本文選題：弗蘭克 + 盧埃林��； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2011年博士論文

【摘要】：美國(guó)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)對(duì)美國(guó)法律思想和法律實(shí)踐的發(fā)展具有重要意義,至今仍然是美國(guó)法學(xué)界最關(guān)注的問(wèn)題之一。弗蘭克和盧埃林是最具典型性的代表人物,是法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的激進(jìn)派和溫和派,盡管?chē)?guó)內(nèi)關(guān)于法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)、弗蘭克與盧埃林法律思想的研究日趨豐富,但缺乏系統(tǒng)化的研究,即使專(zhuān)門(mén)化的研究作品也存在存在諸多曲解、誤解。筆者力圖全面系統(tǒng)地研究弗蘭克、盧埃林的法律思想,并通過(guò)比較研究揭示揭示法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的歷史意義,指出實(shí)際上是圍繞羅斯福新政展開(kāi)的,是法律界的凱恩斯主義。筆者分五章進(jìn)行具體闡述： 第一章,“弗蘭克、盧埃林與美國(guó)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)”。本文以龐德與盧埃林、弗蘭克的“論戰(zhàn)”為線索探尋什么是法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng),展開(kāi)其特殊的時(shí)代背景,最后比較分析弗蘭克和盧埃林的個(gè)人經(jīng)歷以及思想淵源。龐德與盧埃林、弗蘭克的論戰(zhàn)拉開(kāi)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的帷幕,本文將指出盧埃林與龐德的思想在很多方面具有一致性,他們之間的“論戰(zhàn)”是商談性的；而弗蘭克與龐德之間則更多的是思想批判。這不僅可以澄清許多學(xué)者對(duì)“論戰(zhàn)”性質(zhì)的誤解、展現(xiàn)論戰(zhàn)的真實(shí)面目,而且把龐德、盧埃林、弗蘭克對(duì)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的觀點(diǎn)清晰化,為后文進(jìn)一步闡述奠定基礎(chǔ)。美國(guó)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)是特定時(shí)代的產(chǎn)物,本文以聯(lián)邦最高法院的判例為線索闡述這個(gè)時(shí)代背景,不僅因?yàn)樽罡叻ㄔ旱呐袥Q集中反應(yīng)社會(huì)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)的根本性矛盾,是社會(huì)背景最好的縮略圖,而且法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)致力于揭示司法過(guò)程的真相,本文以現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者的視角觀察判決背后的社會(huì)背景。弗蘭克和盧埃林的不同個(gè)人經(jīng)歷在一定程度上決定了他們的法律思想,決定了弗蘭克的政治家視角和盧埃林的學(xué)者視角。盡管弗蘭克和盧埃林共同分享早期實(shí)用主義的法律思想,但弗蘭克更推崇霍姆斯,而盧埃林則推崇卡多佐；在研究方法的選擇上,弗蘭克偏好心理學(xué)方法,而盧埃林強(qiáng)調(diào)社會(huì)學(xué)方法。對(duì)弗蘭克和盧埃林思想淵源的比較可以部分展現(xiàn)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的思想背景。 第二章,“弗蘭克的事實(shí)懷疑論與盧埃林的規(guī)則懷疑論比較”。弗蘭克和盧埃林同屬于法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng),共同分享對(duì)法律形式主義的批判態(tài)度,但批判的方法、內(nèi)容、結(jié)論等方面都不相同。弗蘭克以心理學(xué)的方法戳穿形式主義的基本法律神話,而盧埃林以語(yǔ)言學(xué)的方法證明規(guī)則存在彈性的操作空間。弗蘭克把法律與具體判決相聯(lián)系,而盧埃林強(qiáng)調(diào)從形式主義的規(guī)則中心轉(zhuǎn)向行為中心。弗蘭克認(rèn)為初審過(guò)程充滿法官、證人、律師、陪審團(tuán)的主觀性因素,導(dǎo)致了初審事實(shí)的不確定性,但盧埃林認(rèn)為弗蘭克夸大了主觀偏見(jiàn)的影響,盡管法律形式主義的確定性是虛假的,但通過(guò)研究實(shí)際的司法過(guò)程仍然可以預(yù)測(cè)判決結(jié)果。弗蘭克的事實(shí)懷疑論以初審法院為中心,認(rèn)為初審法院是司法系統(tǒng)的核心,而盧埃林的規(guī)則懷疑論則以上訴法院為中心,并非盧埃林忽視了初審法院的重要作用,而是盧埃林認(rèn)為法院的主要功能不是解決具體糾紛,而是通過(guò)創(chuàng)造法律規(guī)則參與制度改革。而弗蘭克認(rèn)為具體案件公正解決才是司法公正的根本目標(biāo),從始至終弗蘭克都是一位徹底的事實(shí)懷疑論者,不存在由事實(shí)懷疑論向規(guī)則懷疑論的轉(zhuǎn)向。教育思想是弗蘭克與盧埃林法律思想的重要組成部分,批判蘭德?tīng)柕膫鹘y(tǒng)法律教育模式也是法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的任務(wù)之一。弗蘭克把拯救司法公正的希望寄托在法律教育的改革上,建議通過(guò)增加心理學(xué)課程、參與實(shí)際的庭審過(guò)程(特別是初審?fù)?、學(xué)生在具有律師經(jīng)驗(yàn)的教師帶領(lǐng)下實(shí)際辦理案件等措施培養(yǎng)更加合格的初審法官,從而在初審事實(shí)的認(rèn)定上更加逼近客觀案件事實(shí),但這些措施并未真正影響美國(guó)的法律教育模式。盧埃林作為職業(yè)的法律教育者,早期即參與了哥倫比亞的課程改革,并且出版買(mǎi)賣(mài)法的教材貫徹執(zhí)行其法律教育的思想,與弗蘭克不同,盧埃林法律教育的目標(biāo)是培養(yǎng)優(yōu)秀的律師,他們不是僅僅為當(dāng)事人服務(wù)的“訟棍”,而是熟悉社會(huì)背景、對(duì)正當(dāng)?shù)纳鐣?huì)需求及其敏感、具有正義感和理性的律師,他們對(duì)法官作出公正判決的提供最有力的幫助。 第三章,“弗蘭克與盧埃林思想體系比較”。弗蘭克和盧埃林對(duì)法律形式主義的批判不是孤立的,而是從屬于他們的思想體系。