The effectiveness of the mechanism is expected to provide some useful suggestions to a certain extent for China's legislation and legal system in building a harmonious society.
The article first defines and expounds the interests of the legal system, which is stripped from the system of interests and can be realized in legal form and can be realized. Then it studies the related theories of legal interests, mainly on the theory of Marx's law and interest, the law and interest of western economics and law. By using the utility theory and the equilibrium analysis as the normative analysis of the legal interests theory, the paper draws the conclusion that the legal system is like the price signal in the commodity market. It is the conclusion of the equilibrium buoy in the rational game of the multiple stakeholders in the social life, and the rich degree of the rights given by the society is the law. The strict degree of the system is positively related. Then, the analysis of the mechanism analysis and the mechanism of the influence mechanism are analyzed, and the methods to evaluate the benefit of the mechanism are put forward, which can be carried out mainly through the empirical evaluation method and the quantitative evaluation method of the legal benefit evaluation. After the study of the cost of the legal system, the main method is studied. According to the analysis of the game between the various stakeholders in the legislative process, the evolutionary game theory is applied to the formation of the system and the legal system of the continental law system and the Anglo American law system is analyzed. In reality, the current situation analysis and analysis of China's legal interests are carried out, and there is a significant linear and positive correlation between the social economic indicators and the legal indicators, and then the problems in the realistic model of China's legal interests are found out, and the corresponding results are finally put forward. And puts forward the measures to build a harmonious socialist society through the coordination and integration of legal interests.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：D920.4

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 法麗娜;法制利益論[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2009年

本文編號(hào)：1897564