弗蘭克的法律思想只是其思想體系的一部分,從本質(zhì)上說(shuō)弗蘭克是一位出色的政治家,弗蘭克指出美國(guó)應(yīng)當(dāng)采取獨(dú)立發(fā)展的國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)政策,孤立歐洲,重視提高國(guó)內(nèi)購(gòu)買(mǎi)能力,在思想上反對(duì)一切決定論,他從政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、哲學(xué)等方面闡述維持和完善美國(guó)民主市場(chǎng)制度的重要性,法律思想是實(shí)現(xiàn)這一政治理想的工具。盧埃林的法律思想是一個(gè)完整的樹(shù)狀結(jié)構(gòu),可以按照時(shí)間順序劃分為三個(gè)部分,即現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的批判思想、法律社會(huì)學(xué)思想、關(guān)于上訴司法過(guò)程的實(shí)用主義思想,這三個(gè)部分是有機(jī)聯(lián)系的,法律社會(huì)學(xué)思想和實(shí)用主義思想是對(duì)法律形式主義批判的繼續(xù),而批判是后期思想建構(gòu)的前提,整體性理論是宏大風(fēng)格理論的社會(huì)學(xué)部分。四十年代盧埃林與他的學(xué)生霍貝爾合作法人類(lèi)學(xué)著作,盧埃林承擔(dān)理論建構(gòu)的任務(wù),建立了既適用于現(xiàn)代社會(huì)又適用于初民社會(huì)的法律職能理論,希望能夠超越韋伯建構(gòu)的理想模型,建立以整體性理論為核心的法律社會(huì)學(xué)。盡管盧埃林的法社會(huì)學(xué)理論模型沒(méi)有最終完成,但不能忽視他對(duì)法律社會(huì)學(xué)做出的重要貢獻(xiàn)。五十年代以后盧埃林把焦點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到法理學(xué)上,隨著法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的階段性勝利,律師界產(chǎn)生了對(duì)上訴司法過(guò)程的信任危機(jī),盧埃林以宏大風(fēng)格的“可估量性”救治這種恐懼�！镀胀ǚ▊鹘y(tǒng)》是盧埃林法律思想的集大成,體現(xiàn)了盧埃林的實(shí)用主義法律思想。弗蘭克與盧埃林思想體系的差異最終體現(xiàn)在法律訴求的不同上,弗蘭克以個(gè)案正義追求法律面前人人平等的理想,從而保證美國(guó)民主制度的千秋萬(wàn)代,而盧埃林則希望法律制度實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)生活的和諧秩序,尋求法律人如何理解社會(huì)、團(tuán)體成員如何在法律的保護(hù)下實(shí)現(xiàn)自治的途徑。 第四章,“弗蘭克與盧埃林的法律實(shí)踐比較”。弗蘭克作為美國(guó)第二巡回上訴法院的法官,其判決意見(jiàn)和異議意見(jiàn)也是體現(xiàn)其法律思想的重要載體,研究表明盡管弗蘭克在法律思想上屬于激進(jìn)派,但在司法實(shí)踐中卻是嚴(yán)格的保守派,甚至淪為其所反對(duì)的法律形式主義者。而即使弗蘭克掌握了精神分析的方法,也并不能控制他對(duì)共產(chǎn)主義者的偏見(jiàn),側(cè)面證明了其教育改革建議的失敗。盧埃林也并非單純的學(xué)者,通過(guò)主持起草《統(tǒng)一商法典》把他的法律思想付諸實(shí)踐,盡管由于商人陪審團(tuán)設(shè)置的撤銷(xiāo)而使其理論構(gòu)想部分受挫,但商法典的整體框架仍然保留了盧埃林的最初設(shè)計(jì),仍然滲透著盧埃林的個(gè)人氣質(zhì)。無(wú)論是弗蘭克還是盧埃林都是羅斯福新政的支持者,他們的思想都是為了建立更加健康的經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)秩序。最后分析了弗蘭克與盧埃林法律思想和實(shí)踐異同的原因,盡管這些原因在前面的論述中都有涉及,但集中明確地提出來(lái)有助于加深理解。 第五章,“美國(guó)法律思想史背景下的弗蘭克與盧埃林”,探討弗蘭克、盧埃林與早期實(shí)用主義、批判法學(xué)、新現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的關(guān)系,在美國(guó)法律思想史的背景下研究弗蘭克、盧埃林以及美國(guó)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的影響。法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)與早期實(shí)用主義法學(xué)分享相同的哲學(xué)基礎(chǔ),弗蘭克是霍姆斯的信徒,盧埃林十分推崇卡多佐,但通過(guò)對(duì)他們的思想和實(shí)踐進(jìn)行具體分析,可以表明盧埃林才是真正的實(shí)用主義者,而弗蘭克僅僅是法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的邊緣人物。二十世紀(jì)四五年代以后,美國(guó)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的思想獲得了廣泛肯定,在某種程度上說(shuō)二十世紀(jì)的法理學(xué)流派都受到他們的影響,我們都是法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者了,但六七十年代興起的法律和社會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)、批判法學(xué)運(yùn)動(dòng)更具有代表性,他們繼承了法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)的不同方面。美國(guó)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)在三個(gè)方面取得成功：打破法律形式主義的確定性神話、倡導(dǎo)交叉學(xué)科的法學(xué)研究、強(qiáng)調(diào)法律和政治的聯(lián)系。四五十年代以后,法律的不確定性作為共識(shí)被廣泛接受,幾乎沒(méi)有人再相信規(guī)則的邏輯推理能夠得出判決。法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)把交叉學(xué)科研究推向繁盛,弗蘭克以心理學(xué)方法分析法律現(xiàn)象,盧埃林更偏好社會(huì)學(xué)／人類(lèi)學(xué)的方法,新現(xiàn)實(shí)主義(即法律與社會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng))繼承了法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的這個(gè)方面,致力于完全中立客觀地研究法律的描述性方面。盧埃林指出法律淵源不僅包括規(guī)則和原則,還包括政策,政治悄悄進(jìn)入盧埃林的法律思想當(dāng)中,而弗蘭克的法律思想服務(wù)于其政治理想,美國(guó)法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)是羅斯福新政的法律變革思想,批判法學(xué)繼承了法律現(xiàn)實(shí)主義運(yùn)動(dòng)關(guān)于法律的政治性方面,指出法律是政治制度的工具,目的是為了保護(hù)資本主義的市場(chǎng)和民主,其中預(yù)設(shè)了階級(jí)之間的不平等和激烈矛盾。
[Abstract]:The American Legal Realism Movement is of great significance to the development of legal thought and legal practice in the United States. It is still one of the most important issues in the legal circle of the United States. Frank and Llewellyn are the most typical representative figures, the radicals and the warm schools of the Legal Realism Movement, despite the domestic movement of legal realism, The research of Frank and Llewellyn's legal thought is becoming more and more abundant, but it lacks systematic research. Even the specialized research works have many misunderstandings and misunderstandings. The author tries to comprehensively and systematically study the legal thoughts of Frank and Llewellyn, and reveals the historical significance of revealing the movement of legal realism through comparative study and points out that it is true. It is based on the new deal of Roosevelt and is the Keynes doctrine of the legal profession. The author is divided into five chapters:
The first chapter, "Frank, Llewellyn and the American Legal Realism Movement". This article, taking Pound and Llewellyn, Frank's "debate" as clues to explore what is the Legal Realism Movement, launches its special background, and finally compares Frank and Llewellyn's personal experience and ideological origin. The argument of Ke's debate opens the curtain of the Legal Realism Movement. This article will point out that Llewellyn's and Pound's ideas are consistent in many aspects. The "debate" between them is negotiable, while Frank and Pound are more ideological critiques. This can not only be a misunderstanding of the nature of the "controversy" by many of Cheng Qingxu's scholars. The true face of the war, and the clarity of Pound, Llewellyn, Frank's views on the Legal Realism Movement, laid the foundation for further elaboration. The American Legal Realism Movement is the product of a specific era. This article expounds the background of the times with the precedent of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic, not only because of the Supreme Court's judgment set. The fundamental contradiction in the social and political economy is the best thumbnail in the social background, and the Legal Realism Movement is devoted to revealing the truth of the judicial process. This article looks at the social background behind the verdict in the perspective of the realist. The different experiences of Frank and Llewellyn determine their law to a certain extent. Thinking, it determines Frank's statesman perspective and Llewellyn's scholar's perspective. Although Frank and Llewellyn share the legal ideas of early pragmatism, Frank is more admired and Llewellyn admired Cardoso. In the choice of research methods, it prefers the psychological method and emphasizes the sociological side. The comparison of the ideological origins of Frank and Llewellyn can partly reveal the ideological background of the Legal Realism Movement.
The second chapter, "Frank's factual skepticism is compared with Llewellyn's rule skepticism". Frank and Llewellyn belong to the Legal Realism Movement, sharing the critical attitude of the legal formalism, but the critical methods, contents and conclusions are different. Frank pierced the formalistic basic law by means of psychology. Law mythology, and Llewellyn proves the elastic operating space of rules in linguistic methods. Frank links law with specific judgments, while Llewellyn emphasizes the transition from the center of formalism to the center of behavior. Frank believes that the initial trial process is full of the subjective factors of judges, witnesses, lawyers and jurors, leading to the fact of the first trial. But Llewellyn believes that Frank exaggerates the influence of subjective prejudice. Although the determinism of legal formalism is false, it can still predict the outcome of the judgment through the study of the actual judicial process. Frank's fact skepticism centered on the court of first instance and thinks that the court of first instance is the core of the judicial system and Llewellyn The rule skepticism is the center of the court of appeal, not Llewellyn neglects the important role of the court of first instance, but Llewellyn believes that the main function of the court is not to solve specific disputes, but to participate in the reform of the system through the creation of legal rules. And Frank believes that a fair solution to a specific case is the fundamental goal of judicial justice, from the beginning to the end. Frank is a thorough factual skeptic, and there is no change from the fact skepticism to the rule of doubt. Educational thought is an important part of Frank and Llewellyn's legal thought. It is also one of the tasks of the Legal Realism Movement to criticize the traditional legal education model of Randall. Frank is to save the justice of justice. On the basis of the reform of legal education, it is suggested that by adding psychological courses and participating in the actual trial process (especially the trial of the first trial), the students can cultivate more qualified first instance judges in the case of actual handling cases under the guidance of the teachers with the lawyers' experience, so that the facts of the first instance are closer to the facts of the objective cases, but the fact is closer to the facts of the objective case, but this is the same as that of the facts of the case. Some measures did not really affect the American legal education model. As a professional legal educator, Llewellyn took part in the curriculum reform in Columbia early, and published the teaching material for the sale law to carry out the thought of legal education. Unlike Frank, Llewellyn's legal education aims to cultivate excellent lawyers, they are not only the only ones. The "litigant" only serves the parties, but is a lawyer who is familiar with the social background, the legitimate social needs and their sensitivities, with a sense of justice and rationality, and they provide the most powerful help to the judge to make a fair judgment.
The third chapter, "comparison of the ideological system of Frank and Llewellyn". Frank and Llewellyn's criticism of legal formalism is not isolated, but from their ideological system. Frank's legal thought is only part of its ideological system. In essence, Frank is an excellent politician, Frank points out that the United States should Taking the independent development of national economic policy, isolating Europe, paying more attention to improving domestic purchasing power and opposing all determinism in ideology, he expounded the importance of maintaining and perfecting the American democratic market system from political, economic and philosophical aspects. Legal thought is a tool to realize this ideal of political governance. Llewellyn's legal thought is a whole. The tree structure can be divided into three parts in chronological order, namely, the critical thought of realism, the thought of legal sociology, and the pragmatism thought of the appeals judicial process. The three parts are connected organically. The legal sociology and pragmatism are the continuation of the critique of the legal formalism, and the criticism is the later thought. To construct the premise, the holistic theory is the sociological part of the grand style theory. In 40s, Llewellyn and his student Hobel co operated the work of legal anthropology, Llewellyn took on the task of constructing the theory, and established the legal function theory which is applicable to both modern society and the early people society, hoping to surpass Webb's ideal of construction. The model is the legal sociology at the core of the holistic theory. Although the theoretical model of Llewellyn's Sociology of law has not been finished, he can not ignore his important contribution to the sociology of law. After 50s, Llewellyn shifted the focus to the jurisprudence, and with the phased victory of the legal realism, the lawyer circles produced The crisis of trust in the appeals judicial process, Llewellyn treated this fear with the grand style of "measurability". < ordinary law tradition > is the aggregation of Llewellyn's legal thought. It embodies Llewellyn's pragmatism legal thought. The difference between Frank and Llewellyn's ideological system is finally reflected in the difference of legal demands, Frank is a one. The justice of the case seeks the ideal of equality before the law, thus ensuring the democratic system of the United States for thousands of generations, while Llewellyn wants the legal system to realize the harmonious order of social life, to seek how the legal man understands the society and how the members of the group realize the autonomy under the protection of the law.
The fourth chapter, "comparison of the legal practice between Frank and Llewellyn". Frank, as the judge of the second circuit court of appeals of the United States, his judgment and dissenting opinion is also an important carrier of his legal thought. The study shows that although Frank is a radical in legal thought, it is a strict conservative in judicial practice. Even if Frank grasped the method of psychoanalysis, it could not control his prejudice against the Communists, and the side proved the failure of his educational reform proposal. Llewellyn was not a simple scholar, and through the drafting of the unified commercial code, he put his legal ideas into practice, though As a result of the withdrawal of the merchant jury setting, its theoretical conception was partly frustrated, but the overall framework of the commercial code still retained Llewellyn's original design and still permeated Llewellyn's personal temperament. Both Frank and Llewellyn were supporters of Roosevelt's new deal to build a healthier economy. Social order. Finally, the reasons for the similarities and differences between Frank and Llewellyn's legal thoughts and practices are analyzed. Although these reasons are all involved in the previous discussion, it is helpful to deepen the understanding.
The fifth chapter, "Frank and Llewellyn in the background of the history of American legal thought", explores the relationship between Frank, Llewellyn and early pragmatism, critical jurisprudence and Neo realism, and studies the influence of Frank, Llewellyn and American legal realism in the background of the history of American legal thought. The movement of legal realism and the early reality Sharing the same philosophical basis with the doctrine of doctrine of doctrine, Frank is a disciple of Holmes, and Llewellyn highly esteems Cardoso, but through a specific analysis of their thoughts and practices, it can be shown that Llewellyn is the real pragmatist, and Frank is only the marginal figure of the Legal Realism Movement. In the four or five twentieth Century In the future, the thought of the American legal realism has been widely affirmed. To some extent, the jurisprudential schools of the twentieth Century have been influenced by them. We are all legal realists, but the law and social movement, which rose in 60s and 70s, are more representative of the critical law movement, and they inherit the legal realist. Different aspects of the movement of justice. The American Legal Realism Movement has achieved success in three aspects: breaking the deterministic myth of legal formalism, advocating the law research of interdisciplinary, emphasizing the legal and political connections. After 40s and 50s, the uncertainty of the law was widely accepted as consensus, and almost no one believed the rules. Logical reasoning can draw a judgment. The Legal Realism Movement has pushed the cross subject research into prosperity. Frank analyses the legal phenomena by psychological methods. Llewellyn prefers the sociological / anthropological method, and the Neo Realism (Law and social movement) inherits the legal realism and is committed to completely neutral and objective. Llewellyn points out that the source of law not only includes rules and principles, but also includes policies, politics quietly enters Llewellyn's legal thought, and Frank's legal thought serves its political ideal. The American Legal Realism Movement is the legal reform thought of Roosevelt's new deal, and the critical law inherits the law. On the political aspect of law, the movement of law realism points out that law is a tool for political system. The aim is to protect the market and democracy of capitalism, which presupposes the inequality and intense contradiction between classes.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D90

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本文編號(hào)：1968487